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Abstract v
Model based system engineering for safety of railway critical systems
Abstract
Development and application of formal languages are a long-standing challenge within the computer sci-
ence domain. One particular challenge is the acceptance of industry. Although many successful stories have
demonstrated the applicability of formal methods to industrial practice, their use within industry is still lim-
ited. This thesis presents some model-based methodologies for modelling and verification of the French rail-
way interlocking systems (RIS), which aims to use formal methods to eﬀectively ensure railway traﬃc safety.
This thesis mainly addresses two issues. The first one is the modellization of interlocking system by
coloured Petri nets (CPNs). Next, a generic and compact modelling framework is introduced, in which the
interlocking rules are modelled in a hierarchical structure while the railway layout is modelled in a geographi-
cal perspective. Then, a modelling pattern is presented. It is a parameterized model which respects the French
national rules. It is a general reusable solution that can be applied in diﬀerent stations. Then, an event-based
concept is brought into the modelling process of low level part of RIS to have better description of internal
interactions of low level relay-based interlocking logic.
The second issue is the transformation of coloured Petri nets into B machines, which can assist designers
on the way from analysis to implementation. A mechanism describing the multi-sets and their behaviours in
B machines is introduced to allow the following systematic translations. Firstly, a detailed mapping method-
ology from non-hierarchical CPNs to abstract B machine notations is presented. Then the hierarchy and the
transition priority of CPNs are successively integrated into the mapping process, in order to enrich the adapt-
ability of the transformation. This transformation is compatible with various types of colour sets and the
transformed Bmachines can be automatically proved by Atelier B.
All these works at diﬀerent levels contribute towards a global safe analysis framework.
Keywords: railway interlocking system, discrete event systems, CPN, modelling methodology
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Résumé
Le développement et l’application des langages formels sont un défi à long terme pour la science informa-
tique. Un enjeu particulier est l’acceptation par l’industrie. Malgré des succès industriels avérés, la dissémina-
tion des méthodes formelles dans la pratique industrielle ferroviaire est encore limitée. Cette thèse présente
une approche pour la modélisation et la vérification des postes d’aiguillage français, qui utilise les méthodes
formelles pour assurer eﬃcacement la sécurité ferroviaire.
Cette thèse se concentre sur deux questions. La première est la modélisation du système d’enclenchement
par les réseaux de Petri colorés (RdPC). Un cadre de modélisation générique et compact est introduit, dans le-
quel les règles d’enclenchement sont modélisées dans une structure hiérarchique, tandis que les installations
sont modélisées dans une perspective géographique. Ensuite, un patron de modèle est présenté. C’est un mo-
dèle paramétré qui intègre les règles nationales françaises. C’est une solution générale et réutilisable qui peut
être appliquée pour diﬀérentes gares. Puis, un concept basé sur l’événement est présenté dans le processus
de modélisation des parties basses des postes d’aiguillage. Ce dernier fournit une meilleure description des
interactions internes de la logique d’enclenchement à relais.
La deuxième question est la transformation des RdPCs en machines B, qui va aider les concepteurs sur la
route de l’analyse à application. Des mécanismes décrivant les multi-ensembles et leurs comportements dans
les machines B sont introduits. Il permettent la transformation systématique. Tout d’abord, une méthodologie
détaillée, s’appuyant sur une table de correspondance, du RdPCs non-hiérarchiques vers les notations B est
présentée. Ensuite, la hiérarchie et la priorité des transitions du RdPC sont successivement intégrées dans le
processus de mapping, afin d’enrichir les possibilités de types de modèles en entrées de la transformation.
Cette transformation est compatible avec diﬀérents types d’ensemble de couleurs, et la structure des machines
B produites par la transformation permet la preuve automatique intégrale par l’Atelier B.
L’ensemble de ces travaux , chacun à leur niveau, contribuent à renforcer l’eﬃcacité d’un cadre global
d’analyse sécuritaire.
Mots clés : système d’enclenchement ferroviaire, systèmes à événements discrets, RdPC, méthode
de modélisation
IFSTTAR, COSYS/ESTAS
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General introduction
Preamble
This doctoral dissertation presents a synthesis of research work, which was carried out as
a fruit of my Ph.D. work (2012-2015) in the ESTAS1 laboratory of the COSYS2 department
in the IFSTTAR3 (Lille) research institute, under the supervision of Prof. Simon COLLART-
DUTILLEUL and Philipe BON. This work was made possible through the co-financing of
CSC4 and ANR5. In fact, my Ph.D. work took place in the PERFECT6 national level project.
Moreover, this project is also supported by the French i-Trans7 cluster that is financed by
Université Lille Nord de France, RFF8, SNCF9, Alstom.
With the research background of Prof. Simon COLLART-DUTILLEUL in railway safety
requirements engineering (RE) and the previous work of Philipe BON in model-driven engi-
neering (MDE), the research presented in this thesis contributes to the model based system
engineering for safety of railway critical systems. The intention of this research is to provide
some new approaches to eﬀectively ensure railway traﬃc safety.
Motivation
Single European Railway Area
The organisation of railway traﬃc, the governance of railway principles and standards use to
be a national matter. The signalisations and systems have been validated at the national level
where each country has its own “language” for railway and its own requirements for man-
aging trains on its network. With the development of the railway electrification, trains are
1Évaluation des Systèmes de Transports Automatisés et de leur Sécurité (Evaluation of Automated Trans-
port Systems and Their Safety Laboratory )
2COmposants et SYStèmes (Composants and Systems )
3Institut Français des Sciences et Technologies des Transports, de l’aménagement et des Réseaux (French
Institute of Science and Technology for Transport, Spatial Planning, Development and Networks )
4China Scholarship Council
5Agence Nationale de la Recherche (French National Research Agency )
6Performing Enhanced Rail Formal Engineering Constraints Traceability
7Pôle de compétitivité i-Trans
8Réseau Ferré de France (French Rail Network )
9Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français (French National Railway Company )
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increasingly dependent on train control system. So far, there are over 20 kinds of signalling
and speed control systems throughout the European Union. Every system is autonomous
and non-interoperable with the others, so that each train used by a national railway com-
pany has to be equipped with at least one on-board system but sometimes more, just to be
able to run safely within that one country. Meanwhile, the trains run in several countries
have to carry all the on-board systems of these countries, which requests additional integra-
tion eﬀort for engineering, increases the total costs for border-crossing traﬃc, and reduces
the performance of rail transport. For example, the “Thalys”, a high-speed railway between
Paris, Brussels, Cologne and Amsterdam, is equipped with 7 diﬀerent types of train con-
trol systems, which causes considerable costs. All these constrains restrain competition and
impede the integration of the railway transport at a European level vis-a-vis road and air
transport, which have benefited from the absence of such barriers.
With the frequent economic and cultural exchanges among the European Union, there
is a growing demand for international rail traﬃc. Also, the high speed railways have the
quality to shorten the travel time for international journeys. To put an end to such a seg-
mentation situation, and to promote the European rail market for passengers and freight,
a packet of solutions has been launched by the European Union to remove the technical
barriers that were created historically by the development of the national railways. This
innovation relates to the technical and operational harmonisation, called the interoperabil-
ity fo the high speed network and the conventional network. Meanwhile, the European
signalling system ERTMS (European Rail Traﬃc Management System) has been the subject
of a merger of several research projects, in order to create a new generation of signalling
and speed control systems. The main objective of these projects is to have a common, har-
monised, and standardised management of rail traﬃc and signalling in Europe in order to
have a seamless network at the European level. ERTMS functions are located partly on the
ground and partly on board, in this way, the communications between the ground and trains
are standardised. This brand new standard is easier to apply in the new lines, where way-
side signalling cost is kept to a minimum, but all the vehicle fleets that operate on these
lines must be equipped with the ERTMS on-board system. However, for existing lines, there
is an alternative “Mixed operation” solution. This is a strategy where the wayside signalling
is equipped with both ERTMS and conventional systems. Normally, the conventional one
is the legacy line used during the upgrade program. The main reasons for applying such
a mixed solution are: financial and organisational constraints make it impossible to install
ERTMS in the whole network in a short time. In addition, not every train has to go across
the border line, and ERTMS-equipped trains sometimes have to run on the conventional
lines. Most national companies prefer to gradually deploy the ERTMS in order to replace
the conventional systems with a unified European system.
Every conventional signalling system is the result of historical evolution, which was
boosted by progressively technological development and lessons of accidents. Generally,
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its safety is ensured by engineering experiences, rather than by systematic methodology
and their evaluations. So far, there has not been a lot of engineering experience of ERTMS,
which means it is impossible to evaluate the new system in the traditional way. Meanwhile,
the management of railway signalling in ERTMS is based on local rules pertaining to each
country and not on global ones, which makes it diﬃcult to evaluate the combined system in
terms of safety. In order to ensure the safety of ERTMS deployment, any implementations
before being put into use should have detailed verification and validation (V&V), especially
the compatibility of ERTMS and conventional signalling standards. This V&V is related to
a set of rules, technical and operational conditions which ensure that the essential safety
requirements are met. So some new methodologies which are more systematic and formal
need to be adopted. Thus, the strong motivation of my research aims at contributing to the
validation and implementation of ERTMS.
Railway interlocking system
Normally, locomotives and the rolling stock weigh tons, and are hundreds of meters long,
in the distributed environment, under multiple control. These facts mean the trains are
always at risk of collision. Because they are running on fixed track, trains are not capable of
steering away from another conflicting train as road vehicle do to avoid collision. Another
reason is the train needs a quiet long distance for to fully stop, even further than the driver’s
sight distance. So, in the case of obstacles on railway track, the train cannot stop in time to
avoid collision. To avoid collision and other conflicts there is a mechanism called railway
interlocking system (RIS), which is a highly safe and environmentally critical system. Its
malfunctioning could cause death or serious injury to people, large scale environmental
damage or considerable economical loss. For example, the “Zouﬀtgen train collision”[BEA-
TT and AET 2009], which occurred in October 2006, is an RIS accident that was related
to human failure. This accident caused 6 death, 2 serious injuries and 14 minor injuries.
The organization of the accident response needed around 100 militias, 150 firefighters, 50
emergency vehicles and 7 vehicle extrication units.
Thanks to the usage of computers in safety-critical systems (SCSs), which has increased
the concerns about the safety in railways, and successively reduced the number of accidents
between 2006 and 2013 (data source from UIC10 Safety Database Report 2014 [UIC-ETF
2014]). However many of these concerns have been focused on the software component
of the computer based complex systems. Normally, the software itself can non cause an
accident, but it becomes safety critical when it is used to control potentially dangerous sys-
tems. Formal methods, which are based on mathematical foundation, can be applied for
modelling such systems giving an increased confidence. According to the European com-
10UIC (International Union of Railways french: Union Internationale des Chemins de fer) is an interna-
tional rail transport industry body.
4 General introduction
mittee of Electro technical standardization [EN 50128 2011], the use of formal methods in
the development of safety-critical and computer-controlled systems for railway applications
is recommended.
Based on the above discussion, it was realized that the specification and analysis of rail-
way RIS is an important part of the deployment of ERTMS. Moreover, the critical and com-
plicated nature of railway safety properties obliged us to adopt the formal method for the
RIS more rapidly. Thus, my main research approach and case studies are based on the RIS,
using formal methods.
Problematic
This thesis is in the domain of safety requirement engineering in railways and more specif-
ically around the usage of formal methods to assess and validate certain SCSs. It also dis-
cusses the approach of specification and modelling of complex systems. Undoubtedly, the
increasing complexity of automated systems that are applied in the railway industry intro-
duces in an increasing diﬃculty in assessing their structural and behavioural properties. We
are interested in a large part of the design process, from the formalisation of requirements
to integration, validation and verification.
Our research objects can be characterised as following:
• A privileged application domain: the safe and eﬃcient operation of railway transport
networks under certain signal standards.
• Scientific and technical foundation: Models and formal methods, taking into account
the model transformations.
• A methodological context: the development of methods and tools for assisting the
design of complex systems.
The aim of the ERTMS is to create an interoperable railway system within Europe in or-
der to increase its own competitiveness. However, as a signalling system, its most important
responsibility is to maintain transportation safety. During the implementation of ERTMS,
evaluation of the global consistency is needed. Evaluation verifies the consistency between
the conventional system and the ERTMS-equipped system, with regard to safety. This issue
is crucial and yet it has scarcely been covered by scientific literature. In fact, the diﬃculty
of this problem is the lack of formal representations of both system, which could enable the
validation of diﬀerent aspects through test scenarios.
In order to maintain high-level safety with deterministic scope, a project, called “PER-
FECT”, was launched to develop the safety specification and verification of French rail-
way interlocking systems in the context of national rules and the influence of implement-
ing ERTMS laws on the original systems [Bon, Collart-Dutilleul, and Sun 2013; Collart-
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Dutilleul et al. 2014; Sun, Collart-Dutilleul, and Bon 2014]. My Ph.D. project is the low-
level part and the fundamental phase of the project. It focuses on the formal validation
approach of the French railway RIS based on the computer-controlled relay-based system.
The study aims to provide a methodology for a comprehensive assessment of the consis-
tency of the following two aspects: the operating rules of local signalling systems and the
additional safety requirements (ERTMS).
With this method, we are able to follow the safety analysis: The safety assessment of new
systems, the analysis of given scenarios, the evaluation of safety requirements of system up-
dates. After this method is recognized by railway experts, we will develop the method in an
automatic methodological tool easily applied in practice. Then, we will provide a method-
ology for translations between the exclusive model train and classical Petri net model. This
will allow us the opportunity to apply our research results in actual practice.
Contribution
As discussed above, the overall aim in this thesis is to show and explore the hypothesis
that the formal languages can improve the quality with system design and verification in
railway industry. The primary result of this thesis is a systematic design methodology for
modelling and safety verification of the French railway interlocking system (RIS). It provides
a theoretical framework, including system specification and safety requirement verification
by model checking and theorem proving.
The work that has been performed in this thesis can be split into two main results:
Formal modelization of railway interlocking system: The first result of the thesis is to
provide a modelling framework allowing one to specify a RIS, formulated as hierarchical
coloured Petri net (HCPN) models, for simulating and verification of their behaviours. In
this framework, the Petri net’s “place-transition” structures delineate the construction of the
fixed installations and the signalling rules of interlocking control. The dynamic behaviours,
such as signal commands and train movements, are represented by firing transitions and
tokens.
On the practical side, each station or yard along a railway line has its own interlocking
system, which respects the same national standard but has a diﬀerent facility formation. In
order to eﬀectively accomplish the validation tasks and reduce the error probability, we in-
troduce a modelling pattern based on the framework for diﬀerent railway layouts. This pat-
tern is a parametrized model that respects the French national rules (in this thesis, wemeans
the signalling rules of relay-based computer-controlled systems). It is a general reusable so-
lution to this kind of problem and can be used in many diﬀerent given contexts.
The low-level part of the RIS — the relay-based logic, has a nature of concurrency. It is a
mechanism that does not exist in the Petri net language. To solve this problem, we introduce
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an event-based mechanism to simulate a relative concurrency, in order to be able to describe
the internal interaction between each relay. Comparing to the original system, this mecha-
nism brings “internal” states which will enlarge the system state space. To compensate for
this deficiency, we apply a reduction policy, both before and after the state space calculation,
to obtain a new compact graph with the same reliability for analysis.
Model transformation from coloured Petri net to B machines: Since the formalism of
Petri nets has the advantage of communicating and their models could be validated by some
engineering experts, it is still a long distance from the final implementation. The second
result of this thesis is to bridge the gap between the specifications and the implementations.
As the B method oﬀers a formal software development, this thesis introduces a systematic
process of mapping coloured Petri nets (CPNs) formalism into B language formalism. The
transformed B machines will be the input of the B development process and could be au-
tomatically refined into the implementable codes. Moreover, considering the limitations of
model checking, sometimes we want to apply a theorem-proving for the purpose of verifica-
tion. As the B proved models are considered “safe” in French industry, the transformation
from Petri net to Bmachine is needed by any means necessary.
In this transformation framework, we improved the mechanism of multi-set behaviours
based on the work [Bon and Dutilleul 2013], so that the transformed machines can be au-
tomatically proved by Atelier B tool. Besides, we propose some mapping rules for diﬀerent
colour sets, in favour of raising the compatibility.
In order to enrich the adaptability of the transformation, the concept of hierarchy is
integrated into the mapping process. A multi-system that is modelled in a hierarchical
way can be translated into a set of abstract B machines. The hierarchy is expressed by the
composition relations of the machines and the accessible operations. Then, the concept of
prioritized transition is introduced into the transformation. It is achieved by giving each
operation a priority and adding an operation to the machine for priority management. It
maintains the same priority mechanism of as in Petri nets.
All these above works aims to contribute towards a global safe analysis framework.
Outline
This thesis is divided into 3 parts (6 chapters in total). The brief description of each chapter
is as followed:
Part I
Chapter 1. Background: This chapter aims to present and locate the scientific background
of this thesis. It provides an overview of the related fields which are based on the formal
solution of modelling complex safety-critical systems. The first part of this chapter gives
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a general introduction on concept and development of four disciplines, including systems
engineering, safety-critical system, formal languages. In the rest of this chapter, some previ-
ous research and applications about formal method for safety-critical system in the railway
domain are reviewed.
Chapter 2. Some Principles of railway safety: This chapter describes and formalises some
major safety properties and the control logic of railway signalling system. For this purpose,
an analysis has been performed step by step, which is organized around the safety nature
of the signalling based railway system. Firstly, a particular concept of safety has been ex-
plained. Based on that, the background of safety management in France is introduced, and
the problematic of the computer-controlled system is discussed. Next, the context and the
characteristics of the railway are stated. Then, the composition structure of the railway
system is stated. Major components, such as human actors, signalling procedures and in-
stallations are introduced. Further, the common risk form signalling system is summarized.
Finally, the French railway interlocking system is introduced, including the general archi-
tecture and diﬀerent operating phases of a signal centre.
Part II
Chapter 3. Formal modelization for railway interlocking system via hierarchical coloured
Petri net: This chapter deals with modelling and analysis of the railway interlocking system.
The proposed cases are studied and described by using HCPN. Initially, this chapter starts
with the background of Petri nets, and presents a discussion on theGRAFCET and Petri nets,
in order to state the reason for choosing Petri nets as formal tools. The graphic notations
used in this thesis and the modelling ability of CPN are carried out with a series of demon-
strations Then, the structure and the modelling framework of RIS are discussed. After that,
an intuitive modelling approach is performed, which formally specifies the constructions
of the railway network and the signalling procedures of the interlocking logic. Then, con-
sidering each station complies with same interlocking logic rules but with various railway
layouts, a general solution is proposed by introducing a modelling pattern, which could be
easily adapted to diﬀerent stations. Finally, the analysis of the low-level system of RIS is
stated. An event-based concept is introduced to better describe the internal interactions of
relay-based logic.
Chapter 4. Model transformation: from coloured Petri net to B language: This chapter
introduces the modelling transformation approach. First, it reviews the basics and the out-
standing features of the B theory, including some notations, concepts and the mathematical
syntax of B language. After, a systematic transformation framework is introduced, which is
from non-hierarchical CPNs to abstract machine notations. In this framework, it improves
the multi-set mechanism and its related specifications from [Bon and Dutilleul 2013], so
that the transformed B machines can be automatically proved by Atelier B without using
“interactive prover”. Then, we discuss the solutions for hierarchy of abstract B machines
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and present a new transformation from HCPNs to AMNs based on the previous one. A
“multi-system” approach is be studied, and the hierarchical structures are presented by
adding accessible pre-defined functions in those high-level B machines. Finally, the pri-
oritized transition of CPN is considered, which could increase the capacity of describing
the event-based systems. In new transformation, a global priority indicator is added, each
operation is assigned with a priority pre-condition, a priority management mechanism is
created.
Part III
Conclusions: Finally, we draw the thesis to a close by summarising all our proposed
methodologies. We give concluding remarks on applying the methodology and comment on
future areas of interest towards extending the methodology.
Part I
Preliminary

Chapter1
Background
The aim of this chapter is to present and to locate the scientific background of my research.
The subject is the modelling of complex systems considering safety-critical scope via formal
languages. First, system engineering is presented as the basic concept of complex systems,
then, we introduced a general solution of complex system modelling. Second, the defini-
tion and categories of safety-critical system are presented, along with the introduction of
industry standards and a little analysis of its research domains. Third, the background of
formal methods is described and a short discussion about its industry applications. Finally,
a literature review is given on scientifically and technologically related topics.
1.1 Modelling of complex system
System modelling is an activity and its aim is to make a particular part or feature of the
world easier to understand. It is essential for understanding, simulation and analysis of
systems, and it provides a basic prototype for the design process. There are already a lot
of techniques to represent a system in a mathematical form. Still, a model is an approxi-
mation in a simple format. It has to give an abstraction of reality according to some given
established purpose.
But, when a system is getting more complicated, it typically consists of “a number of
elements having diverse, variable behaviours that interact to produce the behaviour of the whole”
[Bar-Yam 2003]. This kind of systems can be referred to as a complex system. Its elements
operate according to Its own rules or schedules and are not all entrained by an overall timer.
The notion of complexity presents analytical diﬃculties coming from their behaviours, size
and natural properties. However, “Complexity (ignoring the definitional debates) is subjective
because there are many different ways of viewing the parts, describing interactions, and different
ways of measuring complexity” [Berryman and Campbell 2010]. Thus, a complex system
cannot be reduced to a single model. Traditional engineering disciplines seem not so well
fitted for such systems.
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The object of our study is focused on the railway context. The railway systems are large-
scale systems typically consisting of many concurrently operating and interacting human
and non-human elements. These elements can produce a result or provide a service or set
of services. In order to analyse this system, we propose to use the technique of systems
engineering.
First, let us look at what is meant by systems engineering, and then consider how com-
plex system approaches are settled by systems engineering as a field of research. Roughly
speaking, “systems engineering is the engineering of complex systems” [Kossiakoﬀ et al. 2011,
p. 3]. The more rigorous forms are illustrated as the following representative definitions
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the International Council on Systems
Engineering (INCOSE).
“Systems Engineering is a discipline that concentrates on the design and application
of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves looking at a problem in its
entirety, taking into account all the facets and all the variables and relating the social
to the technical aspects.” [FAA 2014, p. 303]
“Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the re-
alization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, and then
proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while considering the com-
plete problem: operations, cost and schedule, performance, training and support, test,
manufacturing, and disposal. SE considers both the business and the technical needs
of all customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs.”
[INCOSE 2012, p. 3]
Some keywords can be figured out from the two definitions: interdisciplinary, iterative
andwholeness. It is apparent that such kinds of system description from systems engineering
have many similar characteristics as the nature of complex systems. In other words, “systems
engineering is the engineering of complex systems” [Abbott 2006, p. 1].
The technique of modelling is one of the basic tools of systems engineering, especially in
the circumstances that explicit facts and quantitative information are not readily available.
In such situations, a complex system can non be established as a single model. Thus, a
model of a typical complex system could be constructed in term of constituent parts. Each
constituent part explains only a part of the knowledge of the target system and masks other
information. It is only a “sub-system” representation of a “super-system” in its environment
of use. This formation may be called “system of system (SoS)”. The purpose of this formation
is to define a relatively concise and easily understandable system framework, which can
serve as a point of reference for discussing the process of developing a new system and the
role of systems engineering through the process.
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By their nature, complex systems have a hierarchical structure in their constitution,
which integrates a number of major interacting elements. These elements are generally
called subsystem. Each subsystem is composed of more simple functional entities, and so
on down to primitive elements. The definition and the division of architectural system Lev-
els are confined to the generic system and its subsystem. We will discuss it later in this
thesis based on a typical railway system.
After all, systems engineering is a large interdisciplinary field of engineering, and we are
only interested in the modelling and analysis tools of the systems engineering. To be more
precise, our target field is Safety Engineering, which aims to help non-specialist engineers
in designing complex systems to minimize the probability of safety-critical failures.
1.2 Safety-critical system
“Today, we live in a world in which our safety is more and more dependent on software-intensive
systems” [Larrucea, Combelles, and Favaro 2013]. This is the case for the aeronautic, auto-
motive, medical, nuclear, and railway sectors, as well as many more. The shareholders of
such systems are always seeking more economical way to deal with the enormous increase
in size and complexity, while necessarily regarding the need to ensure system safety. Con-
sequently, in the engineering domain, the safety of a system is always one of the important
goals and core needs. Eﬀort was spent on how to manage risk, eliminate or reduce it to give
acceptable levels of safety.
An informal description of safety could be “Nothing bad happens”. There is an ideal
definition–“Freedom from accidents or losses” [Leveson 1995]. But it is so ideal that no system
can be perfectly safe in an absolute sense. In order to be able to integrate the safety analysis
into a brand new system, designers focus more on removing hazards than accident analysis,
so there comes the modern concept of safety: “System will not endanger human life or the
environment” [Storey 1996].
Safety-critical system (SCS), or so called life-critical system is a system which controls
(or as part of the control) hazardous or safety-critical hardware or software. If such a system
fails that could result in at least one of the following outcomes [NASA 2004; Wikipedia
2003]:
• Death or serious injury to people
• Loss or severe damage to equipment/property
• Environmental harm
Although we may find some other similar definitions of life-critical systems, sometimes
an intuitive criteria will give us a better description. Both formal definition and intuitive
description describe the SCS from the failure consequences. “If the failure of a system could
lead to consequences that are unacceptable, then the system is safety-critical” [Knight 2002].
14 CHAPTER 1. Background
Figure 1.1 – Research domains1 of safety-critical system
The common SCSs can be categorised into several domains as showed in Fig. 1.1. This
figure is the analysis result of CiteSpace2 [Chen 2006; Chen, Hu, et al. 2012]. The original
data is 4,048 paper entries under the topic SCS from the Web of Science (WoS). Although
our data source is not exhaustive, and only contains English publications from the WoS
database, its analysis can still be used as a reference. There are 45 nodes (some are too small
to observe), which represent diﬀerent research categories. The size of the node depends on
the number of papers and the cited index.
In Fig. 1.1, it is clear that there is a large amount of research that has been done on general
computer science and general engineering. However, when it comes to domain-based fields,
such as telecommunication and transportation, the number of studies significantly reduce.
This figure may indicate that the basic theory and methodology of SCS applications in the
general areas are mature, while the major diﬃculty to be applied to typical domains is
lacking in industry knowledge. In other words, the development of domain-based SCS has
great application prospects.
Some widely accepted industry standards can be found in these domains above, such as
IEC 61508 [IEC 61508 2010], EN 50128 [EN 50128 2011], DO178B [DO 178B 2010]. By
regulating or restricting the development processes, via verification and validation, these
standards are intended to reduce the number of risks introduced by the process (e.g. using
rigorous specifications), and to increase the number of risks revealed by the process (e.g.
2CiteSpace is a freely available Java application for visualizing and analysing trends and patterns in scien-
tific literature.
1.3. Formal methods 15
applying rigorous verifications) in order that such risks can subsequently be removed.
Standards prescribe the degree of rigour required in development and assurance, ac-
cording to the criticality of system application. The degree of rigour is typically expressed
in terms of safety integrity levels (SILs), which is to determine the acceptable failure rate of
the system. For example, in EN 50128 the requirement for SIL 4 is defined as: for continu-
ously operated system, the equivalent failure probability rate range is 10−10/h ∼ 10−9/h (≈ 1
failure/114150 years).
Besides the degrees, the standards also define the recommended techniques and pro-
cesses for the development process and system assurance. For example, the guidance EN
50128 states that “Informal” requirements and design specification are considered accept-
able for the lower integrity levels, i.e. SIL 1 and SIL 2. “Semi-formal” techniques are admis-
sible for SIL 3, and “Formal (Mathematical)” specification techniques are expected for the
highest level of integrity, i.e. SIL 4.
Although there are many standards and techniques to ensure safety, we still have to
accept some of the failure, considering the limitation of cost, time and other resources. It is
also a wisdom in system risk management — “fallacious expectation of 0 risk”. There is no
system that can be absolutely safe, and no system can guarantee zero risk.
1.3 Formal methods
In computer science, especially software engineering and hardware engineering, “formal
methods have existed at least as long as the term ‘software engineering’ itself” [Gruner et al.
2013]. “formal methods are mathematically based techniques and tools for the synthesis (i.e.
development) and analysis of software systems” [Haxthausen 2010]. For example, as a tool, the
method should include a specification language. Then such a language has a formal syntax,
a formal semantics and a formal proof system. “The techniques of a formal method help to
construct a specification, and/or analyse a specification, and/or transform (refine) one (or more)
specification(s) into a program” [Bjørner and Havelund 2014]. In an engineering context,
using formal methods (FMs) means applying the design of technology based on scientific
insight, and to assess its properties using some dedicated technology for the analyse phase.
After more than 40 years of research, now we have a wide range of FMs that are applied
in diﬀerent areas [Bjørner and Havelund 2014; Haxthausen 2010; You, Li, and Xia 2012].
The foremost ones can be classified as follows, according to their expression abilities.
Model-oriented specification languages that distinctly define states and operations defi-
nitely, such as VDM3 [Bjørner 1978], Z4 [Woodcock and Davies 1999], B method [Abrial
1996] and Event-B [Abrial 2010]. Their main focus is on the development of specifications.
3VDM: Vienna Development Method.
4Z: Zermelo.
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Property-oriented specification languages, such as CASL5 [Bidoit andMosses 2004], Maude [Clavel
et al. 2007], and CafeOBJ [Diaconescu and Futatsugi 1998].
Analysis methods that use analysis techniques, such as Model-Checking, for example
SMV6 [Clarke Jr, Grumberg, and Peled 1999], SPIN7 [Holzmann 2003].
Logic based methods that explore system by chosen logic, such as ITL8 [Umamageswaran,
Pandey, and Wilsey 1999], DC9 [Zhou and Hansen 2004] and RTTL10 [Ostroﬀ 1989].
Graphical methods that are in a graphic notation, such as Petri nets [Petri 1966], State-
charts and MSC11 [ITU-T 2011]. They are easy to understand and use for some lay people.
Related formal notations that are a set of languages called “process algebras”, such as
CSP12 [Hoare 1985; Schneider, Treharne, and Wehrheim 2012] and CCS13 [Milner 1980].
Despite all these methods, and publications, right now there are still few FMs that have
become a success. In our context, success means being widely accepted by industry or in-
tegrated into production processes. However, from the safety needs of industry, the FMs
are worthwhile. Moreover, they will probably be indispensable in the professional pursuit
of the development of SCSs. Therefore, the situation where FMs are not used, while fitted
scientific methods are available, indicates the immaturity of the adaptation of this FM to
the industrial.
Generally, there are two main technical obstacles of the practice of FMs. First, there is
still not enough research and teaching of FMs, which restrict FMs within a scientific level.
This leads to a lack of belief that FMs are worthwhile for the industry. The second diﬃculty
is the supporting tools of FM are not suﬃcient for large scale use in the industry context. It is
the fact that “industry will not use an FM unless it is standardized and ‘supported’ by extensive
tools” [Bjørner and Havelund 2014]. These two obstacles can be considered as “maturity
of engineering” nature. It may take years for the science of FM to precede industry-scale
engineering.
Fortunately, in the French rail transport area, the FM has reached a level of maturity.
For example, the B method has been used successfully to verify the most relevant parts of
a metro system in Paris [Behm, Benoit, et al. 1999]. The related industry keeps an open
mind on FMs, and they are willing to use them. This will definitely accelerate the process
of engineering maturity of FMs. Therefore, my research is to devote an eﬀort to this process,
concerning the application of FMs for SCSs in the Railway industry.
5CASL: Common Algebraic Specification Language.
6SMV: Symbolic model verification
7SPIN: Simple Promela Interpreter
8ITL: Interval Time Logic
9DC: Duration Calculus
10RTTL: Real-time temporal Logic
11MSC: Message Sequence Charts
12CSP: Communicating Sequential Processes.
13CCS: Calculus of Communicating Systems.
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1.4 Model-driven engineering
To increase the formal methods productivity, one obvious approach is to increase the level
of automation all along the development process. This is one of the important features of
MDE [Santiago et al. 2012; Schmidt 2006], which refers to the systematic use of models as
the primary engineering artefacts [Seidewitz 2003] in a formal and precise way [Lukman
and Mernik 2008]. MDE can be applied to software, system, and data engineering. “The
term MDE is typically used to describe software development approaches in which abstract mod-
els of software systems are created and systematically transformed to concrete implementations”
[France and Rumpe 2007]. It oﬀers an environment which ensures the systematic and disci-
plined use of methods (including FMs) throughout the development process of the system,
especially the software systems.
Douglas C Schmidt summarized that the promising approach to address system com-
plexity is to develop FM technologies that combine the following[Schmidt 2006]:
• Domain-specificmodelling languageswhich formalize the application structure, behaviour,
and requirements within particular domains. Such languages are described using
meta-models, which define the relationships among concepts in a domain and pre-
cisely specify the key semantics and constraints associated with these domain con-
cepts.
• Transformation engines and generators that analyse certain aspects of models and then
synthesize various types of artefacts. Such automated transformation processes are of-
ten referred to as “correct-by-construction,” as opposed to conventional hand-crafted
“construct-by-correction” processes that are tedious and error prone.
As we have discussed in the previous Section 1.3, the significant factor behind the obsta-
cles of applying FMs to industry is the conceptual gap between scientific technology and the
implementation domain. To bridge the gap, an extensive hand-crafting of implementations
is required, which will make the development of SCSsdiﬃcult and costly, andmay lead to ac-
cidental complexities. “MDE is primarily concerned with bridging the gap between problem and
software implementation domains” [Ahmad 2013] through using technologies that support
systematic transformation of formal abstractions to final implementations. The diﬃculties
of bridging the gap can be addressed through the concept we have discussed in Section 1.1,
which describes the complex system in a hierarchical way with multiple levels of abstraction
and from a variety of perspectives, then with automated support for processing and analysis
the models, finally to automatically transform into implementation results.
A brief conclusion, in the MDE-aided system development, “models are the primary arte-
facts of development and developers rely on computer-based technologies to transform models to
running systems” [France 2010]. Our envisioned solution is to put FM into MDE develop-
18 CHAPTER 1. Background
ment environment to solve the problem in modelling SCSsin the railway domain.
1.5 Literature review
After forty years of development, FMs are considered as the promising solution for the safety
certification of railway system designers. This chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the
application of FMs in the railway domain. As mentioned in the previous sections, FMs are
useful in the research of SCSsin this domain. After a recall of some remarkable FMs, we
have chosen two methods, Petri net and B method, which have already been accepted by
the French railway industry to aid with the development of railway safety-critical systems
(SCSs). Thus, in the literature reviews, previous research concerns FMs for SCSs in the
railway domain, Petri net and B applications in France. Moreover, model transformation of
Model-driven engineering (MDE) will be introduced in detail.
1.5.1 Formal method for safety-critical system in railway industry
Nowadays, the design of railway systems increasingly benefits from advances in computer
science, information technology, mathematics, and other engineering disciplines. Most of
the railway devices are computer-related devices, which means either of these system in-
cludes some software, or is controlled by software. But software is notorious for having un-
predictable bugs that may threaten its correct functioning. With the rising complexity, for
a system that is composed of multiple computing elements, it is unfeasible to demonstrate
the safety of a collection of behaviours with traditional safety assessments. “The employment
of very stable technology and the quest for the highest possible guarantees have been key aspects
in the adoption of computer-controlled equipment in railway applications” [Fantechi 2012b; Fan-
techi, Fokkink, and Morzenti 2012]. Therefore, the development and the implementation of
formal proof and verification of system safety have been seen as a necessity for the railway
domain.
Traditionally, “Railway signalling has been considered as one of the most fruitful areas of
intervention by formal method” [Fantechi, Fokkink, and Morzenti 2012]. It is because rail-
way signalling is safety-critical. It has discrete nature and absence of hard real-time need.
The broad use of FMs in this field has already been witnessed by over 182 references in an
early review [Bjørner 2003]. Some recent survey and reviews [Bacherini et al. 2006; Fan-
techi 2012b, 2014b; Fantechi, Flammini, and Gnesi 2014; Fantechi, Fokkink, and Morzenti
2012] focus on the advances in both formal method approaches and railway signalling ap-
plications. Still, lots of related work that has been performed by railway companies is not
published because of confidentiality considerations.
For a long time, there have been many formal notations, methods and tools (most are
prototype) that have been developed for academical propose. They lack industrial robust-
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ness in terms of stable tools, detailed documentation and user support. But in the early
nineties, a series of railway signalling products took advantage of the formal B method in
the design phase. “The success of B has had a major impact in the sector of railway signalling by
influencing the definition of the [EN 50128 2001] guidelines” [Fantechi 2014b], which is issued
by the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC).
The standard EN50128 is the guideline for “software for railway control and protection
systems”, and its latest version is [EN 50128 2011]. In this standard, it does not indicate
a specified development method, but classifies a wide range of methods (both traditional
technologies and new ones), respecting the safety integrity level, in which, FM is ranked as
“Highly Recommended” for software requirements specification, software architecture, software
design & implementation and modelling. Moreover, the formal proof is highly recommended
for verification & testing and data preparation techniques. However, the guideline gives a
list(not exhaustive) of example of FMs, including CSP, CCS, HOL, LOTOS, OBJ, Temporal
Logic, VDM, Z Method, Bmethod and Model Checking.
Generally, railway signalling system can be classified into two main categories: train
control system and railway interlocking system. Train control system contains automatic
train protection (ATP), automatic train control (ATC), automatic train operation (ATO) and
train management system (TMS), while railway interlocking system establishes safe routes
for train movements.
Train control system
With the introduction of ETCS (European Train Control System), formal language studies
have been conducted regarding its context. In early research, CPN has been chosen to han-
dle with the modelling of ETCS [Jansen, Meyer ZuHörste, and Schnieder 1998], a model was
given by [Hörste and Schnieder 1999]. Later, to formalise the ETCS natural language and to
meet the interest of the railway industry, European Railway Agency (ERA) has launched an
“EuRailCheck” project [Cavada et al. 2009], which formalize the system requirements into a
subset of UML. One of its outcomes can be found in [Cimatti, Roveri, and Susi 2008], which
partly relies on the NuSMV model checker. Some recent advances of this aspect are using
SMV [Ghazel 2014], CPN [Lijie et al. 2012] and domain language [Iliasov, Palacin, and Ro-
manovsky 2014]. Moreover, an open source project “OpenETCS” [Feuser and Peleska 2014;
Hase 2011] is now working at developing an integrated modelling, development, validation
framework of ETCS and lowering the costs.
Moreover, railway companies begin to adopt FM in their development cycle. For exam-
ple, Ansaldo STS has modelled the Radio Block Center with SDL and Message Sequence
Charts [DaSilva, Dehbonei, and Mejia 1992], then it has developed a formal specification of
Euroradio protocol [Rosaria et al. 2003] which is provided by UML state Diagrams. In the
UK, the Invensys Rail (now part of Siemens’ Rail Automation) took part in the “SafeCap”
project[Iliasov, Lopatkin, and Romanovsky 2013; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2012], which
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has developed a domain specific language (DSL), which is a graphical editor adapted to
Event-B analysis. It allows signalling engineers to model railway nodes, verify their safety
and improve node capacity. The railway signalling division of General Electric Transporta-
tion System (GETS) mentioned their model-based development, which aims to enforce the
production safety. The company employed system modelling first for the prototype devel-
opment [Bacherini et al. 2006], then used those models for requirements formalization and
automatic code [Ferrari, Fantechi, et al. 2009].
Railway interlocking system
In the past, safety of relay-based railway interlocking systems was based on the fail-safe con-
cept which relies on the gravity. As the systems are being transited into computer-controlled
ones, their safety is more diﬃcult to predict. So railway companies and societies always have
a great need to find a suitable and feasible way to maintain RIS safety.
The first approaches of manufacturers could be found in [Bernardeschi et al. 1998; Cimatti,
Giunchiglia, et al. 1998; Gnesi et al. 2000; Groote, Vlijmen, and Koorn 1995]. But those ap-
proaches are adherent to old relay-based technology. To have an innovative solution, UIC
launched a Euro-Interlocking project between 1999 and 2006. This project collaborated
with the main European infrastructure companies, with the aim of developing a European
level interlocking standard, which could reduce life-cycle costs and optimal compliance
with ETCS. One of the outcomes of this project is EIFFRA (Euro-Interlocking formalized
functional requirements approach) activity [König and Einer 2003]. Another experience
is made by SNCF-RFF, which has modelled the French interlocking logic principles using
Statecharts and Statemate [Le Bouar 2003].
Later, UIC launched another project called INESS (INtegrated European Signalling Sys-
tem) from 2009 to 2012. This project aims to develop formal specifications of a future
interlocking system, which could also extend and enhance the interface of ERTMS stan-
dardisation. Another contribution of this project is to provide business testing tools and
methodologies to carry out the testing for signalling applications.
Moreover, there are some DSLs that have been proposed to formalise railway RISs [Hax-
thausen, Peleska, and Haxthausen 2003; Morley 1994]. The most remarkable one is a ge-
ographic approach called EURIS [Berger, Middelraad, and Smith 1992; Dijk et al. 1998]
which was developed in the Netherlands and later adopted by Siemens, for their GRACE
toolset [Fantechi 2014a; Jung 2000].
When referring to the relevant scientific work and research papers, we found that RIS
has been studied by a wide variety of formal methods. [Chen, He, and Huang 2011] devel-
ops the RIS logic based on Statecharts. [Zafar 2009; Zafar, Khan, and Araki 2012] specifies
and validates the RIS using Z notations. [Rastocny, Janota, and Zahradnik 2004] specifies the
functional safety requirements with UML. [Hartonas-Garmhausen et al. 2000] verifies the
RIS based on Symbolic Model Checking. [Bonacchi, Fantechi, et al. 2014; James, Lawrence, et
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al. 2014] introduces diﬀerent formal verifications via SAT-based Model Checking. [Basagian-
nis, Katsaros, and Pombortsis 2006] carries out analysis and verification with the SPINmodel
checker. [Eriş and Mutlu 2010] using Petri net to design a RIS structure. [Grégory, Olaf, et al.
2013] presents a method to assess the dependability performances based on coloured Petri
net. In [Dincel, Eriş, and Kurtulan 2013], an Automata-based RIS is introduced and im-
plemented. But most of the work is not suitable for RIS design in large stations, although
some optimization of the specification could help [Winter, Johnston, et al. 2006; Winter and
Robinson 2003].
Naturally, during the research, we should always be aware of the trends of this domain,
which is usually led by the experts.
Alessandro Fantechi, the professor from the University of Florence, thinks that model
checking is of particular interest by many railway signalling industries, because it is the
most lightweight method from the process point of view. He did research on exploiting the
use of model checking [Fantechi 2012a; Ferrari, Grasso, et al. 2010; Ferrari, Magnani, et al.
2011]. Also in his recent reviews, he has pointed out that “The ‘SAT-based’ model checking
appears to be more promising in this respect” [Fantechi 2014a], because in some more recent
work [Bonacchi and Fantechi 2014; Bonacchi, Fantechi, et al. 2014; Haxthausen, Peleska, and
Pinger 2014; James, Moller, Nguyen, Roggenbach, Schneider, Treharne, et al. 2014; James,
Lawrence, et al. 2014], they have a common interest in using “SAT-based” model checking
for system verifications.
Anne Elisabeth Haxthausen, the professor from Technical University of Denmark, has
been committed to the research of RAISE14 Specified Language (RSL) in railway applica-
tions. The RAISE/RSL [George 1991; The RAISE Language Group 1992, 1995] is a powerful
specification and design language, with 20 years’ research experience in systematic software
development. Her previous works mainly focus on relay-based RISs [Aanæs and Thai 2012;
Haxthausen 2011; Haxthausen, Kjær, and Le Bliguet 2011; Haxthausen, Le Bliguet, and
Kjær 2010] and interlocking table [Haxthausen 2014; Hede 2012].
Phillip James, a lecturer at Swansea University, is also an advocate of DSL. He has re-
searched DSL at verification using CSP||B [James, Moller, Nguyen, Roggenbach, Schneider,
Treharne, et al. 2014; James 2014; James, Moller, Nguyen, Roggenbach, Schneider, and Tre-
harne 2014a,b,c] and SAT-Solving[James, Moller, Nguyen, Roggenbach, Schneider, Treharne,
et al. 2014; James, Lawrence, et al. 2014; James and Roggenbach 2011].
Last but not least, we should take a look at the eﬀorts of Dines Bjørner, an expert on
domain engineering, requirements engineering and formal methods. He believes that the
two promising directions of future development for FMs are: verification support for pro-
gramming Languages and the point of singularity for FM. The point of singularity means
that “specification, programming and verification are performed in an integrated manner, within
the same language framework, additionally supported by visualization and meta-programming”
14Rigorous Approach to Industrial Software Engineering
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[Bjørner 2012a,b, 2014; Bjørner and Havelund 2014].
1.5.2 The Bmethod in railway
The purpose of the B method is to formally model a system or software and to prove that
all the system or software behaviours respect the properties [Abrial 1996]. Later, there is
another wider used version of the B language called Event-B [Abrial 2010], which aims “to
analyse, study and specify, not only software, but also whole systems” [Lecomte, Servat, and
Pouzancre 2007].
SACEM system
The first industry use of the Bmethod took place in SACEM system of RER line A in Paris. In
1988, GEC Alsthom, Matra Transport International (now Siemens Transportation Systems)
and CSEE Transport (now part of Ansaldo) started to develop the SACEM system for RATP
in cooperation with SNCF [Bowen and Stavridou 1993]. The SACEM is an automatic train
protection system, which continuously governs the speed of all trains on the line. It is
expected to increase the network traﬃc by 25%, while maintaining the existing safety level.
The software of SACEM was completed with Modula 2 programming language, of which
“63% is regarded as safety-critical and has been subjected to formal specification and verification”
[Guiho and Hennebert 1990; Hennebert and Guiho 1993]. A formal specification of the
functional requirement was made in the B language and “the proofs were done interactively
using automatically generated verification conditions for the code” [Woodcock, Larsen, et al.
2009].
The FM in this project helped to find 12 diﬀerences between the implementation and
the natural language specification [Guiho and Hennebert 1990]. The successful application
of FM in the SACEM system convinces RATP to continue the use of FM in their following
projects.
MÉTÉOR
Météor [Behm, Benoit, et al. 1999; Behm, Desforges, and Meynadier 1998], the new metro
line number 14, is the first driverless metro line in Paris, and its ATO system is also the first
real success of industrial use of formal methods, which has been in full operation since 1998.
This project is supported by RATP, and promoted by the B method and Atelier B, which is
the implementation tool. Matra Transport International developed the system using B for-
mal method to develop and validate the self-critical parts of the ATO system. This automatic
guide-way transportation system allows managing automatic driverless trains together with
non-equipped manually driven trains, in which, “the safety-critical software controls the run-
ning and stopping of every train, and controls opening and closing of doors located in trains and
platforms” [Behm, Benoit, et al. 1999].
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One of the conditions for success should be thanks to the industrialisation of FM. The B
method and its associated tool kit Atelier B were industrialized by RATP, Matra Transport
International and Stéria Méditérranée. The formal development started by specifying the
nature requirement in the abstract B machine. Then, these models/machines are refined
step-by-step into more concrete model. Finally, they are transformed into the programming
language Ada. Errors were found during the proofs. As a result, no bugs are detected during
the system testing, either at function validation on host computer, integration validation on
target computer or on-site tests. Furthermore, there is no bugs have been found since the
system was put into operation [Haxthausen 2010; Lecomte, Servat, and Pouzancre 2007].
The formal development was cost-eﬀective. In particular, initial budgets could be kept to.
Other projects
The VAL system [Ferbeck 1981] is the technical predecessor of MÉTÉOR. It is the first fully
automatic driverless metro in the world, and is controlled by digital monolithic integrated
circuits and was applied in Lille in 1983. The “VAL de Roissy” project re-developed the VAL
system by B method. This project is a driveless light train system for the Roissy Charles
de Gaulle airport shuttle [Badeau and Amelot 2005]. The safety software for the automa-
tisms was developed by B method and has been in full operation since 2007. Siemens
Transportation Systems (formerly Matra Transport) took the responsibility of developing
this shuttle system and subcontracted the safety-critical parts to ClearSy Company using B
language. After this project, new VALs are now operating in Taipei, Toulouse, Rennes and
Turin [Boulanger 2014].
Another recent B method engineering application is the COPPILOT system [Lecomte
2008; Patin, Pouzancre, and Servat 2006], It is a platform screen door controller, which
controls the opening and closing of the doors at a metro station platform. These doors are
installed to keep traﬃc flowing safely. This system was called upon by RATP and devel-
oped by ClearSy company via formal method. Its development complies with SIL 3 safety
software. Now, it has been installed in the Paris Metro and the São Paulo Metro.
Related works
In railway signalling related studies, the prominent ones are [Leuschel et al. 2011; Sabatier
et al. 2012], which are experience of large scale work. [Cimatti, Corvino, et al. 2012; Fer-
rari, Magnani, et al. 2011; James and Roggenbach 2011; Kanso, Moller, and Setzer 2009]
verify the safety of RIS with logical approaches. Besides, some researchers use CSP||B to ad-
dress RIS verification, such as [Moller et al. 2013] and Phillip James, whom we have already
mentioned.
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1.5.3 Petri net in railway
The concept of Petri net (PN) was first introduced by C.A. Petri in his Ph.D. thesis [Petri
1962]. Having the advantages of expressing discrete event control systems [Holloway, Krogh,
and Giua 1997a; Murata 1989], PN has been extensively researched for specification, design,
verification, performance evaluation, and simulation.
Studies of PN in railway can be traced back almost 20 years ago [Decknatel and Schnieder
1998]. Afterwards, many researchers and teams devoted their work to contributing to mod-
elling and analysing railway system using Petri Nets, such as [Decknatel 1999; Hielscher
et al. 1998; Hörste and Schnieder 1999; Lei, Tanglong, and Jian 2000]. But these early ap-
proaches are mainly concerned with isolated phenomena. There are some prominent papers
that study the scheduling of railway stations [Aalst and Odijk 1995], and optimal behaviour
on a point [Ren and Zhou 1995]. However, the literature of railway modelling and analysis
using classical Petri net is not extensive in this paper. Such a survey could be found inside a
Ph.D. thesis [BAppSc 1998].
Because the descriptive ability of basic Petri net seems not to meet the needs of complex
systems. Many derivatives of Petri net have been introduced in this research area, such as
coloured Petri net (CPN) [Jensen 1981, 1987] and Predicate/Transition Nets [Genrich 1987],
later be revisited in [Billington 1991].
With the help of such high-level PNs, there comes a large scale application—Oslo Sub-
way [Bjørk 2006; Hagalisletto et al. 2007; Moen and Yu 2004; Yu 2004], which integrates
Petri net into the system development to simulate the Oslo subway and analyse schedules
of trains. This project developed a specification tool for specifying and automatically con-
structing large CPN models of railroads. But due to the immature nature of CPN support
tools, “neither Design/CPN nor CPN Tools are able to represent or execute the models, although
standard CPN formats were used in the implementation” [Hagalisletto et al. 2007]. However,
another important experience of this project shows that PN is a good specification language
for communication, because the research group collaborated with chief engineers from rail-
road infrastructure and traﬃc department. Although none were specialists in PNs nor FMs,
they understood the models, and gave improving suggestions.
The specification, analysis and implementation of railway control logic are always a hot
research topic. In work [Fanti, Giua, and Seatzu 2006; Giua and Seatzu 2008] discuss the
control of the railway network using CPNs. A resource-oriented CPNmethod is introduced
in [Wu and Zhou 2004], which could deal with the deadlock of automated guided vehicle
(AGV) systems. [Cheng and Yang 2009] uses a fuzzy PN for railway traﬃc control. A similar
solution can be found in [Kaakai, Hayat, and El Moudni 2007] using a hybrid PN.
The level-crossing (LC) is also a critical crux in both road and rail infrastructures. Stochas-
tic PNs are applied in [Ghazel 2009; Huang, Weng, and Zhou 2010] in order to precisely
reflect the system’s dynamics. Furthermore, stochastic PNs could be used to evaluate the
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real time system in railways, such as data processing [Zimmermann and Hommel 2003],
Device-to-Device communication [Lei, Zhang, et al. 2013].
Besides ETCS, there is another advanced train control system, called “communication-
based train control (CBTC)”, which has been applied to many metros. Its protocols and
services have been studied by CPN [Chen, Ning, and Xu 2007; Xu and Tang 2007], Deter-
ministic and Stochastic Petri net [Zhu et al. 2012] and timed Petri net [Wang and Bai 2010].
In France’s railway domain, the French national railway company (SNCF) has initiated
and participated in many projects. One of the most successful projects is to develop a for-
mal validation method and tools for new computerized RISs and existing RISs [Antoni
2009a,b,c; Antoni and Ammad 2007, 2008]. This project is led by Marc Antoni, the head of
Innovation Pole technilogique of SNCF Infra and director of the Rail System Department of
UIC. This study developed four successive DSL tools [Antoni 2012b]:
1. Tools A: general way for the definition of safety properties
2. Tools B: generation of the safety properties file
3. Tools C: Proving tool: Formal validation tool
4. Tools D: Reached system state tree and execution certificate
In tools A and B, the safety properties are specified with interpretable deterministic PNs,
which will be later interpreted in the target machine. This method has been accepted by
SNCF Infra. Now it has been applied in real RIS of “Noisy le Roy”, situated next to Paris,
and also applied in a new double track level crossing. It is said that this method will be used
by UIC and will be applied in the German system [Antoni 2012a].
Moreover, in order to verify the high-level systems’ safety requirements, SNCF has made
some performance assessments for both local signalling rules and European signalling stan-
dards, by specification and analysis of CPNs [Buchheit et al. 2011; Grégory, Nicolae, et al.
2010; Lalouette et al. 2010].
1.5.4 Model transformation of model-driven engineering
In MDE, everything is a model. Thus, the model transformations are considered as the
"heart and soul"[Lúcio et al. 2014] of model driven engineering, and can be used for a variety
of purposes, such as the generation of models on diﬀerent levels of abstraction, the creation
of diﬀerent views on a system and automation of model evolution [Czarnecki and Helsen
2006].
They are already some good literature reviews [Amrani, Combemale, et al. 2014; Amrani,
Lúcio, et al. 2012; Calegari and Szasz 2013; Lúcio et al. 2014] on this domain. In the liter-
ature, several issues around MDE have been studied and researched, for example, transfor-
mation languages (TLs) (Graph-based TL [Jurack and Taentzer 2010], meta-programming
language [Combemale et al. 2009]), mapping techniques [Hammoudi, Vale, and Lopes 2008;
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Lopes et al. 2006], model transformation classification [Czarnecki and Helsen 2006; Mens
and Van Gorp 2006].
According to their reviews, a transformation has two natures [Bézivin et al. 2006]: trans-
formation model and model transformation. The first propriety emphasizes on the model
of computation that is embedded in a transformation, while the second one focuses on par-
ticular artefacts manipulated by a transformation. During all the research, meta-models are
often defined using UML Class Diagram. However, there are some other specific languages,
such as MOF (Meta Objec Facility) [Object Management Group 2003], EMF (Eclipse Mod-
elling Framework) [Steinberg, Budinsky, and Paternostro 2009] and KM3 (Kernel MetaMeta-
Model) [Atlas 2005].
In our research, we are more interested in the PN-related applications in MDE. So far,
the PNs have been mainly used for formal verification, either verifying the original model or
the transformation process. A general introduction can be found inWork [Maximova, Ehrig,
and Ermel 2010], which shows the Graph-based TL share a common formal background
with Petri net. M. Wimmer developed a TROPIC (TRansformations On Petri Nets In Color)
framework[Wimmer, Kappel, and Kusel 2009; Wimmer, Kusel, Reiter, et al. 2009; Wimmer,
Kusel, Schoenboeck, Kappel, et al. 2009; Wimmer, Kusel, Schoenboeck, Reiter, et al. 2009]
that provides mapping based on a domain specific language (DSL) and expressed as CPNs.
Varró introduces a transformation fromUML statecharts to Petri nets in [Varró and Pataricza
2003] and later analyses graph transformation systems via PNs [Varró, Gyapay, et al. 2006].
[Combemale et al. 2009] mapping a DSL, xSPEM, into prioritized time Petri net, and for-
mally prove the transformation. [Lara and Vangheluwe 2009] introduces a transformation
from Domain-Specific Visual Languages (DSVLs) into Petri net, in order to benefit from its
formal verification abilities. [Syriani and Ergin 2012] transformed a UML activity diagram
into a Petri net model to detect deadlocks. [Kühne et al. 2009] defines a translation from
State automata to Petri net. The translated model is used to check the given propriety of an
input sequence.
Anyway there are few researchers working on transforming PNs into other languages.
Korečko, in [Korečko, HudáK, and ŠIMOŇÁK 2007; Korečko and Sobota 2014], introduces
a mapping method to translate classical Petri nets into classic B machines and Event-B ma-
chine. Attiogbe [Attiogbe 2009] introduces an encoding method from classical PNs to B
language. The works of Bon [Bon 2000; Bon and Dutilleul 2013] introduce a solution to
transform a CPNmodel into a Bmachine respecting Atelier B syntax.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first introduce the scientific background of my research, including sys-
tem engineering, safety-critical system and formal method. Then, we present an extensive
literature review on the necessary knowledge based on the survey of the art of the various
1.6. Conclusion 27
tools or techniques. This thesis is dedicated to the modelling of complex systems consid-
ering safety-critical scope via formal languages. So, the literature reviews have to be an
interdisciplinary document survey. After a general review concerning formal methods for
safety-critical system in the rail domain, the B method and the Petri nets techniques and
their applications in railway are studied. Furthermore, the model transformation of model-
driven engineering is discussed.
To pursue the highest possible guarantees is always a key aspect in the adoption of
computer-controlled railway applications. From the survey on the state of the art of formal
methods for safety-critical systems, we have enumerated numerous references and some
projects. All this research make railway signalling a fruitful area of formal method theories
and applications.
Considering the French railway context and the industrial robustness, we choose the
Petri nets and the B method for system modelling. The Petri nets have many great features,
such as graphic notations, precise mathematical semantics and hierarchy, which mean these
languages are user friendly, formal and can be applied for large complex systems. Most
important is that Petri nets can be understood by engineering experts, which means we can
always get assistance and suggestions from them. The B method aims to analyse, study and
specify the software or the whole system. We already have many successful applications of
the Bmethod, such as SACEM system, MÉTÉOR and the new VAL system.
From the engineering point of view, these two methods have some advantages and disad-
vantages, andwe consider them as complementary in the French railway context. The propo-
sition leads us to take advantage of both methods using the techniques of model driven en-
gineering. So, an interesting solution should be a model transformation: from the PNs to
the abstract B machines. Such a transformation can build a bridge between critical tasks,
from a strong requirement analysis towards a valid implementation on a real system. Last
but not least, if we want to validate safety at a system level, this transformation is a strong
contribution in order to integrate information from diﬀerent parts.
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Chapter2
Some principles of railway safety
Any applications of signal centre and signalling related procedures require a full explana-
tion of safety properties. This chapter aims to describe and to formalise some major safety
properties and the control logic of critical systems in railway signalling.
Around the safety nature of the signalling based railway system, a step by step analysis
has been performed: First, the particular railway safety in France is introduced. Then the
composition structures and major components of railway system are stated. Finally, the
French railway interlocking system is introduced, including the general architecture and
diﬀerent operating phases of a signal centre.
2.1 Railway safety
When analysing the safety of a particular railway signalling system or device, we have to
consider its integration into its outside environment, in which it participates as a component
of the whole system.
Stopped
Safe
Running
Danger
Train
start
Train
stop
Figure 2.1 – Railway system state
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2.1.1 Concept of safety
The concept of safety has diﬀerent explanations depending on the nature of the systems
and activities. The safety of rail traﬃc is particularly based on “the possibility of stopping”.
Most of the signalling rules take this concept as the primary requirement. If no train is
moving, there will not be any danger to the traﬃc itself. So the basic system state can be
simplified as the diagram shown in Fig. 2.1.
This concept of safety is also widely used in the train control procedures, such as the
ATP system, which stops the train according to the radio based signals, in order to avoid
collision.
In some engineering standards, they may refer to another similar concept — reliability.
There are numerous general definitions of it, such as IEEE, which defines reliability as “the
ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a
specified period of time” [IEEE 1990]. Still, it is hard to give an unambiguous and quantified
definition for railway. However, if we look at their respective consequences, it will be clearer.
Reliability means that the system maintains safety, while the dangers may become system
failures [Antoni 2009c].
How to evaluate the reliability of a system, and do all the undesirable states have equal
importance? This is in the domain of safety requirement engineering, which aims to provide
a safer system under certain safety levels. However, Absolute safety is a beautiful dream that
can never be achieved, so engineers always have to face the unreliability of the machines.
The famous explanation of this fact is Murphy’s law: “Anything that can go wrong, will go
wrong”. This law transforms a probability into a certainty. For a given unsafe event with
determinate probability of occurrence, if given enough time the probability of this unsafe
event within a limited time is actually very high.
How to ensure safety when the systems suﬀer from the lack of reliability? Let us review
the existing applications and the experience in France. In electromechanical devices, used
in most railway signalling system before the introduction of the computer, gravity was used
to bring the system to the fail-safe state in any critical event. For example, a switch itself
could fail to block a section in case of critical events. Another important point is that the
safety of such a system does not primarily depend on the reliability of the devices, but on the
reliability of some physical laws and the “oriented” design concepts. As in electromechani-
cal devices, the system states are not considered as equally stable. Therefore, the system is
“oriented” designed according to the following principles:
• Some states are more stable than others
• “Spontaneous” subsystem always evolve towards the most stable state changes
• It is possible to match the most stable device state with the safest system state
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In this way, railway systems are designed with the techniques above, so that their operat-
ing results will always evolve towards stable states which are intended to be safe. However,
enhanced system reliability is not enough for the “absolute safety”. In the view of safety,
besides reliability, there is a need for a rigorous preventive signalling rule.
Signalling rules in the French railways are historically based on determinism. Every sys-
tem state has one or more cause. If a state is undesirable, removing its causes should help to
avoid it. One commonly used method is reasoning, which is necessary to exploit for every
state, and especially to ensure that an undesirable event does not take place. Consequently,
a system is designed in accordance with the following design rules [Antoni 2009c]:
• A single cause can lead to an accident
• potential failures can be recovered by fail-safe technique. detectable failures always
go in the direction of safe
• Limit the shares of men and procedures
• A precise definition of the role for each actor
• Independent recovery loops as much as possible between diﬀerent actors
• Supervision (permanent, human, procedures or tools)
• Continuous improvement based on feedback
Moreover, the reliability of the signalling rule has a direct influence on system safety.
The fewer time delays and incidents, the fewer dispatchers and procedures will be needed
and the risk will be lower as well. In addition, the fixed installations must also be fast
repairable or self-recovery in order to guarantee the required safety level. In Fig. 2.2, there
are two paths to the “unsafe” state. So, if a system can quickly recover from the “Failure
Detected” state, it will obviously reduce the number of the accidents.
Totally
Safe
Failure
Detected
Unsafe
function error or
failure detected
repairing or
self-recovery
error of the specification
and the execution
error of the
traﬃc operators
Figure 2.2 – Impact of reliability of the overall safety of a signalling system
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Nevertheless, from a technique point of view, humans, who cannot perfectly integrate
into the automated systems, are still a weak link in the signalling control loop. However,
humans play a main role in the railway system. Human dispatchers and operators are usu-
ally at the top level of the whole system, but their reliability does not depend on technique.
Generally, the increasing safety level guarantees the system performances. The failure rate
of a system fails from totally safe state and failure detected state is quite low, so that it can
“compensate” human operations in the control procedures. But we should always be aware
that, when the traﬃc workload is increased, the error rate of an operator may become unac-
ceptable.
2.1.2 Safety management of French railway system
The deterministic reasoning can only be applied to a closed system, because an open system
has unexpected interactions with the outside world, and there will be a risk of unforeseen
system state. This prerequisite also applies in other industrial safety domains.
Thus, the principle of the organization of the external environment is to limit the number
of the interactions, in order to avoid introducing chaos. As the external environment is one
of the foundations of safety design, only those directly related to safety should be considered.
Moreover, for any system it must have at least one safe state. It can be found in the system
states exploitation, and it should be accessible.
As a matter of fact, national railway systems are managed by transportation service
providers who do not develop every system. Rather, they act as system integrators of sys-
tems purchased from external suppliers. Therefore, the technical characteristics of the rail-
way require identifying and anticipating potential conflicts, in order to enhance the integra-
tion safety level. Overall, the integration of diﬀerent systems helps to achieve a safe enough
system. According to their properties, safety management can be roughly divided into two
categories:
• Operating safety is the interactions between integrated systems. Any expected change
among the interactions could interfere with the traﬃc. It depends on the operators
following the signalling rules and procedures.
• Technical safety aims to preserve the functional characteristics of railway traﬃc, which
allow trains to run on an infrastructure. It depends on the device development and
maintenance with respect to the operation procedures of operators and drivers.
In such a railway system, any modification of a system component may aﬀect other com-
ponents, and threaten the existing system safety. It is necessary to have rigorous integrating
procedures, which are based on verification and validation, functional and safety assess-
ment, and safety approval.
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The French railway practice is originated in a deterministic approach, called the intrinsic
safety [Antoni 2009c], which implies an exhaustive knowledge of the component failure
models:
• Failure modes are determined by the physical laws (gravity fail-safe components)
• The combination of failures are accessible for maintenance staﬀ
• The (first) failure could be detected by the default system state
Nowadays, with the development of the computer, the computer-controlled equipment
plays an important role in many industrial areas. It has some advantages such as:
• Handling of complex new functions
• Ability of long distance remote control
• Reduction in staﬀ
But everything has its two sides. It also has disadvantages such as:
• Long development cycle and hard to modify safely once the produce is finished
• Require qualified operating and maintenance staﬀs
• More diﬃcult to validate and to integrate in the global system
• The life cycle of computer devices is shorter than that of mechanical ones
Another important fact is that computers cannot rely on the gravity. That means it is im-
possible for these systems to automatically lead to the default state, and it is also impossible
to identify and address all the possible causes of the unsafe failures. This is also the cause
that has long delayed the acceptance of computer-controlled signalling equipment.
It has been a key aspect for the infrastructure management to find a very stable method-
ology to ensure the correction of the exhaustive functional applications for the adoption of
computer-controlled equipment in railway applications.
2.1.3 Problematic of computer-controlled system
Unfortunately, many experiences show that the current development method cannot pro-
vide a safety guaranteed system according to SIL3 or SIL4. And the integration safety cannot
be ensured under the global framework. A study has shown that “more than 3/4 accidents in
relation with computerized systems are due to specification errors” [Antoni 2012a]. Those acci-
dents are caused by incorrect fiction descriptions, unthoughtful modifications or improper
maintenance.
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In the traditional system, it was necessary to identify the failure events and to reduce
their occurrence causes. When adopting the computer-controlled system, formal proof or
verification is therefore regarded as a necessity. The following aspects should be taken into
consideration.
• The functions and behaviours of such automated systems must be deterministic
• Some properties should be specified rigorously
– safety predicates
– functional predicates
– assumptions of interactions with external environment
• For model checking based formal proof, it is only possible when the reachable system
states is finite
Safety mode
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Figure 2.3 – The overall safety of a computer-controlled signalling system
The safety state of a computer-controlled signalling system is shown in Fig. 2.3. Transi-
tions with red forbidden sign are the undesired system changes, which should be identified
and reduced through formal specification & verification. In this way, the final system could
operate as a “fail safe” system.
2.2 Railway context
Compared to other transport modes, the greatest feature of the railway is that all the ve-
hicles run on the rail. Normally, either the locomotive or the rolling stock weigh tons and
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are hundreds of meters long. Unlike other vehicle drivers, a train driver is free from the
running direction of the train. Besides the long length and the high speed of the train make
it impossible for the driver to observe and judge the situation ahead by his own eyes. The
fixed tracks make the whole railway system in an one-dimensional world, which has the
following characteristics:
• The railway tracks are made of steel, which can withstand very heavy transits, but the
wheel-rail adhesion coeﬃcient is lower than other road transportations.
• The direction of the train can only be changed at particular locations, such as a station
or a point.
The above inherent characteristics adds to the diﬃculty of the train operation. First the
braking distance is greatly exceed the visionary scope of a human driver 1. Second, the rail
prevents the driver from changing the route in order to avoid collisions.
Because of these facts, the train driver, in normal operations, cannon drive “on sight”2,
and he have no right to control the direction of the trains. So there needs to be some other
staﬀ to take responsibility for the organization of the traﬃc and the operation of the fixed
installations.
The duty of the dispatchers are:
• Organize a well-thought schedule of traﬃc management, which will reasonably space
apart the trains on the same route.
• Distribute movement authority. With the aide of train protection technique, It could
inform the train drivers early enough to fully stop a train and maintain a suﬃcient
safe length to ensure a safe transit.
So the mode of railway transportation is in a distributed environment, under multiple
control and guides. The “operation of the train” is not by its driver, but a result of multi-
party cooperation. In practice the main components of the railway system that contribute
to the operation are:
• Fixed infrastructure:
– trackwork: junction, point, level-crossing, · · ·
– track structure: curve, ramp, tunnel, bridge, · · ·
– track characteristics: degree of curvature, gradient, tunnel diameter, · · ·
1Compared with road vehicles, the braking distances of train are not optimistic. For example, the full stop
distance of a freight trains running at 100km/h needs about 1000m, while for a passenger train at 300km/h,
the distance will be about 3500m.
2on sight driving mode is only accepted as a degrade mode
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• Locomotive & rolling stock:
– functional properties: mass, moment of inertia, track transition curve, top speed,
braking ability, · · ·
– usability: door control system, · · ·
• Signalling
– It is a series of signalling rules and the control procedures
– It organizes the “safe” route for trains, and transmit commands to drivers
– It obviates the risks from the train movements and their intersection with the
fixed infrastructures
Since the railway system has such complex components, and the signalling system acts
as a link between trains and fixed infrastructure, it is not allowed to have any functional
defects or technical gaps in the railway signalling.
2.3 The railway system
Similar to any other industrial operation process, the entire railway system can also be cate-
gorised into three parts: human actors, signalling procedures and facilities.
Before clearly specifying the safety requirements, it is necessary to define the framework
and major components of the railway system. The human actors include train drivers on
board and the dispatchers on the ground. They operate the locomotives and the fixed in-
frastructure respectively, in accordance with a series of global signalling procedures. The
system diagram is presented in Fig. 2.4.
The rail system is therefore composed of four types of actors. Fig. 2.4 illustrates the
normal operation mode of the railway system. It is obvious that all the facilities require
human actors to operate and to supervise. The train movement represents the interactions
between the rolling stocks and the fixed infrastructures. All the components are comply
with the unified signalling procedures, which ensure consistency and correctness.
2.3.1 Human actors
Human actors are an indispensable link of the system’s safety and reliability. This is based
more on human reliability than the technical reliability. In order to enhance the system’s
safety level, to reduce the workload of staﬀs and to increase the system’s eﬃciency, auto-
matic and semi-automatic facilities are introduced into the railway system. These devices
can eﬀectively reduce the probability of system error. A schematic diagram of such an eﬀect
of the automatic devices is illustrated in Fig. 2.5.
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Figure 2.4 – The global vision of railway system
In Fig. 2.5, we assume that every actor and device has an intrinsic error rate (P1, P
′
1, P2
,P ′2). Generally, it is believed that the error rate of the automatic devices is much lower than
human, which means P1 >> P
′
1 and P2 >> P
′
2. The final traﬃc safety is a combined result of
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Figure 2.5 – The eﬀect of the automatic devices in system safety
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each player. α and β are the percentage of task distributions, where α,β ∈ [0,1]. From the
figure, it is clear that the system will be safer with automatic devices.
But once the system fails and evidence points to human error, there will always be a
controversial paradox: why does an automatic system allow people to take actions that may
lead to unexpected situations? Should people or the automatic system take the responsibil-
ity for the final security guarantee? From the accident reports, the cause of an accident is
always an integration of multiple factors, even some tiny mistakes or coincidence events.
The reliable nature of such automatic systems naturally induces the human actors to
have a strong tendency to trust them. Actually, the highly automated system has sophis-
ticated and complex characteristics. Most human actors treat them as black boxes in their
daily operations. Because of a lack of knowledge of the internal mechanisms, in some failure
situations, it is sometimes diﬃcult to make a quick right response. On the other hand, the
failure probability of dangerous dysfunctions is so low that most actors will not encounter
this in their lives, not to mention their experience in dealing with it. However, treatment of
the failure situations and the dysfunctions still needs human actors as a part of signalling
procedures.
Human actors are the only ones who are capable of dealing with all situations, especially
in the case of failures and dysfunctions. Human-in-the-loop, plays a major role in the rail-
way system. It is necessary to take human actions into account for any validation of system
safety [Antoni 2009c].
2.3.2 Signalling procedures
The signalling procedures are designed to ensure the consistency of all the activities between
diﬀerent actors. It also monitors and executes the operation of all the equipment. The pro-
cedures are based on a unified language, the signalling rules, whose terms and vocabularies
have been clearly defined and which is known to all the actors.
Diﬀerent actors have diﬀerent operation targets such as various types of rolling stock
and all possible infrastructures. They need to follow diﬀerent operation procedures, but all
these procedures comply with some basic rules, such as the national signalling standard. In
computer-controlled system, the procedures are greatly reduced on account of the highly
automated facilities, which could implement some former low-level procedures.
There are some examples of the signalling procedures:
The train driver can only passively obey the external signals, whether through the radio
or the cab screen. According to the termination of a signal, the driver must immediately
take action to adapt the train to the current signal.
The dispatchers could monitor the occupation status of all the tracks. They can inter-
lock a series of tracks to provide a safe route and open the signal light to inform the train
driver. Although the dispatchers are given the opportunity to operate and arrange the sig-
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nalling facilities at any time, they have to use their rights only when necessary and under
the instruction of superior operating plans.
The various applications of the signalling procedure should be always validated for
safety reasons.
2.3.3 Installations
The installation could be divided into two categories: on-board devices and trackside fixed
installations. They are composed of highly safe and reliable components, in order to secure
human actions and improve system performance. The development trend is to gradually
replace manual processes with automated devices, in order to decrease operational errors.
The on-board devices are mainly equipped inside locomotives, including power, sig-
nalling and mechanic devices. The safety related devices are: brake system, speed control
system, train protection system and cab signalling.
The safety related devices of fix installations are: points, interlocking system, level-
crossings and trackside signals
In order to specify the safety problems of the railway system, especially the interlocking
system, in the rest of this section, we will describe the component of the critical network
components.
Track Segment
The track segment is the main component of a railway network. It is a single piece of railway
track with two or three ends. For safety reasons, track segments are always equipped with
signalling for train movements. The one with two ends is a simple straight track segment,
which can be driven in both directions, as shown in Fig. 2.6(a). It consists of two parallel
rails without branches. In the French system schematic diagram, the straight track is drawn
as a “ZONE” with insulated ends in Fig. 2.6(b). The track segment is called a “Turnout”, if
it is connected with three other track segments.
(a) straight track segment
z.1 z.3 z.5
(b) schematic diagram
Figure 2.6 – Components of track segments
Turnout/Point
A turnout is an assembly of track segment, movable points, and a frog, which aﬀects the
tangential branching of tracks and allows trains to run over one track or another (Fig. 2.7(a)).
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In the French system schematic diagram, the turnout is typically represented as a “ZONE”
with a point. For example in Fig. 2.7(b), “z.4” is the ID of the current track segment and the
number 2 above is the ID of the point.
Point
Point machine
Frog
Facing point
movement Trailling point
movement
Trailling point
movement
(a) Turnout and its compositions
z.4
2
(b) schematic diagram
Figure 2.7 – Components of turnout
In fact, the term turnout3 is mostly used in civil engineering, while in the railway sig-
nalling domain it is usually referred to as “point”, although this term in its original meaning
only applies to the part of a turnout where the points are located. In our following research,
we use “point” to refer to “turnout”.
The points may be operated manually or by a point machine. The part where two rails
cross is referred to as a frog, which is also sometimes operated by a point machine. In each
position change, the point will first disconnect with the original track branch, move to the
new branch and build the new connection. The train movement in this area approaching
the point is called “facing point movement”, whereas the movement approaching the frog
is called “trailing point movement”.
For a single point, the safety requirement and its control logic are very simple and clear.
(a) Junctions
(b) Crossovers
(c) Ladder
Figure 2.8 – Basic point arrangements
3In the American system, a turnout is called a switch, and the point machine is called a switch machine
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But in real cases, the railway network is always a complicated combination of elements,
which need special interlocking rules to ensure traﬃc safety. Some common combination,
such as junction, crossover and ladder, are shown in Fig. 2.8. A junction is an arrangement
where a line is joined by another one. A crossover is a connection between two parallel
tracks which enables trains to move from one line to another. A ladder is a series of point
and parallel tracks that allow trains to access any parallel tracks. The ladders are normally
for yard and terminal layouts.
Crossing
The railway crossing is a critical component of the railway network. It is the intersection
of two rail routes, as shown in Fig. 2.9. There are several types of crossing. Some crossings
that are equipped with points allow trains to move from one rail route to another. For safety
reasons, if a train is moving along on a crossing, then for both rail routes, this crossing needs
to be locked to avoid collision.
(a) rigid crossing (b) movable crossing
(c) single slip (d) double slip
Figure 2.9 – Components of crossings
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2.4 The risk from signalling system
From the analysis above, the characteristics of the railway system that may be potential
safety restrictions are shown in Table 2.1
Table 2.1 – Safety restrictions of railway system
Item Characteristics Safety restrictions
1 One-dimensional unable to overtake and avoid
2 Low adhesion long braking distance
3 Points & Crossings traﬃc convergences
4 Third parties uncertain factors
From these potential restrictions, there are 3 categories of rail accidents, which contain
10 kinds of dangerous events. In Table 2.2, each event should be monitored and prevented
by one or more systems, including rolling stock, fixed installations and interlocking systems.
It should be noted that in the PERFECT project frame, we study the implementation of
ERTMS in high speed lines. However, there will be no level-crossings along the high speed
lines, so the level-crossing is not one of our research topics.
2.5 Railway interlocking system
One of the basic requirements of the railway safety is that a systemmust prevent trains from
collision. For this reason, there is a mechanism, called railway interlocking system (RIS),
which is a collection of associated devices, complying with explicit signalling principles.
The purpose of the RIS is to maintain the transit safety by connecting and arranging the
points and signals, so that a hazardous condition cannot arise.
2.5.1 Overview
There is a simple example of an interlocking system, as illustrated in Fig. 2.10. Track seg-
ments are represented in a topology structure, and all of them have track circuits, which
detect the occupation of a train. Joints of diﬀerent track lines represent the points. The
sign-board-like symbols are signals of various types of transition control. This example is
constituted by 2 allowed routes, 1 point, 2 signals and 3 track circuits.
In Fig. 2.10, the interlocking route that a train can go through safely must meet the
following requirements:
• All points are properly positioned and are locked;
• Conflicting routes must be protected;
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Table 2.2 – Dangerous events of railway system
Dangerous events
Causes
Name Explanation
C
ol
li
si
on
s
Head-on collision 1 2
Rear collision 1 2
flank collision 2 3
Level-crossing Collision 1 2 4
Collision with Obstructions 1 2 4
D
er
ai
lm
en
ts Plain track 2
Curves 2
Junctions 2 3
O
th
er Fire & explosions 4
Fails from trains, individual
on tracks
4
• All the tracks along the route must be clear;
When all of the above conditions are satisfied, the signals can be set to green to let the
train enter the route. These rules express the fundamental principles that hold for all the
RISs. Such rules ensure only the correct combinations of tracks, points and signals, in or-
der to avoid accidents. The signal indications authorise the movements of the train. They
are handled by the interlocking system, and can be considered as a indicator of the route
establishment.
In our research, we restrict ourselves to the modelling of RISs. To better specify this
complex system, we now introduce its composition and main components. In railway sig-
nalling, the term “interlocking” has two meanings [Pachl 2002]. First, “an interlocking”
is an arrangement of signal appliances that prevent conflicting movements through an ar-
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Figure 2.10 – An example of railway interlocking system
rangement of tracks. Second, principles to achieve a safety arrangement between signal
appliances are also generally called “interlocking”.
According to the above definition and considering the train and the operator as external
interactions, the RIS could be roughly divided into two parts: the signalling operations and
the fixed installations.
Signalling operations are a set of operating rules and procedures that can maintain safety
and high eﬃciency of transits. It comprises computer automatic controls and human control
processes. Normally, the computer responds to most of the device-oriented operations, such
as route establishment, route auto-destruction, · · · , while human control deals with decision-
making, such as route selection, route mode selection, route manual destruction, · · · , and
some non-regular operations, such as shunting operations.
Fixed installations are a set of components of geographical routes, which include straight
track sections, points, signal lights, and some ground-based automatic signalling devices
which could work automatically and do not need supervision from the signalling centre.
Thus, they should be treated as a component in the geographical route.
2.5.2 The general architecture of the French signal centre
The general architecture of a signal centre is the result of historical evolution. It is broken
down into the diﬀerent levels of Fig. 2.11, which provide diﬀerent security levels of function.
In Fig. 2.11, Level 0 is human machine interface. Its corresponding functions are com-
mand interlocking routes and certain positions of the components. Level 0 is achieved with
a dependability of SIL2 [Antoni 2009c].
Level 1 is interlocking system. Its aim is to ensure that the various commands are oper-
ated in compliance with all the safety rules. This level is the core of the system safety. It
must be realized with the highest level of security, the SIL4.
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Control table
SIL2
Human machine
interface
Level 0
Interlocking
system
SIL4
Interlocking
system
Level 1
Point machine
Signal controls
Track circuits
Interface of
trackside components
Level 2
Points
Signal lights
Level-crossings
Trackside
components
Level 3
Figure 2.11 – The general architecture of a signal centre
Level 2 is the control interface of the trackside components, such as the point machines,
signal controls and track circuits. This level should be achieved with the fail-safe concept,
and it must also be realized with SIL4 security level.
Level 3 is the trackside components, such as points, signal lights and level-crossings.
2.5.3 The operating phases of a signal centre
Since the advent of the PRS12 type signalling control system, the framework of operating
phases[Rétiveau 1987] is basically set down, and still in use today. Although with the ad-
vances in technology, many new types of signalling control systems (PRG13, PRCI14) have
been developed, they all comply with the following basic principles:
• There are a route control interface (buttons or a computer screen) and an optimal
interlocking table.
• It is possible to save the following functions:
– Saving a route before its formation conditions are met
– Forming a permanent route (for several successive trains)
4CIt (route control relay, french: le relais de Commande de l’Itinéraire)
5CAg (point control relay, french: le relais de Commande des Aiguilles)
6Tr.I (odd transit relay, french: le relais de Transit Impair)
7Tr.P (even transit relay, french: le relais de Transit Pair)
8RRV (track circuit relay, french: Répétiteur du Relais de Voie)
9EIt (entrance signal relay of interlocked route, french: le relais d’Enclenchement d’Itinéraire du signal
d’entrée)
10RIt (route repeater relay, french: le relais Répétiteur d’Itinéraire)
11KAg (point checking relay, french: le Contrôle impératif des Aiguilles)
12PRS (relay-based flexible signalling control, french: Poste d’aiguillage tout Relais à transit Souple)
13PRG (relay-based geographic cable signalling control, french: Poste d’aiguillage tout Relais à câblage
Géographique)
14PRCI (relay-based computer-controlled control, french: Poste d’aiguillage à Relais à Commande
Informatique)
46 CHAPTER 2. Some principles of railway safety
– The operation is “readable” and fully deterministic
• All the operations are clearly and rigorously specified in a regulation
Generally, the operations are carried out in successive phases that take account of suc-
cessive behaviours of points and track segments (Table 2.3 and Fig. 2.12).
The safety principle of the interlocking is achieved by the function of transit relays. Nor-
mally, each track segment has at least one transit relay, Tr.I or/and Tr.P (in Fig. 2.12). Each
transit relay is responsible for one direction of traﬃc. Any of the two relays, which are inter-
Table 2.3 – Function phases of establishing a safe route (based on PRS type)
Phases Actions Translations in PRS Results
Control &
register (com-
mande et
enregistrement)
Press down the but-
ton
Activate the route control re-
lay (CIt4), the button start
flashing
Interlock the
point control re-
lay (CAg5)
Preparation
(préparation)
Positioning the
point for the route
on the condition
that this point is
not interlocked or
occupied by other
routes
Only when the related related
transits (Tr.I6 and Tr.P7) are
activated and the track circuit
relay (RRV8) are deactivated,
then the point control relay
(CAg) can topple over to the
right position.
After all the points
of this route are
placed in the right
position, the re-
lated relay of the
entrance signal of
route interlocking
(EIt9) is allowed
to be switched to
“open” position
Formation in-
terlocking and
verification
(Enclenchement
et contrôle de
formation)
Interlock this route
and prevent the for-
mation of other con-
flicting routes
Deactivate the transit relay
(Tr.I or Tr.P ), which ensures
the interlocking of the transit;
Active the route repeater relay
(RIt10) which ensures continu-
ous control of the position of
CAg and EIt.
The button stop
flashing and switch
on steady
Verification
(Contrôle)
verify the establish-
ment of this route
and open the en-
trance signal light
The eﬀective position of the
point are represented by the
status of relay KAg11; The
activation of KAg allows us
to control the entrance signal
light
Switch on the en-
trance signal light
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Figure 2.12 – An example of PRS type railway interlocking system
locked, can maintain blocking of this track segment. If this track segment has a point, the
interlocked relays can also maintain the position of the point, in order to maintain the forma-
tion of the route. Furthermore, the blocked “transit” of this route prevents other conflicting
routes from being formed and switches oﬀ all the conflicting signal lights. The release of a
“transit” depends on either the manual destruction control of the route, or the release action
from upstream track segments. Only when both transition relays of a track segment are
released, can this track segment be re-used by other routes, and the position of the point be
modified.
Fig. 2.12 presents the fixed installation of a simple point, which shows a circuit diagram
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of the main units for a route establishing procedure. In this figure, the green arrows are
used to indicate the process of establishing the route AC. The realization of the route is the
implementation and completion of each phase:
1. Order a route: press the button⇒ Relay CIt.AC could be activated
2. Register the route: relay CIt related switches change statuses
3. Preparation of the route: relay CAg changes to right position
4. Interlock the route by transit relay: relay Elt and relay RIt.AC is activated ⇒ Tr.5 is
deactivated in order to block the route AB
5. Verify the formation of the route: relay KAg ⇒ KIt could be activated
6. Open the entrance signal light: the signal light C1 is switched on (change to green)
In summary, the functions of a interlocking system are activated in successive phases.
which take into account the positioning of the points, the occupation of the track circuits,
the successive actions of internal relays and switches.
Part II
Methodology Construction

Chapter3
Formal modelization for railway
interlocking system via hierarchical
coloured Petri net
In this chapter, we study the modelling of the French railway interlocking system using
hierarchical coloured Petri net.
3.1 Introduction
A railway interlocking system is a collection of associated devices, complying with specific
interlocking principles. The purpose of the RIS is to maintain transit safety by connecting
and arranging the points and signals, so that a hazardous condition cannot arise. At present,
computer-controlled relay-based interlocking systems still occupy a large proportion of the
practical application in the French railway system. They have the advantages of being less
dependent on human operators and faster self-checking ability, but their complex sequence
of checks and consequent actions makes the railway interlocking a large concurrent system,
which has a potentially complex total behaviour. Hence, detailed verifications and valida-
tions are essential before the system is put into service. As a result, the formalization of RIS
becomes important to both the development of the computer-controlled interlocking system
and the third-part testing of the RIS facilities.
Another strong motivation is the implementation of ERTMS. There are some critical
aspects and many detailed application decisions that will impact on the railway network
once the system is in service [Murphy 2007]. One of the issues is the interlocking system
which is pertaining to each country and not included in the ERTMS specifications. Another
issue is that according to the French national transportation department, before applying
the new ERTMS system to an existing railway line, a safety assessment must be done in
order to prove safety equivalence between the former system and the new one. However,
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the current signalling system and its RIS have withstood the test of time, and are the fruit
of long-term improvements and modifications. To prove the safety equivalence of the new
system without any practical experience, the formal method can be a reasonable solution for
this problem. As a primary step, the formal modelization of RIS is needed as a fundamental
part of this task.
In order to maintain high-level security of RIS, IFSTTAR is leading a project to develop
the formal verification of the French RIS in the context of national rules and the influence of
implementing European ERTMS rules on the original system [Collart-Dutilleul et al. 2014;
Sun, Collart-Dutilleul, and Bon 2014]. My research contributes to the fundamental parts of
the project. It focuses on the formal specification of the French RIS, which is based on the
PRCI1 type system.
This chapter is organized as follows:
First, we describe the modelling structure of an interlocking system and its correspond-
ing network, as well as a set of interlocking properties that this network should obey.
Subsequently, we specify this interlocking system with coloured Petri nets in a generic
and compact structure. In this modelling framework, the high-level functions of RIS are
modelled in terms of a hierarchical and modular point of view. The railway layout (net-
works) is modelled in a geographical perspective, in order to be easily understood by railway
expert engineers.
Then, for the high-level parts of RIS, we propose a modelling pattern of the French rail-
way interlocking system, which is a parameterized model that respects the French national
rules. It is a general reusable solution to this kind of problem and can be used in many
diﬀerent given contexts.
Finally, for the low-level parts of RIS, we introduce an event-based concept into the mod-
elling process, in order to better describe the internal interaction of low-level interlocking
logic. In this process, a reduction policy is applied both before and after the state space
calculation to obtain a new compact graph with the same reliability for analysis.
3.2 Preliminaries of coloured Petri net
In this section, we begin with the background of Petri net (PN), and discuss the reason for
choosing PNs as research tools. Then, we review basic concepts and notation of coloured
Petri net (CPN) [Jensen 1981, 1987], including non-hierarchical CPN, hierarchical CPN,
CPN with priroitized transitions and the analysis method of CPN tools: the state space.
1PRCI (relay-based computer-controlled control, french: Poste d’aiguillage à Relais à Commande
Informatique)
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3.2.1 Background
Petri net theory was first introduced in Germany in 1962 by C.A.Petri and documented in
his Ph.D. thesis [Petri 1962]. His work has attracted the attention of several research groups
and his thesis has been translated into English [Petri 1966].
Petri nets [Holloway, Krogh, and Giua 1997a; Murata 1989; Peterson 1981; Reisigs and
Rozenberg 1998] are the technique suited to the specification and development of concur-
rent and distributed systems. Nets can model systems at diﬀerent abstraction and concep-
tual levels. This technique also provides the foundation of a straightforward and intuitive
graphical notion for specifications. These clear notations make it possible for a system to
be visualized by its corresponding net model. Moreover, all the executions of Petri nets
are performed by a rigorous and explicit algorithm process, which is based on a complete
mathematical theory. So, they could be used for some formal proofs.
In general, a Petri net comprises a bipartite directed graph consisting of a set of places,
a set of transitions, a set of arcs (connecting transitions to places or places to transitions),
together with the associated annotations and an initial marking. Places can contain tokens
(data values). Distribution of tokens to places is known as the marking of the net. An ini-
tial marking is the initial distribution. Typically, places represent system resources (called
states), whereas transitions represent events. Transitions are enabled when suﬃcient re-
sources are available. Enabled transitions can occur. The occurrence of a transition could
change the state of the system.
Although Petri net is a formal, mathematical, well-developed theory, French industry
still prefers to use another informal tool—GRAFCET. In order to be close to industry usage
habits, and to take advantage of formal methods, we make a little comparison of GRAFCET
and Petri nets to discuss why the Petri net is our best solution for modelling the French
railway system.
3.2.2 GRAFCET and Petri net
GRAphe Fonctionnel de Commande Étape/Transition (GRAFCET) is a method of represen-
tation and analysis of automation. This is a graphical tool for describing the behaviours of
the control processes. It describes the informational interactions across the system bound-
ary. This mode of representation is independent of the technology used in the automation,
and reflects a consistent specification of the automatism.
This method was proposed in 1977 by the Association Français pour la Cybernetique
Economique et Technique (AFCET) as a standard to represent specifications for software
control systems. Promoted by the Agence Nationale pour le Developpement de la Produc-
tion Automatise (ADEPA), it was accepted in 1982 as a French standard by the Association
Française de Normalization (AFNOR) [Union Technique de l’Electricitè 1982]. In 1987, it
was accepted as an international standard IEC 1131.3 by the International Electrotechnical
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Commission (1EC) [IEC 1988]. The GRAFCET is also known as DFS (Diagramme Fonction-
nel en Séquence) or in English, the SFC (Sequential Function Chart).
Later, GRAFCET became widely used in both industry and research areas. The main con-
tribution of GRAFCET is that its formalism allows a clear modelling of inputs/outputs and
of their relations. It also permits modelling of concurrency and synchronisation. This makes
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) more tractable and simplifies the simulation of the
control logic of the system [Zaytoon and Villermain-Lecolier 1999]. Many PLC builders
today use the GRAFCET as a specification and/or as a programming language. Large com-
panies using it widely or recognising it as an internal standard, include Alstom, Renault,
Siemens, Peugeot, Michelin.
Theory in short
The basic composition of a GRAFCET model [Giua and DiCesare 1993] is quite clear and
simple: the steps, the transitions, the links, the actions and their associated receptivity. An
example of the GRAFCET can be found in Fig. 3.1.
1
2 3a
3b
4a
4b
Receptivity
Action
5
•
Initial step
Active step
Step
Transition
Figure 3.1 – Basic concepts of the GRAFCET
The basic components of the GRAFCET are:
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The steps are represented by square boxes. A step may be active or inactive, which is
represented by the presence of a token in the step. The state of a GRAFCET, at a given time,
is defined as the set of the active steps.
Transitions are represented by horizontal bars. They represent the possibility of changing
from one state to another. A transition is enabled when all immediately preceding steps are
active. A transition may be cleared (or fired) if it is enabled and its receptivity is “TRUE”.
The links are directed arcs joining steps to transitions and transitions to steps. They
express the flow of control. The direction of the links is assumed to be downward unless an
arrow specifies otherwise.
A receptivity is associated with each transition. Receptivity is a boolean expression that
can have true or false values depending on the state or status changes of variables. The
receptivity determines the “clear” act of the transition. A variable can be internal (state of
stage timing) or external (PLC input).
The actions specify what must be done during the activation step. An action can be
internal (counter, timer arming) or external (PLC output).
Moreover, there are five rules that are originally used to describe the evolution of a given
GRAFCET [Zaytoon and Villermain-Lecolier 1999]:
R1 Initialization: Activate the initial steps at the beginning of system analysis.
R2 Fire a transition: If a transition is enabled and its receptivity is true, the transition will
be fired.
R3 Activate steps: Firing a transition will immediately lead to the activation of all the
downstream steps.
R4 Concurrency: Several simultaneously enabled transitions can actually be fired simulta-
neously.
R5 Simultaneously Activate and deactivate a step: During a transition, if a step is simultane-
ously active and inactive, it will remain active.
From GRAFCET to Petri net
The GRAFCET has many advantages and it already has a wide range of applications. How-
ever, with the increasing safety need of the international standards, GRAFCET has also long
been criticised because of its lack of a formal foundation that allows it to ensure correctness
and safety requirements. On the other hand, “it lacks adequate methodology that allows an ef-
ficient development of high quality models in the case of complex systems on the other” [Zaytoon
and Villermain-Lecolier 1999].
To compensate for its deficiency, researchers began to use other formal languages to de-
scribe GRAFCET. Particularly, formal design methods of state diagrams and Petri nets are
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available. State diagrams are easy to learn and can be converted into many existing program-
ming languages of GRAFCET without any problem. However, some complex structures,
such as a parallel, cannot be well represented. Petri nets can achieve almost all the struc-
tures of GRAFCET [René and Alla 1992, 1997]. The models can be extensively analysed by
PNs in order to prove formally. Also, the model of PNs can be converted into GRAFCET.
Furthermore, PNs are also accepted by some French industries.
Here is a comparison of the structure of GRAFCET and PN in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 – Structure comparison between GRAFCET and Petri net
GRAFCET Petri net
Step ⇔ place
transition ⇔ transition
link ⇔ arc
receptivity ⇔ guard
action ⇔ auxiliary place
With Table 3.1, the model in Fig. 3.1 can be transformed into a PN model as shown
in Fig. 3.2. Their notation formalism is so close that the engineer who is familiar with the
GRAFCET will easily understand the models of PNs. In other words, if a system is specified
by PNs, it can be validated both by PN tools and by experienced expert engineers . In this
way the designed system can be considered as a strong formal proof. As a result, the PN is
the most appropriate formal language to continue our research. Currently, the PNs are ac-
cepted by some French industries, such as the French national railway company(SNCF) [An-
toni 2012b; Buchheit et al. 2011; Lalouette et al. 2010].
1
2 3a
3b
4a
[Receptivity]
4b Action
5
Figure 3.2 – Corresponding Petri net model
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The major diﬀerence between these two languages is the mechanism of “concurrency”.
The GRAFCET allows the all the enabled concurrent transitions to be fired at the same
time, while in PNs, there will be a “choice” of firing one or another transition, thus reaching
diﬀerent newmarkings. Further information on the diﬀerences betweenGRAFCET and PNs
can be found in [Giua and DiCesare 1993].
3.2.3 Coloured Petri net
Coloured Petri nets (CPNs) are a backward compatible extension of Petri nets. PNs were
developed by Prof. Kurt Jensen [Jensen 1981, 1987, 1996] during late 1970s and 1980s. The
definitions of PNs are based on distinguishable tokens being arbitrary complex data values
and with some concepts from high-level programming language— the Meta language (ML).
The CPNmaintains the properties of classical PN and provides a new formalism to allow
the distinction between tokens. Then, each token is no longer noted with indistinguishable
black dots, but with a data value which is named as the token colour. Each place in the CPN
models can be marked with diﬀerent tokens, but with the same type which is called the
colour set. Arcs and transitions are inscribed with symbolic expressions. The arc expressions
on the arc going into or out of the place are evaluated, and become a multi-set of tokens
of the same type as the colour set of the place. There are two types of inscriptions that
may be associated with a transition: the guard expression and the code segment. The guard
expression is a boolean expression that is evaluated and becomes TRUE or FALSE. The code
segment contains ML code, and is executed when its parent transition occurs. It is utilized
to do some calculation and may bind the variables located on the output arcs. The state of a
CPN model (marking) is composed of all the tokens including both their numbers and their
colours.
In the late 1980s, the hierarchical concept was introduced to PNs [Huber, Jensen, and
Shapiro 1991; Jensen 1996]. It provides a mechanism to formally integrate a set of smaller
PNs to construct a larger CPN.
In the 1990s the concept of transition priority was introduced to PNs [Bause 1997; Best
and Koutny 1992], and later this function was integrated into CPN tools [Westergaard and
Verbeek 2011, 2013]. The transition priorities can be a useful mechanism when describing
priorities of concurrent events, such as an exceptional event.
The time attribute is also an important concept of PNs, which allows us to model and
analyse temporal behaviours and performance of real time systems [Jensen 1996; Jensen and
Kristensen 2009].
Commonly, PNs are used to investigate the behaviours of the modelled system. CPN
models that are investigated in this thesis are CPN of non-time domain, including non-
hierarchical CPN, hierarchical coloured Petri net (HCPN), and CPN with prioritized transi-
tions.
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3.2.4 Graphic notation and modelling ability of coloured Petri net
This section explains the graphic notation which is adopted to represent PNs and the as-
sociated concepts. With diﬀerent examples, it also expresses the modelling ability of PNs.
First, we use a non-hierarchical CPN example to introduce the basic components of the PNs.
Then, we add hierarchical concept to the example to discuss the HCPN and its notations.
Finally, we add prioritized transitions into the model to have a better description of the sys-
tem. All the formal definitions can be found in Appendix A, or in the book, “Coloured Petri
nets: modelling and validation of concurrent systems” [Jensen and Kristensen 2009] and in the
paper of Westergaard and Verbeek [Westergaard and Verbeek 2011, 2013].
A non-hierarchical coloured Petri net example
For a better understanding of CPN notations, we have a toy example in Fig. 3.3. It is a small
circular railway network of 7 sections (tracks) and 2 trains (A and B). The simple operating
rule is that there must be a safe distance of one section between trains. That means, when
moving to a new section, both this section and the next one should be empty. Trains are all
moving towards the same direction. The corresponding CPNmodel is shown in Fig. 3.4
Figure 3.3 – A circular railway network
Coloured Petri net component CPN models have two parts: the Declarations and the net
graphs which consist of places, transitions, arcs and associated inscriptions.
Declarations: each CPN model has a set of declarations, which declares a number of
colour sets, functions, variables and constants. Once declared, they may be used in the
net inscriptions of the corresponding net, in particular in the guards, arc expressions and
transition code segment. All these declarations use “a language called CPN ML, which is
3.2. Preliminaries of coloured Petri net 59
Sections Move
1‘(s, busy)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), free)++
1‘(((s+2) mod 7), free)
1‘(s, free)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), busy)++
1‘(((s+2) mod 7), free)
Train
(t, ((s+1) mod 7))
(t, s)
TS
1‘(A,0)++
1‘(B,3)
SS
1‘(0,busy)++
1‘(1,free)++
1‘(2,free)++
1‘(3,busy)++
1‘(4,free)++
1‘(5,free)++
1‘(6,free)
Declarations:
val n=7;
colset Section = int with 0..n-1;
colset State = bool with (busy, free);
colset SS = product Section * State;
colset Train = with A|B;
colset TS = product Train * Section;
var s : Section;
var t : Train;
Figure 3.4 – A non-hierarchical coloured Petri net example
relatively close to the style of declarations used in ordinary high-level programming languages”
[Jensen 1996]. In Fig. 3.4, the declarations define 1 constant, 5 colour sets and 2 variables.
CPN ML language: The CPN ML language is based on the functional programming lan-
guage Standard ML (SML) [Milner 1997]. “It embeds the Standard ML language and extends
it with constructs for defining colour sets and functions, declaring variables, and writing inscrip-
tions in CPN models” [Jensen 1996].
Places: places are represented, as usual, by ellipses. The place name, the colour set and
the initial marking are located close to their corresponding place. The initial marking is
also a multi-set, and it may be a union of several multi-sets. In Fig. 3.4, there are two places.
Place Train have the colour type of TS, which indicates the train name and its location. Place
Sections with colour type SS, represent the circular tracks and their occupation status.
Transitions: transitions are represented by rectangles. They may contain the transition
name, the transition condition (guard function), the code segment and the priority. As this
model is so small that we can put all the calculation on the arcs, the transition in this model
has no further inscription with it.
Arcs: arcs are represented by arrows, and they are annotated by terms of the same type
as their associated place. The arc expressions can be as simple as a constant (bool or enu-
meration value), a single variable, or comprise complex inscription involving functions. In
Fig. 3.4, the arc (Train,Move) has an expression of a simple variable, while the expression of
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arc (Section,Move) is a multi-set with functions.
State space graph The state space graph (SSG), or so-called reachability graph, is repre-
sented by a set of system states and the arcs between diﬀerent states. The nodes of the SSG
are noted by rounded boxes. Each node represents a reachable marking. The numbers in
the node identify its ID and the number of predecessors and successors. Each arc represents
the occurrence of a transition. The inscription on an edge indicates the name of a transition
together with the particular bindings of variables.
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Figure 3.5 – State space graph of the non-hierarchical coloured Petri net example
The SSG generated from the example model of Fig. 3.4 is shown in Fig. 3.5. It contains
28 nodes and 42 arcs. The purple arcs are the movements of Train A, while the blue ones
represent Train B.
Hierarchical coloured Petri net example
Now, we add more details in the example of Fig. 3.3, and get a new example in Fig. 3.6. We
suppose that the drivers cannot drive the train without the movement authority (MA) from
the signal centre. Each time the signal centre can send out only one MA. The generation of
the MAs obeys the same operating rule as in the previous example. This new driving mode
fully depends on and obeys the order of the MA. In other words, the drivers are “blind” for
the situation of the front routes.
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Figure 3.6 – A circular railway network with a signal centre
The corresponding HCPN model is shown in Fig. 3.7. The colour set MA represents
the movement authority, which is generated in sub-module Signal_centre and sent to sub-
module Driver.
InHCPN, the construction of CPN allows a net to be organised as a module, in a similar
way to the process in which programming language is implemented into modules. With
the modular structure, any large system could be divided into separate modules and their
connection relationships could indicate an overview of the system. Conceptually, nets with
modules are nets with multiple layers of detail. Such a hierarchical model is easy to handle
when designers only need to concentrate on one small part of the system at a time. Moreover,
some repeated components could only be defined once but used repeatedly. This is quite
eﬃcient and time-saving.
Substitution transitions: this mechanism can be achieved by breaking the CPN net into
smaller pieces by utilizing the substitution transitions. A substitution transition can rep-
resent an entire piece of net structure. In Fig. 3.7, the transition Driver and Signal centre
are substitution transitions. They represent the perspectives of the drivers and the signal
centre.
The token exchange between diﬀerent layers is through port–socket relation, which relates
the port places of the sub-module to the socket places of the substitution transition. The
sockets are the places that are directly connected to a substitution transition, for example
Sections andMA are sockets of both transition Driver and Signal centre. The ports are places
that are associated with each socket. The port places are marked with blue tags, such as
In-tag, Out-tag and In/Out-tag.
Fusion places: the fusion places are a set of special places so that anything that happens to
each place in a set also happens to all the other places in the set. The set of the fusion places
is called fusion set. The fusion places can exist on the same page of a net or on diﬀerent
pages. A fusion place is assigned with a fusion tag. Any fusion places that are marked with
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the same fusion tag belong to the same fusion set, which means they are the same place.
Inhibitor arcs: the transition that is connected to the inhibitor arc can only fire if there is
no token in the involved place. In Fig. 3.7, the transition Control has an inhibitor arc from
place MA, which prevents Control from enabling if place MA contains a token.
State space of HCPN model: the SSG generated from the example model of Fig. 3.7 is
shown in Fig. 3.8. It contains 70 nodes and 84 arcs. The purple arcs and blue arcs represent
the movements of Train A and Train B. The red arcs and cyan arcs indicate the diﬀerent MAs
that are generated for Train A and Train B.
Sections
Driver Signal centre
MA
SS
1‘(0,busy)++
1‘(1,free)++
1‘(2,free)++
1‘(3,busy)++
1‘(4,free)++
1‘(5,free)++
1‘(6,free)
MA
Driver Signal_cente
(a) Top layer
Declarations:
val n=7;
colset Section = int with 0..n-1;
colset State = bool with (busy, free);
colset SS = product Section * State;
colset Train = with A|B;
colset TS = product Train * Section;
colset MA = product Train * BOOL;
var s : Section;
var t : Train;
var state : State;
(b) Declarations
Sections Control
1‘(s, busy)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), free)++
1‘(((s+2) mod 7), free)
Train
(t, s)
MA
(t,true)
SSIn
TS
1‘(A,0)++
1‘(B,3)
train
MAOut
(c) Sub-model of Singal cnetre
Sections Drive
1‘(s, busy)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), state)
1‘(s, free)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), busy)
Train
(t, ((s+1) mod 7))
(t, s)
MA
(t, true)
TS
1‘(A,0)++
1‘(B,3)
trainSSIn/Out
MAIn
(d) Sub-model of Driver
Figure 3.7 – The hierarchical coloured Petri net model of the circular railway with a signal
centre
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Figure 3.8 – State space graph of the hierarchical coloured Petri net example
Transition prioritized coloured Petri net example
In practice, not all trains have the same priority. Normally, the TGV2 has higher priority
than TER3. We suppose that Train A is a TGV and Train B is a TER. The new scenario is
shown in Fig. 3.9.
The corresponding prioritized HCPN model is shown in Fig. 3.10. In this CPN model,
we have assigned a priority tag “P_HIGH” to transition Control A, while the other transitions
have the default priority “P_NORMAL”.
The transition priority can be a useful mechanism when describing priorities of concur-
rent events. For example, a high-priority transition is forced to occur before other transi-
tions if they are enabled. This is useful for handling exceptions. On the other hand, the
low-priority transitions can be used to model background tasks that should only be exe-
cuted when no other transition is enabled. Transition priorities are also useful for analysis,
as the internal priorities could reduce the concurrency, leading to smaller state-spaces.
Transition priorities: for low-level PNs, static priorities are defined in [Best and Koutny
1992], which are relational static priorities. For high-level PNs, CPN Tools support the abso-
2TGV (high-speed train, french: Train à Grande Vitesse)
3TER (regional express transport, french: Transport Express Régional)
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Figure 3.9 – A circular railway network with a signal centre and train priorities
Sections
Control B1‘(s, busy)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), free)++
1‘(((s+2) mod 7), free)
Control A
1‘(s, busy)++
1‘(((s+1) mod 7), free)++
1‘(((s+2) mod 7), free)
Train
(A, s)
(B, s)
MA
(B,true)
(A,true)
SSIn
TS
1‘(A,0)++
1‘(B,3)
train MAOut
P_HIGH
(a) Prioritized singal centre module
Declarations:
val P_HIGH = 100;
val P_NORMAL = 1000;
(b) Declarations
Figure 3.10 – Prioritized hierarchical coloured Petri net model of circular railway
lute static priority concept, which is described in [Westergaard and Verbeek 2013].
We are using Kurt Jensen’s definition form in our research, while the publication above is
using other forms of PN definitions. To normalize all the definitions, we adapt and integrate
the definitions of [Best and Koutny 1992; Westergaard and Verbeek 2013] into Kurt Jensen’s
definition framework. Then, we have the definitions as below:
Definition 3.1. Static Priority (Def. 3.1 in [Best and Koutny 1992],Def. 3 in Westergaard
and Verbeek 2013) A static priority system is a pair (CPN,ρ), which:
1. CPN = (P,T ,A,Σ,V ,C,G,E,I ) is a CPN.
2. ρ : T → P is a priority function that assigns a priority to each transition.
3. P is a finite set of natural numbers, called the priorities of the transitions.
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The priorities in Definition 3.1 are global and do not depend on the binding of the tran-
sition. Intuitively, if ρ(t) < ρ(t′) then t′ has priority over t. Precisely, it means that t′ can be
enabled before t. When dealing with such priority systems, we define that if a transition is
enabled according to Definition A.5 in Appendix A, it is pre-enabled. Then, we can have
the new enabling rules for priority systems as follows:
Definition 3.2. Enabling with Priority (Def. 3.3 in [Best and Koutny 1992],Def. 4 in [West-
ergaard and Verbeek 2013]). A transition t ∈ T is enabled in the marking M if it is pre-
enabled and no transition t′ with ρ(t) < ρ(t′) is pre-enabled.
The algorithm for checking enablingwith priority in CPNTools is shown in Algorithm 3.1.
First, it sorts all transitions according to priority and processes them highest-priority-first
until it reaches t. If it finds a pre-enabled transition with higher priority than t, it returns
false. If it does not find a pre-enabled transition with higher priority than t it returns the
pre-enable status of t.
Algorithm 3.1 Algorithm for checking enabling with prior-
ity (Algorithm 3 in [Westergaard and Verbeek 2013])
1: SortedTransitions← PrioritySort(T)
2: After any transitions or initialisation
3: procedure CheckEnablingPriority(t) is
4: for all t′ ∈ SortedTransitions do
5: if ρ(t′) > ρ(t) then
6: if CheckEnabling(t′) then
7: return false
8: else
9: return CheckEnabling(t)
In fig. 3.10, corresponding to Definition 3.1, each priority is a natural number that is
defined in the declaration table in Fig. 3.10(b). In CPN Tools, the priorities are defined
as Positive INT variables. The higher the number, the lower the priority. According to the
model declarations, priority relation is P_NORMAL < P_HIGH.
The state space of the CPN model example is shown in Fig. 3.11. It contains 28 nodes
and 28 arcs. Compared to the SSG in Fig. 3.8, it is clear that prioritiezd transitions can
exclude some occurrences, which could eﬀectively reduce the size of state-space. The result
means the technique of prioritized transitions is useful for analysis, as we can assign some
internal transitions with higher or lower priority, in order to preempt or relinquish the order
of concurrency, leading to smaller state space.
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Figure 3.11 – State space graph of the prioritized hierarchical coloured Petri net model
3.3 Initial coloured Petri net specification of railway inter-
locking system
As we have discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, the railway interlocking system plays a vital
role in the safe transportation of a railway system. In our research, we focus on the traﬃc
safety aspect, and suppose that all the fixed infrastructures are both reliable and robust.
The only threat to safety comes from the imperfect signalling rules or the incompatible
international standards.
The modelling framework of the whole railway interlocking system could be divided
into three parts: the signalling operations, the fixed installations and rolling stock, as in
Fig. 3.12. The train driver communicates with the dispatcher and requests an interlocking
route. Train movement is a series of interactions with fixed installations (such as stopping at
red lights, actions on track circuit). In response to train requests, the signalling operations
send certain commands to fixed installations(such as points and signal lights) according to
its operating principles.
• Signalling Operations is a set of operating rules and control procedures of an inter-
locking system. It comprises computer automatic control and human manual control.
Normally, the computer processes are responsible for most of the device-oriented op-
erations, while human dispatchers deal with decision-making and non-regular opera-
tions.
• Fixed Installations includes track segments, points, signal lights, and other automatic
facilities that could be self-acting without the instruction from the train controlling
centre. Whereas the critical safety results are always represented in the fixed installa-
tions, the safety verification for all the fixed ones’ function is needed.
• Rolling Stock runs on interlocking routes and is supervised by both route conditions
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Signalling Operations
Fixed Installations
Rolling Stock
Safety Verification
Commands Relay value
Requests
Movements
Figure 3.12 – Specification framework of railway interlocking system
and operating instructions.
PNs are a powerful formal tool that have been applied to many railway applications.
Their formal definition can be found in Appendix A. Considering the large scale and the
space complexity of interlocking systems, one feasible solution is to model the RIS byHCPN.
The signalling operations and the fixed installations are represented by the topology struc-
ture of PN, in order to express complex connections and logical relations between diﬀerent
devices, while each train is defined as a coloured token which can move along the network
of track work.
To distinguish between various syntactic parts of a Petri net model, we classify diﬀerent
nets into 3 types. The first two basic types in RIS are the signalling operations and the fixed
installations. The net N o = (Po,T o,Ao,Σo) represents the operation part, which implements
the route management process and movement authority control. The net N i = (P i ,T i ,Ai ,Σi )
represents the installation part, where the train movements are realized by the transitions
t ∈ T i . The notation N s = (Ps,T s,As,Σs) denotes the supplemental part, which is used to
ensure the integrity of the model simulation and safety analysis. It could realize the initial
simulation inputs or actions from the human operators, where p ∈ Ps may be a compound
place existing in other nets.
In order to standardize our modelling process, we have definitions below:
Definition 3.3. A basic unmarked RIS net is a connected Petri netNRIS =N o∪N i∪N s, where:
N o ∩N i = Pequip, N o should not be a empty set N o , ∅pn and N i is strongly connected.
The common parts Pequip of the operation nets and the installation nets are signal equip-
ment, such as signal lights, position of points. They perform the role of indicator in the
operation nets and conduct the train movement in the installation nets.
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3.4 A geographical approach of railway interlocking system
As a first approach, the RIS is specified into a CPN in a hierarchical and geographical per-
spective. This study can be found in our previous work [Sun, Collart-Dutilleul, and Bon
2014]. The basic hierarchy of the HCPN model framework is described in Fig. 3.13. The
Main net is the topmost net, which is the carrier of the whole model, “storing” all the sub-
systems and their interactions.
main
Signalling Operations
Fixed Installations
Supplemental
Figure 3.13 – Basic specification framework of railway interlocking system
In the following subsections, we introduce the specifications of signalling part and in-
stallation part separately.
3.4.1 Signalling operation specification
RIS signalling operations are a system with multi-input and multi-output. Their operat-
ing processes are involved with the functions in distributed levels. When modelling such
a system, a specific model for system functionality seems not suitable for achieving the
modelling objective. Successful experience in modelling the European Train Control Sys-
tem using CPN [Janhsen, Lemmer, Horste, et al. 1997; Janhsen, Lemmer, Ptok, et al. 1997;
Jansen, Meyer Zu Hörste, and Schnieder 1998] could give us some useful inspiration. In
such systems, there are three aspects which should be integrated: components, scenarios and
functions.
When modelling the component view, the aim is to specify the communications and the
interactions between diﬀerent subsystems. A net of the component view shows a subsystem
and its interfaces, and it could be further detailed in additional levels. The scenario view
is the modelling of operational procedures. Its main elements are the sequence of events
required to maintain operation, and the interactions between the signalling operations and
the fixed installations. Individual scenarios are categorised into diﬀerent groups and in
this way they could be integrated into the corresponding component model. The functions
represent the lower model level. They are involved in the process aspect and represent
the activities or the response to interactions from the scenarios. Some of the functional
modules can be used in diﬀerent objects and so-called functional blocks. These functional
blocks are modelled as separate nets and can serve as functions in diﬀerent scenarios, under
the modelling principle of hierarchic decomposition. In this way the sub-nets can be reused.
3.4. A geographical approach of railway interlocking system 69
Vertical decomposition model
As the objective model framework needs to have so many features, an extensible framework
is needed, which should also be readable, maintainable and easy to accept by others. As a
result, it should be modelled in a modular way. The hierarchical structure is the most con-
sistent with the modelling requirements. It could integrate diﬀerent functions of the system
description and contain isolated modularity views in the model. Besides, their advantages
are easy to comprehend, to adapt and modular models can be reused. Meanwhile, the hier-
archical ability of CPN provides a good basis for setting up the model in a straightforward
way.
In order to structure the main component models of the signalling operations, a layered
approach, proposed by [Janhsen, Lemmer, Ptok, et al. 1997; Jansen, Meyer Zu Hörste, and
Schnieder 1998] is adopted. Dynamics and functionality are expressed by both scenarios
and functions. Scenarios show the behaviours of the system in its external environment,
which means the railway operation context. Functions can process data received form ex-
ternal components or internal ones. The diﬀerence between scenarios and functions is that
functions are not subordinated to any scenarios. They are independent of scenarios and can
be used within arbitrary scenarios.
Scenario
Function
Decomposition
Pre/Post
Component
Elementary
Top Level
Fusion place
Place / Port place
Transition
Substitution transition
Figure 3.14 – Hierarchical model structure of signalling operation
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Moreover, the concept of function in this thesis is not restricted to the very basis math-
ematical functions, but can also represent procedures (may complex ones). To be more
precise, each function represents a task. However, given the nature of their functionalities,
we continue to use “functions” to refer to them.
The corresponding vertical decomposition model is in Fig. 3.14 with several levels.
The generic structure has a “Top Level” to store all the components. It shows the connec-
tions between components and their corresponding communications. The “Composition”
layer shows the detail of the component models. The “Decomposition” layer represents
the decomposition of the component model, because some components are too complex to
represent in one single model. The “Function” layers and the “Scenario” layers represent
the function view and scenario view respectively, and they may be further decomposed if
necessary.
Moreover, for simulation purposes and compatibility reasons, two supplementary levels
should be added into the hierarchical structure. The “Elementary” level is used to replace
the preliminary transition of the top level. The “Pre/Post” level concerns the relations be-
tween diﬀerent components. They are used for preprocessing incoming messages and post-
processing outgoing messages.
Examples of signalling operation
To illustrate how to map from signalling operation to the CPNmodel, here is a small demon-
stration of the Route formation procedure, an important part of the interlocking opera-
(a) Route establishment flow chart
Demanded
Routes
RT’DMDIn
Route Control
RtDmd
Route_Control
Correct
Request
RtDmd
RT’DMD
Route Formaltion
RtDmd
Route_Formaltion
Formatted
Routes
RtDmd
RT’DMD
Error
Request
feedback
FeedBackOut
(b) Corresponding HCPN model
Figure 3.15 – Example of mapping signalling operations (1)
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tion. A complete process control always involves many aspects (see Page 392 in [Rétiveau
1987]). As a demonstration example, only the core of the control flow will be presented. In
Fig. 3.15(a), There is the control flow chart. It receives the route control instruction (route
command), and checks whether this instruction is feasible and compatible with existing
ones. Then it will format the route according to its formation information, such as the posi-
tions of points.
The first 2 consecutive actions of interlocking route establishment are: control and forma-
tion. The control part validates the input of "Route control" instruction and acts as a filter.
Error
Request
Out
FeedBack
Demanded
Routes
In
RT'DMD
Established
Routes
Out
RT'DMD
Commanded
Route
RT'DMD
Formatted
Route
RT'DMD
Interlocked
Route
RT'DMD
Zone to be
Unblock
In
PROTECTION
Route Control
Route Control
Route Formation
Route Formation
Route Verification
Route Verification
Route Interlock
Route Interlock
RtDmdRtDmd
feedback
RtDmd
RtDmd
feedback
RtDmd
RtDmd
RtDmd
RtDmd
prtn
(a) Component net (Route Establishment)
Commanded
Route
Out
RT'DMD
Demanded
Routes
In
RT'DMD
Result
Out
FeedBack
Checked
Route
RT'DMD
Permitted
Route
RT'DMD
Route Type Check
Route Type Check
Permission Verfication
Permission Verfication
Compatibility Verfication
Compatibility Verfication
feedback
RtDmdRtDmd
feedback
RtDmd
RtDmd
feedback
RtDmd
RtDmd
(b) Decomposition net (Route Control)
Result
Out
FeedBack
Checked
Route
Out
RT'DMD
Demanded
Routes
In
RT'DMD
Routes
on TP
LST'RT'DMD
1`[(("3","13"),TP),(("2","1"),TP)]
Type TP forbidden
[#2 RtDmd=TP
andalso
not (mem LstRtDmd RtDmd)]
Type DA/NL
[#2 RtDmd<>TP]
Type TP permited
[#2 RtDmd=TP
andalso
mem LstRtDmd RtDmd]
Interdit'TP
RtDmd
RtDmd
RtDmd
LstRtDmd
RtDmd RtDmd
LstRtDmd
(c) Scenario net (Route Type Check)
Result
Out
FeedBack
Checked
Route
In
RT'DMD
Permitted
Route
Out
RT'DMD
Occupied
Signal Lights
SL OCCUPATION
LST'NS'ENS
nil
Prohibited Route
[mem'LstSL LstNsEns [ns1,ns2]]
Permitted Route
[not (mem'LstSL LstNsEns [ns1,ns2])]
Interdit'RT((ns1,ns2),TypeRT)
LstNsEns
((ns1,ns2),TypeRT) ((ns1,ns2),TypeRT)
LstNsEns
(d) Function net (Permission Verfication)
Figure 3.16 – Example of mapping signalling operations (2)
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Only when the requested route is satisfied with current interlocking status, is it allowed to
establish. Otherwise, an error message will be output and the process ends. In the French
context, 2 aspects are checked concerning safety:
• Forbidden route: Inverse transit is forbidden and must be deactivated. When a track
segment is acting as the destination of an established route, any new route originated
from it is forbidden.
• Incompatible route: The region ahead of the signal must be free (in the case of a DA4
route). This means that only when a route is partially destroyed because of the use of
flexible transit5, can the corresponding initial signal be used for another route. Other-
wise, any new routes originating from the same signal are incompatible.
The Formation part positions all the points of the commanded route. If the point is
already in the expected position, no further action is performed. If the point is occupied
by other routes, the process will wait until it is released. Only if a point is not in the right
position and is liberated, will an instruction be sent to the fixed installation model to change
the point. After receiving the new position, the procedure continue to confirm the next point
of the route. When all the points are in the right position, this process is over.
The real corresponding model of the control flow is represented in Fig. 3.16.
Fig. 3.16(a) represents a “Component level”. It consists of hierarchical transitions for
route control and route formation. The input place contains the token of route information.
It could be passed through the model or output an error token. Fig. 3.16(b) is the decompo-
sition net of route command procedure. It still contains sequences of functions: route type
check – permission verification – compatibility verification. Fig. 3.16(c) is a scenario net, be-
cause the place “Routes on TP” contains the configuration of a certain scenario. Fig. 3.16(d)
is a function net, because its function is independent of the scenarios.
It should be noted that in this hierarchical structure, only the scenario nets reflect the
localization of the stations by their configurations (the initial tokens), while the other parts
of the model are the specifications of national railway standards and do not vary with diﬀer-
ent stations. Once we have completed a model of the signalling operations, the models of
other stations under the same national standards could easily be derived from the previous
model by only changing the initial tokens in each scenario net.
3.4.2 Geographical railroad layout specification
The normal solution of modelling the fixed installations is the geographical approach. This
approach can be considered as distributing the knowledge of the interlocking rules to ob-
jects modelling the geographic placement of physical elements [Banci, Fantechi, and Gnesi
4Automatic destruction : A typical French interlocking route type that could be destructed by the passage
of the train
5Transit souple: a flexible interlocking mechanism, which enable a route to destruct partially after the
passage
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2004]. Its geographical structure allows us to slice the whole railway layout into indepen-
dent and distributed components that can be individually modelled and physically located
next to their relevant units.
The basis railroad components
Normally, an RIS route layout is made up of multiple similar components: tracks, points and
track-side signals. A track segment is a section of straight track, which contains a complete
track circuit for occupation detection. It is a simple straight or Y-shape with a point. A point
is a railroad switch enabling railway trains to be guided from one track to another. The
direction of the point is controlled by the signalling system according to the route requests.
Generally, an interlocking system is within a station yard, where trains are running at low
speed, so train movements are partly directed by fixed signal lights installed along the rail.
A signal light mainly uses 2 aspects: red (stop intermediately), green (route clear).
Both track and point are referenced as atomic components, which could form the geo-
graphical structure of the whole railway layout and compose the route for transit. These
journeys are also properly controlled by signal components along the railway layout, so the
signal light could be regarded as constraints for train movement.
Track segments Fig. 3.17 shows a demo of PN of two successive track segments. Each
place represents a track segment. Two transitions move train tokens between the two seg-
ments, depending on the direction of the train and supervision by the guard function of
the transitions. The direction from left to right is referred to as the “odd” direction (impair
in French system). and the opposite direction is called the “even” (pair in French system)
direction.
z.1 z.3
(a) Track segment demo
TS1
TS
TS1 to TS3train
[#dir train=odd]
TS3 to TS1train
[#dir train=even]
TS3
train
train
TS
(b) Corresponding CPN model
Figure 3.17 – A Petri net representation of track segments
Points Fig. 3.18 shows a CPN model of a point component. In the French railway system,
a point is attached to a track segment, as shown in Fig. 3.18(a). In its corresponding model,
the point is represented by a single place which stores the current connection information
(left or right). In the French system, the position “left” or “right” refers to the tracks on the
left or right side when facing a point (see the schematic diagram in Fig. 2.7(a)). This point
74 CHAPTER 3. Formal modelization for RIS via HCPN
z.2 z.4 z.6
z.10
2
(a) Point demo
TS2
TS
TS2 to TS4train
[#dir train=odd]
TS4 to TS2train
[#dir train=even]
TS4
train
train
TS
TS10 to TS4
train
TS4 to TS10
train
[#dir train=odd]
[#dir train=even]
TS10
train
train
TS
TS4 to TS6
train
TS6 to TS4
train
[#dir train=odd]
[#dir train=even]
TS6
train
train
TS
PT2
L
L
R
R
PT
(b) Corresponding CPN model
Figure 3.18 – A Petri net representation of point component
place works as a condition place of 4 transitions (movements). However, its position will
not aﬀect the movements between TS2 and TS4 as they are constantly connected.
Signal lights Fig. 3.19 shows a CPNmodel of a signal light component. Normally, a signal
light can only be in charge of one direction of the transit. In Fig. 3.19(a), the movement from
TS7 to TS9 is controlled by signal light. So, in Fig. 3.19(b), Signal place is only connected to
the transition “TS7 to TS9”. This transition is only enabled when the token (indicator colour)
of Signal place is not “red”. After a train passes the signal light (firing the transition), the
signal light is switched oﬀ by setting the indicator to red. The operator “<>” in the guard
function means “not equate to (,)”.
z.7 z.9
C
1
(a) Signal light demo
TS7
TS
TS7 to TS9train
[#dir train=odd
andalso Ind<>red]
TS9 to TS7train
[#dir train=even]
TS9
train
train
TS
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Ind
CloseSL Ind
SL
1‘Cv
(b) Corresponding CPN model
Figure 3.19 – A Petri net representation of signal light
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Figure 3.20 – A Petri net representation of “DA” mode
Automatic unlock devices In the French system, there is a ground-based automatic mech-
anism, which could unlock the interlocked formation by the action of train passage [Ré-
tiveau 1987]. This mechanism is used for a flexible transit, and it is called the “DA” mode.
This DA mode is fully automatic and ground-based, so we treat it as a fixed installation,
rather than part of the signalling operations. The conditions of establishing a DA mode
interlocking route are:
• there is a pedal (see in Fig. 3.20(a)) on the track segment
• the direction of the interlocking route is the same as the direction of the pedal
If a route is established in DA mode, when a train passes and activates the pedal, all the
upstream tracks will be automatically unlocked. Based on the original model in Fig. 3.18(b),
this type of mechanism is represented with two additional parallel transitions. Each DA
sub-model unlocks a track segment that is stored in the fusion place (see in Fig. 3.20(c)).
Example of geographical approach
In our research, a typical station from the French railway signalization book [Rétiveau 1987]
is studied, shown in Fig. 3.21. It is only half of the station, which contains 5 points, 6
eﬀective signal lights, 12 track segments, and 13 complete interlocking routes. The detailed
information about this case study can be found in Chapter 15 in [Rétiveau 1987]. This
case study example has been chosen as an academic benchmark by experts involved in the
PERFECT project [Collart-Dutilleul et al. 2014; Sun, Collart-Dutilleul, and Bon 2014].
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The whole layout is represent by the CPNmodel in Fig. 3.22, using the basic components
that have been discussed before. This layout allows all the train movements according to
the interlocking routes.
Together with the signal operation parts in Section 3.4.1, the whole HCPN model is a
complete RIS specification. It can perform basic functions of an RIS by automatically arrang-
ing the routes according to diﬀerent train commands, blocking the inverse path and signal
light when a route is established, and enabling the route destruction function after the train
passes through. The whole model is too big and not necessary for a detailed demonstration
in this section. However, all the other nets are modelled by the previous methodology.
3.5 A pattern of railway interlocking modelling
An RIS has two main parts: the signalling operations and the fixed installations. In each sta-
tion, signalling operations are localized instances of the national railway standards, which
monitor and control the status of the fixed installations. It could be established via a hierar-
chical structure as we discussed in Section 3.4.1.
However, fixed installations consist of a series of track-side appliances, which are diverse
in practice, as each station has its own rail route structure. Specification and evaluation of
each station along a railway line is a repetitive and tedious job, and it has low eﬃciency and
will probably introduce new errors from re-modelling processes. A feasible solution is to
summarize all the common parts of the RIS, and establish a parameterized model frame-
work that can be applied to all stations. This study can be found in our previous work [Sun,
Collart-Dutilleul, and Bon 2015].
In this section, a generalization model pattern is presented, which is a reusable solution
for the RIS with PIPC type. Models of diﬀerent stations can be derived from this pattern
without re-modelling, just changing the configurations in the pattern.
3.5.1 Generalisation concept
The stations that are equipped with the same type of RIS follow the same national rules. The
only diﬀerences are the layouts of their fixed installations.
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Figure 3.21 – Case study of a station layout
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Figure 3.22 – The Petri net model of route layout
The expected structure should be both general and parameterized, which allows the
specifications of stations to be derived from the same model with diverse configurations.
That is to say, in this structure, the unmarked coloured Petri net is a set of RIS functional
rules, while the initial tokens are the concrete performance of stations. In such a model
framework, the configurations (tokens) represent all the scenario information, based on the
formation of the RIS layout and the “condition table” (or control table). When modelling a
new station, the only job is to change the initial tokens on the expected structure.
To have this general structure, the railroad layouts cannot be performed by the physical
location of places and connection of transitions. However, this information is indeed impor-
tant for train movements, so all this diverse information must be represented in the token
forms, ensuring the PN structure itself remains universal.
For a better understanding of the generalization concept, we use an incremental process
and comparison examples to illustrate how to generalize the railroad structure.
Basis Track segments Compared to Fig. 3.17, the new model in Fig. 3.23 has the same
performance capabilities but in a parameterized form. A token in “train location” place
indicates the train ID and its current location. Each time the transition occurs, the value
of the train token will be refreshed according to the enabled binding elements. The “track
connection” place is the constraints of train movement, which guides the train to move
forward.
Adding points When we introduce the points into the generalized structure, it will first
need a place to “store” all the point information, including point IDs and the positions.
Meanwhile, the points will have an impact on the train movements, so the configuration
of track connection should be modified. The new model in Fig. 3.24 is the corresponding
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Figure 3.23 – Generalized representation of track segments
model of the example in Fig. 3.18. The new colour set of TC contains the point constraints.
Only when the point stored in the Point List place satisfies the point constraints, can the
train move.
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Figure 3.24 – Generalized representation including points
Adding signal lights Similar to a point, a signal light is also the movement constrain. So
the introduction of signal lights comes with a new place and a modification to the colour set
of TC. The new model in Fig. 3.25 is the corresponding model of the example in Fig. 3.19.
The function SL’Permit checks the corresponding signal indicator. If the indicator is red (Cv
in French), then it returns false to prevent train movement. Otherwise, it returns true to
permit the transit. The function SL’Close switches oﬀ the corresponding signal lights after
firing the transition.
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Figure 3.25 – Generalized representation including signal lights
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From the above examples, we can conclude that the components of railroad and their
combinations can be expressed by generalized structure, using constrain places and diﬀer-
ent transition conditions.
However, in a real practice, there are more constraints (appliances) and rules. First, we
should list all the scenario-related elements, and prepare their specification forms for the
expected model.
In Table 3.2, train, track, point and signal light are normal components that we have
introduced in previous parts. In this table, we give them several attributes to distinguish
between each token. The Track Connection stores all the connection information between
diﬀerent tracks, considering the constraints of points, signal lights and formation release
triggers (the pedals) . The pedal is the prerequisite condition for “DA” mode interlocking
route. The “Destruct Auto” is the automatic unlock mechanism and its devices. It contains
the related unlock conditions and the unlock actions.
Table 3.2 – Scenario-related elements in general structure
Element Content Notation
Train
train name NmTr
train direction DirTr
route name NmRt
route type (DA,TP,etc) TpRt
train position PosTr
movement authority MA
Track
track name NmTs
Occupation status Ocp
Track
connections
current track CurTs
connection direction DirTs
post track PostTs
points
PtTs(number varies [0,2])
(with name and its position)
signal light name [0,1] NmSl
indication of pedal Ped
Point
point list
LstPt
(contains name and its position)
Signal
light
signal light list
LstSl
(contain name and its colour)
Destruct
Auto
exiting track
TsDa
(where DA take place)
eﬀective direction of pedal DirDa
tracks to be destructed TsLstDa
signal light to release SlDa
points to release PtDa
With all these variables and their notations, the next step is to describe the movement of
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a train. Although the expected model does not have visible routes, we can determine train
movement by token values. If the value of the train position changes, that means this train
actually moves. Generally, there are two types of routing routes,DA and TP, in the French
national context6. We also consider the route for shunting (OM), and the “staﬀ responsible”
mode (SR) for override operations. However, due to the space limitation, only DAmode will
be discussed in this section.
The conditions for enabling DA movement are:
1. There should be a pedal (passage detector for DA mode) in the current track;
2. Points of the route must be proper positioned;
3. Signal light (if any) in front of the train should be green;
4. Train’s movement authority allows it to move onto the next track.
The actions which release the formation of the route along with train movement:
1. Release tracks of the route behind the train;
2. Release points of those tracks;
3. Switch oﬀ signal light (if any) after passing.
For analysis purposes, we introduce a security guard function, which constantly checks
the occupation of the front track. The train’s movement is safe provided that the front track
is clear. Otherwise, if the front track is occupied, there will be a “face to face” or “face to
tail” collision.
From what has been mentioned above, the more formal definition of the enabling rules
of the DA movement is shown in the Table 3.3. With the help of CPN ML language, all the
conditions above can be embedded into one transition and can combine into a single model
to represent all the DA mode movements.
3.5.2 Example of generalized model
The study case of Fig. 3.22 is modelled by the generalisation concept above. The complete
CPN model provides a pattern which could be applied to all the relay-based computer-
controlled RIS in the French national context. It can automatically arrange the routes for
diﬀerent trains, block the incompatible routes when a certain route is established, enable
the route destruction function after a train passes, and support 4 types of route modes
along with their mixed traﬃc operations. The whole model is really large for a demonstra-
tion. Only one layer of the model and its result will be introduced. The other parts of the
model are built by successive implementation.
Fig. 3.26 shows the DA module of the general structure, which includes all the neces-
sary elements mentioned before: tokens of train, track segments, track connections, points,
6DA: Destruction automatique, TP: Tracé permanent
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Table 3.3 – Conditions and equations of “DA” movement
Condition equation
Route type
TpRt = DA
Ped=TRUE
Route formation
PosTr = CurTs
DirTr=DirTs
PtTs ⊆ LstPt
Singal open (NmSl,green) ⊆ LstSl
Movement authority PostTs∈MA
DA activated
TsDa = PosTr
DirDa = DirTr
To release
TsLstDa
SlDa
PtDa
Security check
Ocp of CurTs = Occupied
Ocp of PostTs = Clear
signals and information of automatic destruction. Then, this transition is ordered by the
conditions and fulfils the following actions. Train tokens are stored in an “Inside Station”
place, with all the trains within this station. All tokens in this module do not really transit.
They only “update” the data inside themselves.
Supposing we have the following initial parameter of simulation (Table 3.4):
Table 3.4 – Initial configuration of the model
Train demand route “3/15”
1‘{NmTr=“TER-0315”, DirTr=odd, NmRt=(“3”,“15”),
TpRt=DA, PosTr=“”, MA=[]}
List of all point 1‘[(“1”,R),(“2”,R),(“3”,R),(“4”,R)]
List of all signal lights
1‘[(“1”,Cv), (“2”,Cv), (“3”,Cv), (“5”,Cv), (“6”,Cv),
(“7”,Cv)]
The simulation result of CPN Tools is shown in Table 3.5. After the establishment of the
route “3/15”, related points change their position, and related track segments are blocked
in memory. After switching on, signal lights change their indication and become blocked.
After receiving an MA, the train can start with permission. As the train moves, its MA
is gradually reduced and block components are released by the mechanism of automatic
destruction. When MA equals zero, the train stops right away and triggers the route de-
struction. Finally, all the blocked components become free and the train exits the station.
Then we use the state space analysis function that is embedded in CPN tools to analyse
the space state of this simulation. Its calculation result shows that this “single train” sce-
nario has 26 state and 32 arcs. There is not any deadlock or live lock in the system. Then
we perform another two simulations with 2 trains and 3 trains demanding for diﬀerent in-
terlocking routes. The sizes of the state space are 339 and 2025, and all the states are “safe”.
82 CHAPTER 3. Formal modelization for RIS via HCPN
Track 
Segements
TS
TS
1`{NM'TS="Z.01", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.02", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.2", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.1", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.3", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.4", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.5", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.6", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.7", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.8", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.9", OCP=Available}++
1`{NM'TS="Z.11", OCP=Available}
Turnouts
Points
LST'PT
1`[("1",R),("2",R),("3",R),("4",R)]
SignalLights
Signal Light LST'SL
1`[("1",Cv),("2",Cv),("3",Cv),
("5",Cv),("6",Cv),("7",Cv)]
Track
Connections
TC
TC
1`{CUR="Z.01",DIR=odd,POST="Z.1",LTT=[("1",L)],SL="3",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.02",DIR=odd,POST="Z.1",LTT=[("1",R)],SL="5",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.1",DIR=odd,POST="Z.3",LTT=[("2",R),("3",R)],SL="",PED=true}++
1`{CUR="Z.1",DIR=odd,POST="Z.7",LTT=[("2",L)],SL="",PED=true}++
1`{CUR="Z.2",DIR=odd,POST="Z.4",LTT=[("3",L)],SL="1",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.2",DIR=odd,POST="Z.4",LTT=[("3",R)],SL="1",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.3",DIR=odd,POST="Z.5",LTT=[("3",R)],SL="7",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.3",DIR=odd,POST="Z.5",LTT=[("3",L)],SL="7",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.4",DIR=odd,POST="Z.6",LTT=[("3",R)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.4",DIR=odd,POST="Z.3",LTT=[("3",L)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=odd,POST="Z.9",LTT=[("4",R)],SL="",PED=true}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=odd,POST="Z.11",LTT=[("4",L)],SL="",PED=true}++
1`{CUR="Z.6",DIR=odd,POST="Z.8",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.7",DIR=odd,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.8",DIR=odd,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.9",DIR=odd,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.11",DIR=odd,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.01",DIR=even,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.02",DIR=even,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.1",DIR=even,POST="Z.01",LTT=[("1",L)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.1",DIR=even,POST="Z.02",LTT=[("1",R)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.2",DIR=even,POST="",LTT=[],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.3",DIR=even,POST="Z.1",LTT=[("2",R),("3",R)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.3",DIR=even,POST="Z.4",LTT=[("3",L)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.4",DIR=even,POST="Z.2",LTT=[("3",L)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.4",DIR=even,POST="Z.2",LTT=[("3",R)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=even,POST="Z.3",LTT=[("4",R)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=even,POST="Z.3",LTT=[("4",L)],SL="",PED=true}++
1`{CUR="Z.6",DIR=even,POST="Z.4",LTT=[("3",R)],SL="",PED=true}++
1`{CUR="Z.7",DIR=even,POST="Z.1",LTT=[("2",L)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.8",DIR=even,POST="Z.6",LTT=[],SL="2",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.9",DIR=even,POST="Z.5",LTT=[("4",R)],SL="",PED=false}++
1`{CUR="Z.11",DIR=even,POST="Z.5",LTT=[("4",L)],SL="6",PED=false}
Inside
Station
Inside Station
TR
Destruction Auto
Records
DAinfo
DS
1`{CUR="Z.1",DIR=odd,
    LPT=[("1",L)],LNT=["Z.1"],SL="3",LMT=["1","2"]}++
1`{CUR="Z.1",DIR=odd,
    LPT=[("1",R)],LNT=["Z.1"],SL="5",LMT=["1","2"]}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=odd,
    LPT=[("3",R)],LNT=["Z.3","Z.5"],SL="",LMT=["3","4"]}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=odd,
    LPT=[("3",L)],LNT=["Z.3","Z.4"],SL="1",LMT=["3","4"]}++
1`{CUR="Z.5",DIR=even,
    LPT=[("4",L)],LNT=["Z.5"],SL="6",LMT=["4"]}++
1`{CUR="Z.6",DIR=even,
    LPT=[],LNT=["Z.5"],SL="2",LMT=["4"]}
Turnouts
OccupiedPT_OCCP
LST'NM'PT
nil
Signal 
d'occupation
SL OCCUPATION
LST'NS'ENS
nil
Zone
Occupe
ZN OCCP
LST'ZN'RT
nil
DA Movement
[#TYPE train=DA 
andalso #PED tc
andalso FormationOK train tc ts1 ts2 LstPT
andalso SL'Permit tc LstSL
andalso SafeMove tc ts1 ts2
andalso MA'Prmt train (#POST tc)
andalso DAcondition DAinfo train LstPT]
input (LstSL,train,tc,ts1,ts2);
output (LstSL2,train2,ts1n,ts2n);
action
(let
val ens= #ENS train
val newSL = CloseLights ens tc LstSL
val newTR = RefreshTR train tc
val newTR2= TR'Move train (#POST tc)
val newts1=TS.set_OCP ts1 Available
val newts2=TS.set_OCP ts2 Occupied
in (newSL,newTR2,newts1,newts2)
end
);
tc
LstPT
1`ts1++1`ts2
LstSL
train
train2
LstSL2
1`ts1n++1`ts2n
DAinfo
LstNsEns
DA'SL LstNsEns (#SL DAinfo)
LstNmPT
listsubfix LstNmPT (#LMT DAinfo)
LstZR
DA'Ped LstZR (#LNT DAinfo)
Figure 3.26 – Generalized Petri net model of “DA” route pattern
That means there in no state has two trains on the same track.
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Table 3.5 – Result of route “3/15” simulation
Last Action Train token
Signal
Points
Tracks Signals
lights occupied occupied
Initial
Canton=Z.01, (3,Cv) (1,R),(2,R)
MA=() (7,Cv) (3,R),(4,R)
Route establish
Canton=Z.01, (3,Cv) (1,L),(2,R) Z.01, Z.1, Z.3,
MA=() (7,Cv) (3,R),(4,L) Z.5, Z.11
Open Canton=Z.01, (3,VL) (1,L), (2,R) Z.01, Z.1, Z.3,
3, 7
signal lights MA=() (7,Et) (3,R),(4,L) Z.5, Z.11
Generate MA
Canton=Z.01, (3,VL) (1,L), (2,R) Z.01, Z.1, Z.3,
3, 7MA=(Z.1, Z.3, (7,Et) (3,R),(4,L) Z.5, Z.11
Z.5, Z.11)
Z.01→ Z.1
Canton=Z.1, (3,Cv) (1,L), (2,R) Z.1, Z.3,
3, 7
MA=(Z.3, Z.5, Z.11) (7,Et) (3,R),(4,L) Z.5, Z.11
Z.1→ Z.3
Canton=Z.3, (3,Cv) (1,L), (2,R)
Z.3, Z.5, Z.11 7
MA=(Z.5, Z.11) (7,Et) (3,R),(4,L)
Z.3→ Z.5
Canton=Z.5, (3,Cv) (1,L), (2,R)
Z.5, Z.11 7
MA=(Z.11) (7,Cv) (3,R),(4,L)
Z.5→ Z.11
Canton=Z.11, (3,Cv) (1,L), (2,R)
Z.11
MA=() (7,Cv) (3,R),(4,L)
Destruction
(3,Cv), (1,L), (2,R)
(7,Cv) (3,R),(4,L)
3.6 An event-based approach for relay-based logic
In the previous two sections, we mainly focus on the high-level parts of the RIS. More pre-
cisely, we study and model the computer-controlled parts of the RIS. In this section, we
analyse the low-level parts of RIS. That is the modelling methodology of the relay-based
systems.
3.6.1 Background of relay-based logic
All the controls and commands that come from the high-level part of RIS are implemented
by a set of relays. They achieve the control procedures by changing their states. Most re-
lays have two states, activated and deactivated, sometimes maybe left and right. Because
of diﬀerent functional purposes, the relay circuit diagrams can be divided into separate di-
agrams. For example, according to the book [Rétiveau 1987], the functional phases of the
route establishment of the PRCI type have four stages:
1. Route formation: receiving the route command from the dispatcher, and setting point
to the right position by point machines.
2. Formation verification for interlocking: verifying the positions of the points relay. If
all the relays are properly positioned, the formation will be interlocked.
3. Route verification: verifying the real point positrons, if they are well positioned, then
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send a command to signal light control logic
4. Signal light control: switching on the lights and display diﬀerent colours depending
on the interlocking route itself.
For a better understanding, we create a small scenario with only one point. This example
is designed on the basis of the control logic and the circuit diagram in (Fig. 15.23, Fig. 15.27,
Fig. 15.29, Fig. 15.39, Fig. 15.40, Fig. 15.46 in [Rétiveau 1987]), and it is shown in Fig. 3.27.
The example contains the main components for route establishment. It is realized by a set
of relays and switches that are located in diﬀerent layers (circuits diagram). However, as
shown in Fig. 3.27, the dash-dot line connected elements, in nature, are the same element.
They are physically connected together, changing their states at the same times, but located
in diﬀerent circuits. The established procedures of this example are explained as follows:
Figure 3.27 – An example of PRCI type system of a single point
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1. After receiving the formation command(LC.Ag.L => left or LC.Ag.L => right), the con-
trol relay CAG is going to change for the preparation of the route.
2. After the point is well positioned, interlocking command L.EIt(O) is sent to interlock
the enable relay EAG by locking its transit with Tr.I or Tr.P.
3. When command LCOC is received, if the point is in the right position and well-locked,
a further command will be sent to control the signal light.
4. Switching on the signal light according to the relay CFR and BS.
From Fig. 3.27 and its procedures, we know that relays can be activated or deactivated
in diﬀerent layers by commands from the signalling centre, occupation changes of the track
segments or the internal relay state changes. Moreover, each switches aﬃliated with these
relays will be changed at the same time. Consequently, once a relay changes its values, all
the related circuits will be refreshed simultaneously. However, this kind of concurrence is
quite diﬀerent from the rules in CPN. It has brought some problems in our early attempts.
Nonetheless, all these problem are caused by the HCPN models that consist of several sub
nets. If all the logic connections are modelled in a single net, we can combine all the linked
elements into one element (place), and there will be no further problem of concurrence.
But, in that way, we will obviously lose the readability of the model and lose the description
of the system’s structure. So all the following problems, discussions and their solution are
based on the model with multiple nets.
The following part begins with two simple examples to illustrate the problems. Then,
we apply the event-driven concept to solve these problem.
Modelling Problem I: Synchronous Firing
In the envisioned model with the hierarchical structure, relays and switches are located in
diﬀerent nets. So if a relay changes its state, the related transitions cannot fire at the same
time. As the states of the relays are closely coupled to each other, the dis-synchronization
of firing transitions fails to refresh the system simultaneously, and it may lead the system to
uncertain states, such as standstill, live-lock, dead-lock or even an unreasonable state. Such
an example can be found in Fig. 3.28.
This example describes two logical processes which are controlled by relay A and relay
C. Processes are placed in diﬀerent nets and each one has two transitions. Assuming the
initial state is Sinit=[m,n/A,B,C]=[1,1/1,1,1], the expected firing sequence is: T1n,T1m→
T2m,T2n, and the expected final state is Sf ini=[3,3/ 1,0,1]. But if the transition T2n fires
before T1m, the result state is [m,n/A,B,C]=[1,3/1,0,1]. This state does not exist in a real
system and it may cause unknown problems. This issue demands a transition management
mechanism, which could organize all the marking enabled transitions to be fired in the right
orders, as they do in the real system. Moreover, considering the compatibility, the proposed
solution should be achieved under the framework of CPN.
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T1nn1 n2 T2n n3
B
UNIT UNIT UNIT
UNIT UNIT UNIT
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BOOL
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1‘true
1‘true
BOOL
BOOL
C
C
1‘true
1‘true
BOOL
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B
B
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1‘true
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true
true
true
true
false
true
Relay_A Relay_C
Figure 3.28 – Modelling problem I: synchronous firing
Modelling Problem II: Firing Conditions
Generally, a relay’s status is controlled by several circuit elements, including electrical sources
and switches. These elements can be considered as constant variables. If a relay is controlled
by such constant variables, no matter the order, when all elements meet the required condi-
tions, the relay is activated. However, there is another "temporary" type of conditions. They
are pulse signals which are a kind of instant variables A relay connected to such pulse sig-
nals will only be activated at the "pulse" moment. For such a relay, we need to pay more
attention to its activating condition order. The example is shown in Fig. 3.29(a)
The Cmd_E is a command from signalling control and the SW_F is a controlled switch.
Their states aﬀect the value of Relay_G. If we have a corresponding model, as shown in
Fig. 3.29(b), we will encounter the unreasonable firing sequence: E=true→ F=true→ t1. In
order to solve this problem, a reset mechanism (non-timed CPN approach) can be applied or
time concept (timed CPN approach) can be introduced. Considering that an RIS is more like
a continuous sequence event system, it is not necessary to add time factors into our models.
The rest solution would be a new mechanism to diﬀerentiate two kinds of condition types
with good readability.
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(a) Example of diﬀerent conditions
E
F
t1 G
BOOL
BOOL
BOOL
1‘true
1‘true
1‘false
true
true
true
false
(b) Corresponding model
Figure 3.29 – Modelling problem II: firing conditions
3.6.2 Event-driven concept
In relay-based systems, every circuit state change is driven by an event, such as external
commands or internal switch actions. Such a mechanism reminds us of a special PN — the
controlled Petri net (CtlPN). It is a class of Petri nets with external enabling conditions
called control places which allow an external controller to influence the progression of to-
kens in the net [Holloway and Krogh 1994; Holloway, Krogh, and Giua 1997b]. Fig. 3.30
illustrates a controlled Petri net, where the squares (c1,c2,c3) indicate the external control
place.
As with ordinary Petri nets, the state of a CtlPN is given by its marking, which is the dis-
tribution of tokens in places. A controlled transition can only be fired when this transition
is marking enabled and the connected control place are “TRUE”.
Inspired by this occurrence rule, we design a similar mechanism to solve our previous
problems under the framework of CPN without breaking any existing rules of CPN. This
mechanism is achieved by introducing event-based enabling rules and an event place into
ordinary CPN models. An event-driven model is a class of Petri nets with event conditions
stored in the event place (fusion type place), which makes the connected transitions event-
driven, in order to allow internal/external event to influence the progression of tokens. The
event place contains an FIFO list, which stores all the events in progress in their order of
occurrence. This FIFO list has the following properties:
1. Only the head (first element) of the list is referred as the current activated event and tt
will activate its corresponding transitions.
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p1
p6
p5
p8
p4
p2
p3
p7
c2
c1 c3
c1
Figure 3.30 – An example of controlled Petri net
2. The tail (exception of the first element) of the list is considered as deactivated until the
head of the list is removed. The new head will become activated.
3. New events which are induced by internal actions are stored at the end of the list.
4. Only when the system has nomore events in this list, can this system accept an external
command.
As in the Petri net literature, it is commonly assumed that only one transition can be fired
at a given instant. So, parallel actions becomes “choices”. If one transition introduces new
internal events (relay status changes) before the last event is complete, the system status
will appear confusing. However, with the help of event places we can achieve a loose syn-
chronization of firing the transitions. It continues firing all the enabled transitions related
to the first event until there are no more enabled transitions. Then an event management
function (transition) will be enabled. It removes the “useless” event (the first event), then
moves on to the next event and makes it the new head of the list. In this way, the whole sys-
tem is gradually progressing forward, event by event, in order to imitate a synchronization
system.
The expected event-driven model has 4 transition priorities: PEvent > PClear > PNormal >
PExternal .
• PEvent belongs to the event related transitions that are directly connected to event
place.
• PNormal belongs to the set of transitions that are not directly connected to event place.
• PClear belongs to an event remove mechanism, which will remove the “useless” event
from the FIFO list if this event cannot fire any transitions.
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• PExternal belongs to external inputs for scenario analysis and state space calculation
purposes.
m1 T1m m2 T2m m3
B Event Place
Event Place
T1nn1 n2 T2n n3
B
Event Place EventEnd
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UNIT UNIT UNIT
1‘()
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EventList
EventList
1‘[("A",true),("C",true)]
1‘[("A",true),("C",true)]
1‘[("A",true),("C",true)]
BOOL
BOOL
B
B
1‘true
1‘true
P_EVENT
P_EVENT
P_EVENT
P_EVENT
[hd EvtLst=("A",true)] [hd EvtLst=("C",true)]
[hd EvtLst=("A",true)] [hd EvtLst=("C",true)]
P_EVTCLR
[EvtLst<>nil]
EvtLst
EvtLst
EvtLst
EvtLst
true
false true
tl EvtLst
EvtLst
Figure 3.31 – Event-driven coloured Petri net model of Fig. 3.28
Now, we can rebuild the example in modelling problem I: "the synchronous firing" with
the event-driven concept. In Fig. 3.31, the colour set of events is defined as colset Event=
STRINGxBOOL. It contains the name of the event and its value, for example (“A”,true)
means relay “A” is activated, (“B”, false) means relay “B” is inactivated. All the transitions
are connected to an "Event Place" which stores the events to be triggered in their order of
occurrence. Its colour set is colset EvntList= list Event. The token in this place is in the form
of list type. the head of the list (hd list, in Meta language grammar, is to abstract the first el-
ement from the list) represents the event which is currently taking place in the system. The
guard function checks the first element of the event list (hd EvtLst) and determines whether
the transition is event-enabled or not. Any event-enabled transition has the ability to fire,
and it can fire if it is also marking enabled. Moreover, if a transition brings in a new event,
then this new event will be stored at the end of the event list in "Event place", and it can
be triggered in later progress. After all the enabled high priority transitions are fired, the
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transition with low priority is enabled. It will remove the current activated event from the
list (tl EvtLst returns a new list with exception of the first element) and the second event
become activated.
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(a) Space state of Fig. 3.31
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Figure 3.32 – Simplification rules of system space state
The state space of this model is shown in Fig. 3.32. For a concise indication, in this state
space graph, the system state is represented by the marking of the vector (m,n,B). Here,
m is a mapping from markings of (m1,m2,m3) and m → {0,1,2} represents the markings
of {(1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1)}. Similarly, n : (n1,n2,n3) → {0,1,2}. B indicates the marking in
"B place" and 1/0 used to represent "true/false". The inscriptions under the vector are the
content of the FIFO event list. The label on the arcs between two states is the fired transition.
The initial state of the system is (m,n,B) = (1,1,1), EventList = [(”A”,1)(”C”,1)]. Each time
the transition EventEnd is fired, an event will be removed from the event list.
The state in blue is called "event-steady" state. This means a previous event is finished
and begins to activate a new event. The state in red is an "event free" state. This means there
are no more events and the system state is preserved until there is an external input event.
The state in white is the internal state, or instantaneous state. Between 2 successive system-
steady states, there may be more than one path, and the number of combinations of the path
depends on the number of the parallel transitions, which could result in a large number of
system states. But no matter how the state changes, it will eventually be stabilized, and
finally reach the next steady state.
When we analyse this space state graph, we will find that not every state has equal im-
portance. The event-steady and event-free states are more concise to describe the safety
reachability of a system. Hence, an abstraction method to minimize the size of the system
state will be demonstrated in Fig. 3.32(b). From the perspective of analysis, the internal
states are not useful because they have less value than the steady ones. Each internal state
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is a tiny change inside the fixed installations, only when the system finishes all the changes
in a space state path, which means a complete response to the external input. While, from
the modelling point of view, all the states and changes between two steady states should
not exist in the real system, because they are parallel at the same time, as in the modelling
result, these states can be considered as transient states.
Therefore, the original state space in Fig. 3.32(a) can evolve into a quite simple one in
Fig. 3.32(b) The new state space has an initial state (1,1,1) and two external input events
[(”A”,1), (”C”,1)], and each event allows the system to advance into a new state. This method
will eﬀectively reduce the state space complexity caused by the relay-based components that
act simultaneously in diﬀerent layers.
Also the modelling problem II: the "firing condition", can be solved by the event-driven
model in Fig. 3.33. The original pulse signal CmdE was replaced by a single event in the
"Event Place", in order to achieve a similar instantaneous eﬀect. From the simulation scenar-
ios and results on the right side, it is clear that this model will fire transition "t1" only in the
right action sequence "F=true→ E=true→ t1 f ire".
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Place EventEnd
BOOL BOOL
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1‘[("E",true)]
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P_EVTCLR
true false
true
EvtLst
tl EvtLst
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Action sequence:
E=true » F=true
(0,0)
[]
(0,0)
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(0,0)
[]
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(1,0)
[]
(1,0)
[("E",1)]
(1,1)
[("E",1)]
(1,1)
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E=true EventEnd F=true
F=true E=true t1
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Figure 3.33 – Event-driven coloured Petri net model of Fig. 3.29
From the above examples, we can have a general idea of an even-driven transition. It
relies on both the condition places and the event place. However, in real systems, condition
changes may call a new event. Moreover, an action could be either new condition change or
new event. So the property (event, condition, action) of diﬀerent system processes should
be clearly defined. All the possible types we may use in fixed installations are summarized
in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6 – Type of logical variables ant its properties
Type Description Event Condition Action
Control The status of relay(or switch) X X
Command The output command of relay X X
Indicator internal variable X X X
Message command send by controlling centre X
Action command or data send back to controlling centre X
3.6.3 System validation of event-based model
The final aim is to verify whether the system specification will hold the safety properties.
Standard model checking algorithms are based on an exhaustive visit to all the reachable
states of the specification. In our study, we chose CPN Tools which integrate a powerful
state space tool. It could generate the full state space of the PNs mode and it could analyse
the state space by means of a CTL-like temporal logic, which allows user-defined searches
and queries.
Model checking relies on the simulation environment. It determines which scenarios
are going to be simulated and how each of the scenarios will be simulated. In each case
study, we consider the original system to be a multi-input multi-output module. To be
able to check its entire property, a test layer is added to provide external input events and
variables, and allows them to vary freely. In the system priority aspect, the test layer has
the lowest priority. Only when the original system reaches a new steady state, can the test
layer give a new external input. This assumption is also consistent with real practice, where
RIS is a relay-based computer-controlled system. It has a faster processing cycle than its
external inputs, such as human instruction or train movements. So it is reasonable to have
a test layer with the lowest priority to simulate external input.
Safety performance of the system specification is "Safety property holds in every reach-
able state" or "danger case never happens". During the state exploring, if we meet an unsafe
state, there is no need to exploit its successive states, because all post-states are potentially
unsafe. With this selective exploring method, we can reduce the state space without loss of
reliability of safety analysis. So, before starting the state space calculation, we use the safety
properties to specify that, under certain circumstances (system not safe), the CPN Tools do
not need to calculate all the successors of a state.
Normally, after a state exploring, we will get a large number of states and their marking
information. A lot of them are internal states caused by subsystems. From the perspective
of the safety analysis, we are more interested in a concise state space and system counterex-
amples. So, we make our own queries (ML functions) to search for all the "event-steady"
states and the unsafe states, to generate an event based state space tree, and to list the event
paths of all the counterexamples.
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Figure 3.34 – Modelling structure and simulation environment
System modelling
To illustrate a complete practical use, a model of RIS in Fig. 3.27 will be demonstrated. This
case study is very simple in that it only contains one point and two interlocking routes.
(a) coloured Petri net model of signalling operations layer
(b) coloured Petri net model of route formation
Figure 3.35 – coloured Petri net model of signalling operations
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The signalling operations in this model are to send commands to establish or destroy an
interlocking route. A reasonable modelling structure and its simulation environment is
shown in Fig. 3.34.
It should be noted that in order to better illustrate the analysis capabilities, we need an
imperfect system model. So, when modelling the signal system, we deliberately ignore a
condition that is "System needs to wait 150ms, before sending command to switch on the
signal light". Then we get a potentially unsafe system.
The first part of the RISmodel is the signalling operations as we discussed in Section 3.4.1.
There is a simplified version of it in Fig. 3.35(a), which contains diﬀerent route phases (un-
formed, permitted, formed, etc) and corresponding transitions. Fig. 3.35(b) is also a sim-
plified version of route formation. As the signalling operations have been discussed before,
Point
Machine
(a) coloured Petri net of point layer
(b) coloured Petri net of transit layer
Figure 3.36 – coloured Petri net model of point control
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considering the space restrictions, other sub-models of signalling operations are not shown
here. The events in this model are defined in the form of (Event type, Event name, value), for
example, the event to form the route "AB" is (MSG,"AB",form). The event-trigger function is
f un EV : Event list * Eventx − > BOOL. It is the guard function of event-related transitions,
and will return true if the Eventx is at the top of the Event list.
The point control (in Fig. 3.36) contains two parts: 1. The point layer which could change
the point’s logical position by route command, interlock or release point by shared resources,
and send commands to the point machine to change the rail connection(as shown in dashed
line). 2. The Transition layer is the necessary condition of route formation in flexible tran-
sition mode of the French context. The function "gEV" is a multi-event condition for transi-
tions, which means any of the following events will enable this transition.
The final RIS layer is the signal light control (in Fig. 3.37), which could switch on signal
lights if a route is established and the front zone is unoccupied. If the route is destroyed or
if the front zone is occupied or if the point machine is not well-positioned, then the light is
switched oﬀ.
Figure 3.37 – coloured Petri net model of signal light control
For model checking purposes, we need to add a test layer to simulate all the external
input events in Fig. 3.34, and allow those events to vary freely. In this mode, the considered
external inputs are route command(formation/destruction), zone occupation, pedal action,
point machine status KAg (If a point is positioned to the right side, then relay KAgR=true
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else KAgR=false). The outputs are signal light status, and point machine command CAg.
The model of simulation environment is shown in Fig. 3.38
Figure 3.38 – coloured Petri net model of test layer
State space analysis
The safety statements of this system are:
1. ϕ1 : If any route is formed or zone is occupied, the relay CAg that controls the point
cannot change;
2. ϕ2 : if no route is formed or zone is occupied, signal light cannot be switched on;
3. ϕ3 : if the zone is occupied, the point machine must not act;
The selective branching option for exploiting the state space is designed asϕ1(S)∧ϕ2(S)∧
ϕ3(S)− > BOOL, if the function returns f alse the state S will be a terminal state. With the
result we can start queries to examine if the state space will break any safety statements.
The simulation result are shown in the second column of Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 – State space calculation result
Exploring Type Default Selective Vectorization
State space size 366 301 76
Statement ϕ1 holds holds holds
Statement ϕ2 holds holds holds
Statement ϕ3
not holds
(48 states)
not holds
(6 states)
not holds
(6 states)
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Although the size of the system state space has been simplified, it is still not readable.
Moreover, too much information on CPNmarkingmakes its diﬃcult for humans to compare
each state. So another query is needed to transform the original state space into a more
compatible form. Only event-free states and unsafe states will appear in the new state space.
The original paths between each new state will be replaced by an external input event. So
the new state space is an event-state graph, where each input event leads the system to a new
state. Each of the new states is represented by a vector, Si = [A,B,C,D,E/F,G], each variable
represents either a layer status or a relay value, and here, Si=[Route progress, CAg, EAg, Tri,
light / Zone, KAgR]. The new state space graph has a total number of 76 states, where 29 are
duplicates and 6 are danger states (third column of Table 3.7). Part of the graph is shown
in Fig. 3.39, where the node in grey dashed style is the state already visited(duplicates), and
red node is the danger state.
Init [1 0 1 1 0/1 1]
rAB=1 [2 0 1 1 0/1 1]
LcAgR=1 [3 1 1 1 0/1 1]
L.Eit=1 [4 1 0 0 0/1 1]
L.Kit=1 [5 1 0 0 0/1 1]
Zon=0 [5 1 0 0 0/0 1]
Zon=1 [5 1 1 1 1/1 1]
Zon=0 [5 1 0 1 0/0 1]
Zon=1 [5 1 1 1 1/1 1]
Pad=1 [1 1 0 1 0/0 1]
Zon=1 [1 1 1 1 0/1 1]
KAgR=0 [1 1 0 1 0/0 0]
KAgR=0 [5 1 0 1 0/0 0]
rAB=0 [1 1 0 1 0/0 1]
Zon=1 [1 1 1 1 0/1 1]
rAB=0 [1 1 0 1 0/0 0]
rAB=1 [1 1 0 1 0/0 1]
KAgR=0 [5 1 1 1 0/1 0]
KAgR=1 [5 1 1 1 1/1 1]
rAB=0 [1 1 1 1 0/1 0]
rAB=0 [1 1 1 1 0/1 0]
Pad=1 [1 1 0 0 0/0 1]
KAgR=0 [5 1 0 0 0/0 0]
rAB=0 [1 1 0 0 0/0 1]
KAgR=0 [5 1 0 0 0/1 0]
rAB=0 [1 1 1 1 0/1 1]
Figure 3.39 – Part of the state space tree
The counter-examples of the verification are generated by giving the paths from initial
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state to each danger state. There are 6 paths in this example:
1. Init→ rAB=1→ LcAgR=1→ L.Eit=1→ L.Kit=1→ KAgL=0→ rAB=0→ KAgR=1→
rAB=1→ LcAgR=1→ L.Eit=1→ L.Kit=1→ Zon=0→ KAgR=0
2. · · · → L.Kit=1→ Zon=0→ rAB=0→ KAgR=0
3. · · · → L.Kit=1→ Zon=0→ Pad=1→ KAgR=0
4. · · · → L.Kit=1→ Zon=0→ Zon=1→ Zon=0→ KAgR=0
5. · · · → L.Kit=1→ Zon=0→ Zon=1→ Zon=0→ rAB=0→ KAgR=0
6. · · · → L.Kit=1→ Zon=0→ Zon=1→ Zon=0→ Pad=1→ KAgR=0
All of the counter-examples violate the statementϕ3. The reason for this danger situation
is that when a new command is sent from RIS to point machine, its feedback KAg will take
some time. If the RIS does not wait for new KAg data and continue to perform subsequent
processing programmes, then the old KAg data may lead the RIS to switch on the signal
light and allow the train to enter while the point machine is going to change the point’s
position. So we get a dangerous state. The point position is changing but there is a train in
this zone and this will probably cause derailment.
System specification improvement
The solution to this fault is to add a time constraint to the RIS route establishing process.
When the logical position of point CAg is changed and the front light is not yet switched
on, the RIS waits for a moment, which is longer than the operation cycle of a point machine,
thereby ensuring that all the actions of the point machine will be accomplished before the
light switches on.
After we applied this new constraint to the model, and analysed its safety property, it
turns out that the new system holds all the safety statements for every state. The newmodel
has 259 original states in CPN Tools’ state space calculation, while after state abstraction, it
has 65 states where 25 are duplicates, no danger state and no counterexample.
3.7 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter is to present a formal specification methodology for RIS. The work
reported in this paper exploit both the modelling power of CPN and its rigorous seman-
tics. Its hierarchical and colour features make it possible to propose a generic and compact
structure which contains all high-level functions of RIS. This chapter first introduces a ge-
ographical approach of RIS, which consists of two parts: a hierarchical model of signalling
operations and a geographical model of fixed installations. After that, in order to have a
reusable and parametrized structure of fixed installations, we propose a general modelling
pattern for French RIS. Models that are less compact can also be derived from this generic
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one in order to validate various aspects, while keeping the safety property. For low-level
systems (relay-based logic), we introduce an event-based concept, which could make the
relay-based system clearer and easier to be constructed. It maintain the system’s synchro-
nization during a signal event and it is compatible with classic CPNmodels. Furthermore, a
simplification method fo the state space analysis is proposed, making the system state space
more compact, easier to analyse and read, without losing reliability.
Actually, another strong contribution of the paper lies in the fact that there are few ap-
proaches for French railway infrastructure modelling in the state of the art. As a result,
the presented works are original contributions. This method could also be applied to other
similar railway interlocking systems.
100 CHAPTER 3. Formal modelization for RIS via HCPN
Chapter4
Model transformation: from coloured Petri
net to B language
This chapter introduce the modelling transformation approach, which is from the CPNs
model to abstract B machines.
4.1 Introduction
In model driven engineering, everything is a model. Thus, the model transformations are
considered as the "heart and soul" [Lúcio et al. 2014] of model driven engineering, and
can be used for a variety of purposes, such as the generation of models on diﬀerent levels
of abstraction, the creation of diﬀerent views on a system and automation of model evolu-
tion [Czarnecki and Helsen 2006]. The aim of this chapter is to describe a method of CPN
model transformation. This method could help people to quickly shift from a valid design
solution to a valid input of B development process in the design phase.
On the one hand, a fine behavioural specification has to be able to be assessed by an ex-
pert. On the other hand, the implementation result should respect some common industrial
constraints. In the French railway context, the PNs and the B are two industry recognized
tools. The PN models are understood and widely used by expert engineers , because of
their powerful properties, especially the graphical "place-transition" notations. Therefore,
many practical systems and valid solutions are specified with PNs and other high-level PNs.
However, successful engineering stories convince people of the reliability of the B method,
because the final implementation code generated from abstract Bmachine is considered safe
and is proved to be safe. So in the French railway context, B proved model is accepted as
a strong safety proof [Boulanger 2013a,b]. Let us remark that the assessment of high-level
design is a major safe element on its own. In this case, you may not need to execute the
complete B refinement processes. Consequently, in this chapter, we do not really focus on
the B refinement.
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Actually, in most industrial practices, the accurate requirements are diﬃcult to express
and to assess using formal methods. So the guidance and correction from human expertise
cannot be avoided [Defossez, Collart-Dutilleul, and Bon 2011]. Although the B method is
well suited for formal assessment in the development of computer software, its notation
form demands a lot of pre-training for set theory and first order logic, which greatly in-
creases the research and development costs. So it has only been implemented in the major
safety-critical applications, such as a city metro line’s signalling system [Erbin and Soulas
2003]. In contrast, the fine graphical representation of PNs is really an advantage for indus-
trial experts who may not be familiar with mathematical formalism. So there are already
many valid solutions modelled by PNs. Moreover, the modelling power of CPNs, a sort
of high-level PNs, provides a good formal framework for large scale, complex systems but
presents a concise model, which enhances its scope of application [Sun, Collart-Dutilleul,
and Bon 2014].
This technique mismatch leads to the following question. Let us assume in the design
phase, a model has been validated by industry experts, using dedicated industrial tools or
their expertise. The problem is how to prove it formally with respect to the specifications
and automatically generate the implementable codes. To be more precise, the problem to be
solved is the translation from the CPN formalism into the B language formalism. Some sim-
ilar work of this approach can be found in [Attiogbe 2009; Korečko, HudáK, and ŠIMOŇÁK
2007; Korečko and Sobota 2014], which are based on low-level PNs. Our research is an im-
provement of the work from [Bon and Dutilleul 2013], which translates a CPN model with
only numerical colour sets into B machines regarding Atelier B syntax.
This chapter is organized as follows:
First we briefly recall the basics and the outstanding features of the B theory, including
some notations, concepts and the mathematics syntax of B language.
After, we introduce an explicit and detailed transformation framework from non-hierarchical
CPNs to AMNs in which we improve the multi-set mechanism and its related specifica-
tions in [Bon and Dutilleul 2013], so that the transformed B machines can be automatically
proved by Atelier B without using “interactive prover”.
Then, we introduce the hierarchical concept of HCPN into the previous transformation,
and present a new transformation from a HCPN to abstract machine notations.
Finally, we consider the prioritized transition of CPN, and achieve the transformation by
giving each operation a priority and adding a priority management operation.
4.2 Preliminaries of the Bmethod
The B method is a state-based model-ordered method, developed by Prof. Jean-Raymond
Abrial [Abrial 1996], designing and coding software systems. This language is founded on
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the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice [Cansell and Méry 2012]. It pro-
vides a specification formalism called abstract machine. Sets are used for the static part
(data or state) of models. Generalised substitutions are used to express the dynamic part
(data modification or state changes). Refinements are used for evolving the B machine at
various levels of abstractions. The developing process is “machines→ refinement→ imple-
mentation”. Fig. 4.1 shows the schematic diagram of the software developing process with B
method. This language is supported by Atelier B tool [ClearSy 2011, 2014] and the B [Lano
and Haughton 1996; Robinson 1997].
Figure 4.1 – Software development with method B
The B development tool used in this these is Atelier B tool, which is a robust, commer-
cially available tool developed by ClearSy company. It covers all stages of software devel-
opment, including the specifications (abstract B machine), the refinements, proof tool and
code generation. All formal proofs are automatically generated and proved by the proof
tool. Atelier B also provides an interactive proof environment used in the case where the
automatic proof engine fails.
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Proof-based development
“Proof-based development methods integrate formal proof techniques in the development of soft-
ware systems” [Cansell and Méry 2012]. The main process is started with an abstract ma-
chine (the B model) of the system. Details of the system are gradually introduced into the
original machine by generating a series of more concrete machines. The relationship of two
successive machines is the called the “refinement”. The refinement process can be repeated
many times, each refinement representing the intermediary stop between specification and
the final implementation. The important feature of the refinement process is that it can pre-
serve those already proved system properties including safety properties and termination.
During each refinement process, the correctness and eﬀectiveness of each step are vali-
dated by proof obligations (POs) which are responsible for the consistency of the develop-
ment process. This whole process allows B machine to develop into safe code. Such POs
could be generated by the proof tool using automatic or interactive proof procedures sup-
ported by a proof engine [ClearSy 2014].
Before the generation of the POs, system properties in the B model are described by
means of the “invariant” predicate. Invariants and proof obligations together keep the con-
sistency of the model. Moreover, invariants are required to ensure that data properties are
preserved by the operations of the machine. In each refinement step, the machine is added
with a further invariant which relates the more concrete data form. These invariants are
also used to generate the new proof obligations for refined machines.
4.2.1 The B language
In this subsection, we only present the mathematical concepts and some notations relating
to the Bmethod, which are necessary for understanding the following chapters.
Sets and predicates
The B development of a machine is started with analysis of the mathematical structure: sets,
constants and properties over sets and constants.
Constants can be defined using first order logic and set-theoretical nations of B A set can
be defined as {x | s ∧ P(x)} or a Cartesian product s × t or a set of sets P(s), intersection of
set using ∪ and ∩. A pair is denoted as (x,y) or x 7→ y. A relation over two sets s and t is
an elements of P(s × t). A relation r has a domain dom(r) and a range ran(r). A function f
from sets s and t is also a relation that mapping from each element in dom(f ) to at least one
element in t. A function si either partial f ∈ A 7→ B, or total one f ∈ A→ B
The formal syntax of B formulas is summed up as follows, where V is the set of variables,
I is the set of identifiers, E is the set of expressions, S is sets, P is the predicates, BIG is an
infinite set.
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V := I | V 7→ V
E := V | [V := E]E | E 7→ E | S
S := S × S | P(S) | V | P | BIG | I
P := P ∧ P | P⇒ P | ¬P | ∀V .P | [V := E]P | E = E | E ∈ S | I
In Table 4.1, some set-theoretical notations are listed in both symbolic and mathematical
ways. Those notations are used to eﬀectively describe the system.
Table 4.1 – Set-theoretical notations of B language
Name Syntax ASCII Explanations
Binary relation s↔ t <-> P(s × t)
Composition of relations r1; r2 ; {x,y | x ∈ a∧ y ∈ b∧∃z.(z ∈ c∧ x,z ∈ r1 ∧ z,y ∈ r2)}
Inverse relation r−1 ∼ {x,y | x ∈ P(a)∧ y ∈ P(b)∧ y,x ∈ r}
Domain dom(r) dom(r) {a | a ∈ s∧∃b.(b ∈ t ∧ a 7→ b ∈ r)}
Range ran(r) ran(r) dom(r−1)
Identity id(s) id(s) {x,y | x ∈ s∧ y ∈ s∧ x = y}
Restriction to the domain s ⊳ r <| id(s); r
Restriction to the range r ⊲ s |> r; id(s)
Subtraction to the domain s ⊳− r <<| (dom(r)− s)⊳ r
Subtraction to the range r ⊲− s |>> r ⊲ (ran(r)− s)
Image r[w] r[w] ran(w⊳ r)
Override q ⊳− r <+ (dom(r)⊳− q)∪ r
Partial Function s 7→ t +-> {r | r ∈ s↔ t ∧ (r−1; r) ⊆ id(t)}
Logical structure of Bmachine
The notation of the specifications in B method is known as the abstract machine notation
(AMN), which could describe diﬀerent levels of abstractions. Fig. 4.2 presents a B method
notation and its refinement. Normally, an abstract machine could contain diﬀerent clauses
to describe its properties and operations. These clauses can be classified into three cate-
gories: composition, declarative and executive [Boulanger 2014]. In Fig. 4.2, each category
is marked with a character style, the compositions are normal style, the declaratives are
italics style, and the executives are bold style.
Compositions The compositions are used to define the relationships between diﬀerent
abstract machines which belong to the same system. The possible relations are INCLUDES,
SEES, IMPORTS, EXTENDS or USES. Each clause indicates a diﬀerent visibility and access
permission on the components of the other abstract machines.
The INCLUDES clause is to bring together the components of machines instances (sets,
constants and variables) as well as their properties (PROPERTIES and INVARIANT clauses),
in order to make up a complex abstract machine using other abstract machine. The includ-
ing component cannot modify included variables, but can access them by “read”. However,
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MACHINE REFINEMENT
M(p) R(p)
SEE REFINES
N M
CONSTRAINTS CONSTRAINTS
C C1
SETS SETS
St St1
CONSTANTS CONSTANTS
k k1
PROPERTIES PROPERTIES
Bh Bh1
VARIABLES VARIABLES
v w
INVARIANT INVARIANT
I J
DEFINITIONS DEFINITIONS
D D1
INITIALISATION INITIALISATION
T T1
OPERATIONS OPERATIONS
y← op(x) = y← op(x) =
PRE P THEN S END PRE P THEN S END
... ...
END END
Figure 4.2 – General structure of Bmachine (left) and refinement (right)
the included component allows the including component to modify included variables by
included operations. The included invariant is preserved by the including component and
is used by the proof tools for generating proof obligations of the including component.
The SEES clause is used to reference other machine instances, which means it can access
the constituents (sets, constants and variables) of other machines without modifying them.
The IMPORTS links an implementation and an abstract machine instance. The imple-
mentation creates the imported abstract machine instance to use its data and operations to
implement its own data and operations.
In an abstract machine or a refinement, the EXTENDS clause is equivalent to an inclusion
of the machine instances and the promotion of all of the operations of the included machine
instances.
The USES clause is used for the included machines, to share the data of one of the in-
cluded machines. Using machines can refer to share variables in their invariants, and data
of the used machine are shared among using machines. When a machine uses another ma-
chine, the current project must contain a machine which includes the used and using ma-
chines.
4.2. Preliminaries of the Bmethod 107
Declarative The declarative clauses describe all the statements of data (sets, variables, con-
stants) and their invariant conditions, which will always be verified in order to keep the
validity of the machine. All the declarations depend on the set theory and first order pred-
icates. The B language is built on manipulation of sets, rather than on the manipulation of
types. For each variable, it will calculate all the associated values. Table 4.2 introduces the
basis sets.
Table 4.2 – The basic sets
Expression Name ASCII Explanation
B Boolean BOOL {true, f alse}
N Natural number NATURAL {0,1, · · · }
NAT Finite set of natural numbers NAT {0,1, · · · ,MAXINT }
Z Integer INTEGER {· · · ,−2,−1,0,1,2, · · · }
INT Finite set of integer INT
{−MAXINT , · · · ,−2,−1,0,
1,2, · · · ,MAXINT }
Those basic sets are associated with some operators which make it possible to construct
more complex sets. Table 4.3 introduces the major operators for the creation of B sets.
Table 4.3 – Operators of complex sets
Expression Name ASCII Explanation
∅ The empty set {} The empty set
{e1, e2, e3} A list {e1,e2,e3}
A set which contains
only the elements e1,e2
and e3
P ∗Q Cartesian product P*Q
The Cartesian product
of P by Q
S ↔ T
Set of all the rela-
tionship of S*T
S<->T
Set of all the relation-
ships from S to T, equal
to P(S*T)
In the B machines, all the mathematical notations are written in the form of ASCII nota-
tion. Table 4.4 shows a comparison of ASCII notations and the corresponding mathematical
notation.
Executives The executive part presents the dynamic actions of an abstract machine which
includes the initialization and the operations. They make use of the generalized substitution
language (GSL). A subset of GSL is shown in Table 4.5.
The DEFINITIONS clause contains explicit declarations or definition files of definitions
of a machine. A definition may have parameters and could be used in other clauses for pred-
icates, expressions or substitutions. In Atelier B, each use of a definition is directly replaced
by the corresponding text, where formal parameters take the place of real parameters. The
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Table 4.4 – Comparison of mathematical and ASCII notations
Mathematical ASCII
Explanation
notation notation
⊆ <: included or equal
∪ \/ Union
∩ /\ Intersection
∈ : Belong to
:∈ :: Becomes an element of
∀x.(· · · ) !x.(...) Universal quantifier
∃x.(· · · ) #x.(...) Existential quantifier
∧ & logical “AND”
∨ or logical “OR”
¬ not logical “NOT”
λx.(· · · ) %x.(...) Lambda function
Table 4.5 – A subset of generalized substitutions
Substitution Meaning of GS
x:=E [x := E]R ⇔ substitution of all the
free occurrences of x in R by E
skip [skip]R⇔ R
S || T [S ||T ]R⇔ [S]Rs ∧ [T ]Rt
S;T [S ;T ]R⇔ [S]Rs, [T ]Rt
CHOICE S1 OR S2 END Do S1 or S2
PRE E THEN S1 END
If predicate E holds, do S1, other-
wise do anything
SELECT E THEN S1 END
If E holds, do S1, otherwise do not
execute
IF E THEN S1
ELSE S2 END
If E holds, do S1, other-
wise do S2
VAR v IN S1 END
For any values of local variables
from the list v do S1
ANY v WHERE E
THEN S1 END
For any values of variables from v
that satisfy E do S1, If no values sat-
isfy E, do not execute
scope of a definition located in a component is the whole of the component, including the
text situated before the declaration of the definition.
Refinements
Abstract B machines are expressed in non-deterministic formalism, and they follow the
rules of set language and first order logic. So some of the algorithms such as loops and
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recursion are forbidden in the abstract machines. In engineering applications, these algo-
rithms cannot be avoided, so progressive refinements are performed. These refinements are
made in order to put in concrete form the manipulated structures and solve indeterminism
in order to obtain a software written in a common programming language. Specifically, to
refine means to modify data and operations. By refining, the non-deterministic parts of
an abstract machine are replaced by some more programming-like substitutions, such as
WHILE loops. The interfaces (such as parameters and operation headers) of a refining and
a refined component have to be the same. For example, in Fig. 4.2 invariant J of the refine-
ment R defines properties of w but also a relation between v and w. Whether J is maintained
by all the operations of R is also verified by proving the POs.
Proof obligations The conditions of verification are the proof obligations They are gener-
ated from the declaration part of the model using mathematical theory. They are generated
from the executive part of the model for the preservation (when re-calling the operations) of
the invariant. Proof obligations state the correctness of safety properties with respect to the
invariant. During the refinement process, they make clear the relationship between abstract
model and concrete model.
More precisely, a number of proof obligations ensure that [Cansell and Méry 2012]:
• Each abstract event is correctly refined by its corresponding concrete version
• Each new event refines skip
• No new event takes control for ever
• Relative deadlock-freeness is preserved
4.3 From non-hierarchical coloured Petri net to Bmachine
With the extensive applications of formal methods, sometimes the integration of formal
languages is unavoidable. The translation from PNs to B machines seems to have been a
research interest in recent years. Published works give eﬀorts to this approach from diﬀer-
ent perspectives. The work in [Korečko, HudáK, and ŠIMOŇÁK 2007; Korečko and Sobota
2014] presents a mapping method of low-level PNs (the PNswith undistinguishable tokens)
to abstract B machines and to Event B machines. A similar work [Attiogbe 2009] presents
an encoding of PT nets to the Event-B language. Our research is based on the work of [Bon
2000; Bon and Dutilleul 2013], which successfully translates a non-hierarchical CPN with
numerical colour sets to B machines with Atelier B syntax. Nevertheless, the practical expe-
rience shows this work generates a lot of unproven POs using “automatic prover” in Atelier
B.
Our study continues to use the basic data structures defined in [Bon and Dutilleul 2013].
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Based on this, we introduce a more explicit framework of the translation, simplify the oper-
ations for multi-set structures, make the translation compatible with non-numeric types of
colour sets. Then, we reform the mechanism of multi-set specifications, in order to ensure
the target B machines can be automatically proved by Atelier B without using “interactive
prover”.
The translation introduced in this section is for non-hierarchical CPNs. It will consist
of three parts. First, the framework (or template) of the translation is presented, for map-
ping the PN’s "Place-transition" structure to the B machine formalism. Second, the colour
property of CPNs is achieved by introducing the multi-set mechanism, which defines the to-
ken representation and its mathematical operators. It allows binding tokens with diﬀerent
colour types to each places, and modifying the content of the tokens. Then, diﬀerent colour
sets in CPNs are mapped into AMNs and user-define declarations are discussed. Finally,
two non-hierarchical CPNmodels are introduced to demonstrate the translation process.
4.3.1 Framework of non-hierarchical translation
For a CPN N = (P,T ,A,Σ,V ,C,G,E,I ), we define that:
(i) P = {p1, ...,pm},
(ii) T = {t1, ..., tn},
(iii) A = {(p,t) | p ∈ P ∧ t ∈ T } ∪ {(t,p) | t ∈ T ∧ p ∈ P},
(iv) Σ = {σ1, ...,σk−1,σk , ...,σl },
(v) C = {c1, ..., cm},
(vi) G = {G(t) | t ∈ T } and
(vii) I = {I(p) | p ∈ P}.
Let β be the mapping β : CPN → AMN , then the image of CPNN under β is a Bmachine
Bm, Bm = β[N ] with the following structure.
For all the elements mentioned in Fig. 4.3, they have the following mapping relationship:
1. "MultiSets.def" is a external definition file, which will be introduced in next subsec-
tion.
For each colour set ∀k ∈ {1..l}, the mapping relations are shown below.
2. Colsetk = β[σk ] is the colour set , where σk = C(pi) ∈ Σ.
3. (Colsetk)MS = β[C(pi )MS ], is the multi-set of colour .
For each place related elements ∀i ∈ {1..m}, the relations are shown as follows.
4. VPi = β[M(pi)], is the marking of each place, where pi ∈ P.
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MACHINE M
SETS Colset1, Colset2, · · · , Colsetk−1
CONSTANTS Colsetk , Colsetk+1, · · · , Colsetl
PROPERTIES
Colsetk := EXPR
k
V & Colsetk+1 := EXPR
k+1
V & · · · & Colsetl := EXPR
l
V
VARIABLES VP1, VP2, · · · , VPm
INVARIANT
VP1 : (Colset1)MS & VP2 : (Colset2)MS & · · · & VPm : (Colsetl )MS
INITIALISATION
VP1 := V I1 || VP2 := V I2 || · · · || VPm := V Im
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def";
· · ·
VAR_tj == EXPR
tj
V ; // For trainsition Tj
E_p1_tj == EXPRVAR_tj ;
E_p2_tj == EXPRVAR_tj ;
· · ·
E_tj_p1 == EXPRVAR_tj ;
E_tj_p2 == EXPRVAR_tj ;
· · ·
GRD_tj == EXPRV ;
CDT_tj == EXPRV ;
· · ·
OPERATIONS
OP1= SELECT CDT1 THEN ACT1 END;
OP2= SELECT CDT2 THEN ACT2 END;
· · ·
OPn= SELECT CDTn THEN ACTn END;
END
Figure 4.3 – The framework of a Bmachine transformed from coloured Petri net
5. VPi ∈ (Colsetk)MS , where Type[VPi] = Colsetk
6. V Ii = β[I(pi )〈〉] is the initial value , where Type[V Ii] = Colsetk .
7. System marking β[M] is defined as β[M] =
m∑
i=1
VPi
8. The initial marking β[M0] is defined as β[M0] =
m∑
i=1
V Ii
For each transition related elements ∀j ∈ {1..n} , the relations are shown below.
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9. OPj = β[tj ] is the transition, where tj ∈ T .
10. VARj = β[Var(tj )] is the variables of transition tj .
11. GRDj = β[G(tj )] is the guard function.
12. CDTj is the condition of each operation, CDTj = (VARj ∈ Colsetk)∧cdt(p1, tj )∧cdt(p2, tj )∧
· · · ∧ cdt(pm, tj )∧GRDj .
13. ACTj = act(p1, tj )∧ act(p2, tj )∧ ...∧ act(pm, tj ).
The detail definitions are that for ∀p,t (p ∈ P,t ∈ T ) there exists:
14. Ea is the arc expression, where Ep,t = β[E(p,t)] and Et,p = β[E(t,p)].
15. Ea =

EXPRt ∈ (Colsetk)MS if a ∈ A
ΦMS if a < A
16. cdt(p,t) =

VP ≥ Ep,t if p ∈
∗t
true if p < ∗t
17. act(p,t) =

VP := VP −−Ep,t ++Et,p if p ∈ ∗t ∪ t∗
skip if p < ∗t ∪ t∗
In general, the clauses SETS, CONSTANTS and PROPERTIES define all the new sets used
in the model. Each element of VARIABLES VP in the B machineM represents the marking
M(p) of given place p in the CPN N . The INVARIANT clause assigns a multi-set of diﬀerent
colours to each place. The INITIALISATION clause ensures each place has the same initial
value asm0(p). The DEFINITIONS clause prepares all the variables of transition, arc expres-
sion functions and guard functions for the following operations. In OPERATIONS, each OP
represents a transition t, the predicate CDT is similar to the CPN enabling condition, and
the ACT is the token computation formula. The substitution SELECT in each operation is
the conditional bounded choice, its actions can only be executed when its condition CDT is
true.
4.3.2 Multi-set concept
One of the important features of CPNs is the diﬀerent data types. A CPN marking cor-
responds to a multi-set, which contains information of token numbers and token colours.
Each behaviour of the transitions is associated to the marking modifications. In order to
integrate this mechanism into the Bmachine framework, the multi-set specifications should
be introduced.
In CPN ML language, there is a predefined set of basic types named simple colour sets.
These simple colour sets can be used to compose structured colour sets using a set of colour
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set constructors [Jensen and Kristensen 2009]. While in the AMN, only simple data types are
predefined. The composed ones will be presented in the next subsection. The mechanism
to be introduced must be able to cope with all types of multi-sets. However, it is both
unwise and unnecessary to pre-define all types of multi-sets in a single abstract machine. In
order to be more adaptable and flexible, we introduce a series of parameterized definitions,
which could associate the token numbers with their colours, and allow the modification of
tokens via operations. These definitions are written in a "MultiSets.def" file, which could be
directly included in any abstract Bmachines, and these definitions can help to complement
the clauses in the previous framework. Listing 4.1 gives the content of the file.
Listing 4.1 – Specification of multi-set and their operations
✞ ☎
DEFINITIONS
MS(ss)==(ss<->NATURAL);
Ms_Empty(ss)== {elt|elt: ss * {0}};
Ms_Subset(ms1,ms2,ss)== !elt.(elt:ss => ms1(elt)>=ms2(elt));
Ms_Add(ms1,ms2,ss) == (%ee.(ee:ss & ms1(ee):ran(ms1) & ms2(ee):ran(ms2) & ms1(ee)>=0 &
ms2(ee)>=0 | ms1(ee) + ms2(ee)));
Ms_Less(ms1,ms2,ss)== (%ee.(ee:ss & ms1(ee):ran(ms1) & ms2(ee):ran(ms2) | ms1(ee) - ms2(
ee)))
✝ ✆
The defined function MS(ss) is to give the formalism of the marking in Bmachines. The
function Ms_Empty(ss) generates an empty token with colour type ss for the initialization
propose and further token operations. The function Ms_Subset(ms1,ms2,ss)makes a com-
parison for multi-sets ms1 and ms2 which has the same colour type ss, the function returns
true if and only if the number of each element in ms1 is equal to or greater than that in ms2.
The function Ms_Add(ms1,ms2,ss) and Ms_Less(ms1,ms2,ss) are addition and subtraction
algorithm for multi-sets.
From a mathematical point of view, part of the preconditions in Ms_Add and Ms_Less
seems redundant, such as ms1(ee) : ran(ms1), ms2(ee) : ran(ms2), ms1(ee) >= 0, ms2(ee) >= 0.
But they are some important additional theories, which can help the Atelier-B prover to
prove the POs. Using this technique, the multi-set mechanism can be automatically proved.
It is applicable for all data types.
For a better understanding, we take an example of a simple colour set to demonstrate
AA t1 BB
BOOL BOOL
1‘true 1‘false
bb
Figure 4.4 – Toy example of multi-set demonstration
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the above mentioned definitions. In Fig. 4.4, there is a simple transition with two places.
Each place has the same colour type BOOL. The initial marking of this CPN is that place AA
has a token 1‘true, while place BB has a 1‘f alse. After firing the transition t1, AA has no
token and BB’s marking is 1‘true + +1‘f alse. In the AMN, the token representations will
be defined as following.
1. The variables in the B machine are also denoted with AA and BB.
2. Each variable has a data type, AA:MS(BOOL), BB:MS(BOOL), where
MS(BOOL)⇒ {true|− > n,f alse|− > n}, n ∈NATURAL
3. Each variable needs initialization,
AA := Ms_Empty(BOOL) <+ true*{1} ⇒ {true|->1, false|->0},
BB := Ms_Empty(BOOL) <+ false*{1}⇒ {true|->0, false|->1}.
4. After firing transition t1,
AA = Ms_Empty(BOOL)⇒ {true|->0, false|->0},
BB = Ms_Empty(BOOL) <+ {true, false}*{1}⇒ {true|->1, false|->1}
4.3.3 Colour sets and coloured Petri net declarations
The sets of token colours in CPN are specified by ML programming language. They are
classified into two categories, the basic types which inherited from Standard ML are simple
colour sets, the others are compound colour sets using the previously declared colour sets.
In this paper only non-time related colours are involved.
Table 4.6 – Comparison of basic data types
Colour set CPN specification B notation
Unit
comprises a single element
no direct corresponding
colset name = unit
Boolean
set of true and false
BOOL
colset name = bool
Integer
numerals without a decimal point
INTEGER
colset name = int
String
sequences of printable characters STRING
colset name = string Only in operation input
Enumerated
Enumeration values
SET={E1,· · ·,En}
colset name = with id0|id1| · · · |idn
Index
sequences of values comprised of an identifier
no direct corresponding
colset name=index id with exp1..exp2
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In the types supported by the CPN Tools, the simple colour sets and their corresponding
data types in B language are enumerated in the following Table 4.6. Similar data types for
Integer, Boolean and Enumerated can be found in AMN.
For the other simple colour types, we can only have a non-direct translation. The Unit
colour sets can be represented with a set containing only one element, such as unit={new_unit}.
The Index colour set is a concrete instance of positive integer. So it could be denoted by
a finite positive integer set index={int-exp1..int-exp2}, where index:NAT. The String
colour sets is a finite string character set. while in the AMN, string type can only be used
to type operation input parameters. In practical translation, we recommend using a finite
enumerate set to indicate all the strings needed.
For the compound colour sets, CPN use constructors to define more complex colour sets.
The Product color sets colset Name = product name1 ∗ name2 ∗ · · · ∗ namen, where n>=2.
In B notation, there is the same Cartesian product ’∗’, and definition will be Name:=name1 ∗
name2 ∗ · · · ∗ namen.
The record colour set colset Name = record id1 : name1 ∗ id2 : name2 ∗ · · · ∗ idn : namen.
It is a fixed-length colour set and has the same function as Product. The only diﬀerence is
that a product colour is position-dependent, while in record colour, each component has a
unique label to be identified. In B language, the record concept is the same, and the nota-
tions are: The set of records is SET = struct(id1:name1, · · ·, idn:namen), an extensive
record is REC = rec(id1:name1, · · ·, idn:namen), where n is an integer greater than or
equal to 1. The access to a record field (quote operator) is idi’REC.
The List colour set is a variable-length data type. The values are a sequence whose colour
must be the same type, colset name = list name0. As one of the most flexible structures
in CPNs, the list structure has many pre-defined operations which can achieve functions
such as inquiry, self-loop and recursion. But this concrete programming language is only
accepted in the Implement phase of B method. So the mapping of the lists form CPNs
to B machines is conditional, and the most suitable candidate is "Sequence expressions".
Table 4.7 is a partial mapping of two data structures. The other list functions could only be
realized inside the operations.
Table 4.7 – Mapping of List data type
CPN specification B notation
colset Lst = list CS Lst:=seq(CS)
nil or []
[]
empty list
Continued on next page
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Table 4.7 – continued from previous page
CPN specification B notation
hd Lst
first(Lst)
head, the first element of the list
tl Lst
tail(Lst)
tail, the last element of the list
length Lst
size(Lst)
length of list
elt::List
elt -> Lst
prepend element as head of list
rev Lst
rev(Lst)
reverse list
List.nth(Lst, nth)
Lst(nth)
nth element in list
List.take(Lst, n)
Lst / |\ n
returns first n elements of list
List.drop(Lst, n)
Lst \|/ n
returns what is left after dropping first n elements of list
List.null Lst
Lst=[]
returns true if list is empty
mem Lst elt
elt:ran(Lst)
returns true if element is in the list
contains Lst1 Lst2
ran(Lst1)<:ran(Lst2)
returns true if element is in the list
union Lst1 Lst2 (or Lst1^^Lst2)
Lst1^Lst2
the concatenation of two lists
ins Lst elt
Lst<-elt
inserts element at the end of list
Other pre-defined list functions are more programming like functions. They cannot be
written in a compact form with set theory and first order logic. In practice, depending on
the context, list functions may appear in diﬀerent forms in the operations. Sometimes the
function can only be realized in the implementation phase, where recursion and loop are
allowed in B machines. Here is an example (Fig. 4.5) of achieving the same function inside
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the operation.
CPN specification B notation
ins_new l x ann<-ins_new(ll,xx)==
if x is not a number of list
l, then x is inserted at the
end of l, otherwise l is re-
turned
IF xx : ran(ll)
THEN aa := ll
ELSE aa := ll<-xx
END
Figure 4.5 – Example of mapping coloured Petri net function into B operation
Besides the declaration of colour sets, the CPN Tools also allow constant declaration and
user-define function declaration. A constant declaration binds a value to an identifier, which
then works as a constant. It should be defined in the B constant part. The functions of a B
machine are directly used in the operations, they can be accomplished by the substitution
which is similar to programming language, such as IF condition and Case condition. Some
simple parameterized function may appear in the definition as reusable modules.
4.3.4 Transformation equivalence
Earlier in this section, the methodology of translation from non-hierarchical CPNs to B
machines was defined formally, as well as the multi-set concept and some common token
colours. With the presented translation rules, we now present a global design for proving
that the model translation is equivalent, also known as strongly consistent. To better illus-
colset BOOL = bool;
colset SmallInt= int with 1..3;
colset LiftCar = product SmallInt * BOOL;
var a:SmallInt;
var b:BOOL;
Figure 4.6 – Coloured Petri net of an elevator
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trate the verification properties a small example will be introduced.
This is a toy model of an elevator system, the tokens representing the locations and
availabilities of the lift car. There are 3 floors, the lift car can move upwards or downwards
in a certain state of the system.
Conformance
The basic needs is to ensure that the transformed specifications are well-formed with respect
to its transformation language. In the CPNs, the state (or the static property) of the system
is represented by the marking, which is the mapping from places into multi-set of tokens.
In the transformed specifications, the variables are used to express the system state, which
is the marking, VP == β[M(p)]. The variables obey the same invariants as the marking in
CPNs: The colour set invariant and the initialization invariant.
Let a Bmachine Bm be the image of aCPNN after the translation β, where P = {p1, · · · ,pm}.
the set of colour set as Σ = {σ1, · · · ,σl }. The state of the B machine State(Bm) is defined as
follows:
1. VPi ≡ β[M(pi )], where i ∈ {1..m}
2. State(Bm) = VP1 ∧ · · · ∧VPm
3. State0(Bm) = V I1 ∧ · · · ∧V Im
4. Colsetk ≡ β[σk ], where k ∈ {1..l}
Lemma 4.1. State of system. The relation of the system state before and after the translation
is shown as:
1. State(Bm) = VP1∧ · · · ∧VPm = β[M(pi )]∧ · · · ∧ β[M(pm)] = β[M]⇔M
2. State0(Bm) = V I1 ∧ · · · ∧VIm = β[I(pi )]∧ · · · ∧ β[I(pm)] = β[I ]⇔ I ==M0
3. Invariant(Bm) = VP1 : Colset1 ∧ · · · ∧VPm : Colsetl ⇔ C : P→ Σ
The system state of the elevator example can be transformed into the specifications in
Listing 4.2.
Listing 4.2 – Corresponding system state of Fig. 4.6
✞ ☎
VARIABLES
OpenDoor, CloseDoor
INVARIANT
OpenDoor : MS(LiftCar) &
CloseDoor : MS(LiftCar)
INITIALISATION
OpenDoor := Ms_Empty(LiftCar) <+ {(1|->TRUE)|->1} ||
CloseDoor := Ms_Empty(LiftCar) <+ {(2|->FALSE)|->1,(3|->FALSE)|->1}
✝ ✆
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The colour set is related to diﬀerent data types, and each new type (or non-common type)
is pre-defined in the declaration part of CPNs. Such types should also be declared in the B
machines (see Listing 4.3). They will be used as an important part of invariants, because all
the variables and operation must comply with their own "colour (data types)" .
Listing 4.3 – Corresponding colour set of Fig. 4.6
✞ ☎
CONSTANTS
SmallInt, LiftCar
PROPERTIES
SmallInt<<:INT & SmallInt=1..3 &
LiftCar=(SmallInt*BOOL)
✝ ✆
In this way, all the system states have the corresponding images and their possible invari-
ants are held at all time.
Execution Semantics
The dynamic properties of the CPNs are expressed by firing the transitions, while such
properties can only be approached by operations in Bmachines. According toDefinition A.5,
a transition is called enabled at markingM , if and only if there are some qualified binding
elements.
In order to present the enabling conditions, it is necessary to have the variables of the
transition. In Definition A.4, the variable is defined as t ∈ T : Var(t) = {v | v ∈ Var(G(t))∨
∃a ∈ A : v ∈ Var(E(a))} In the B machine, variables of a transition are denoted as VARj =
β[V ar(tj )]. According to B language syntax, each variable should have its data type in the
condition CDTj of the operation tj . We denote the image of a binding b ∈ B(tj ) is bβ , then
the enabled conditions for the Bmachines are:
1. β[G(t)〈b〉 = true] ⇒ β[G(t)〈b〉] = true
⇒ β[G(t)]β[〈b〉] = true ⇒ GRDj〈bβ〉 = true
2. ∀p ∈ P : β[E(p,t)〈b〉 ≤M(p)] ⇒ β[E(p,t)〈b〉] ≤ β[M(p)]
⇒ Ep,t〈b
β〉 ≤ VP ⇒ Ms_Subset(VPp,Ep,t ,Colsetp)〈bβ〉.
So we can claim that the enabling rules of the translation are consistent.
Lemma 4.2. Enabling condition Let a transition t be enabled by a binding element (t,b) ∈
BE, the image of such transition is OPt = β[t], which could also be enabled by the correspon-
dence condition (t,bβ), As they satisfy the following conditions:
1. β[G(t)〈b〉 = true] ⇒ GRDj〈bβ〉 = true
2. ∀p ∈ P : β[E(p,t)〈b〉 ≤M(p)] ⇒ Ms_Subset(VPp,Ep,t ,Colsetp)〈bβ〉.
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Here we have a demonstration of the operation OP_UP, which is the image of transition
"UP" in the elevator example.
Listing 4.4 – Corresponding definitions part of Fig. 4.6
✞ ☎
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def";
VAR_UP == aa;
E_OpenDoor_UP== (Ms_Empty(LiftCar) <+ {(aa|->TRUE)|->1});
E_UP_OpenDoor== (Ms_Empty(LiftCar) <+ {((aa+1)|->TRUE)|->1});
E_CloseDoor_UP== (Ms_Empty(LiftCar)<+ {((aa+1)|->FALSE)|->1});
E_UP_CloseDoor== (Ms_Empty(LiftCar)<+ {(aa|->FALSE)|->1});
GRD_UP== (aa<3);
CDT_UP== (aa:SmallInt & GRD_UP & Ms_Subset(OpenDoor, E_OpenDoor_UP, LiftCar) & Ms_Subset(
CloseDoor,E_CloseDoor_UP,LiftCar));
· · ·
✝ ✆
If a binding element (t,b) ∈ BE is enabled in M , it may occur, and it leads to a new
markingM ′. We say that the markingM ′ is directly reachable fromM , which is also written
asM
(t,b)
−−−→M ′.
Lemma 4.3. Token transit. Let a marking M be fired by a binding element (t,b) ∈ BE,
and changed into a new marking M ′. Then corresponding data changes in B machine are
expressed as:
1. OPtj ≡ β[tj ]
2. β[M ′(pi)] = β[M(pi)−−E(pi , t)〈b〉++E(t,pi )〈b〉]
= β[M(pi)]−−β[E(pi , t)〈b〉] + +β[E(t,pi )〈b〉]
= VPi −−Epi ,t〈b
β〉++Et,pi 〈b
β〉
=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(VPi ,Epi ,t ,Colseti ),Et,pi ,Colseti )〈b
β〉
= VP ′i
.
It could also be written in another form:
3. M(pi)
(tj ,b)
−−−→M ′(pi)⇔ VP
OPtj 〈b
β〉
−−−−−−−→ VP ′.
The complete form of operation OP_UP is shown as follows:
Listing 4.5 – Corresponding operations part of Fig. 4.6
✞ ☎
OPERATIONS
Op_UP=
SELECT #(VAR_UP).(CDT_UP)
THEN ANY VAR_UP
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WHERE CDT_UP
THEN
OpenDoor := Ms_Add(Ms_Less(OpenDoor,E_OpenDoor_UP,LiftCar),E_UP_OpenDoor,LiftCar) ||
CloseDoor:= Ms_Add(Ms_Less(CloseDoor,E_CloseDoor_UP,LiftCar),E_UP_CloseDoor,LiftCar)
END
END;
✝ ✆
Hence, for each transition and its image operation, the enabling conditions and occur-
rence rules are coherent. So the correctness of behaviour (dynamic) properties can be
proved.
Model Checking
The CPN and the B language are both tool-supported formal methods based on system state
space. Since we have proved the static and dynamic properties of the translation by theorem
analysis, we can use model checking as an auxiliary method of verification. Model check-
ing has a mathematical representation of a system, and its result consists of a systematic
exhaustive exploration of the mathematical model. There is already some research using
model checking for verification of model transformations [Calegari and Szasz 2013]. Be-
cause the well known "state explosion" limitation exists, this approach can only be applied
in a small system or be used as an auxiliary method.
The comparison is shown in Fig. 4.7, the state space of CPN is calculated by the CPN
Tools, and the state space of B-machine is calculated by ProB. After initialisation, eachmodel
has 3 states , and 4 state changes. Their state space can be considered as the same, and this
result reinforces the reliability of our translation method.
4.3.5 Demonstration for mapping non-hierarchical coloured Petri net
This section presents two examples to illustrate the translation process of non-hierarchical
CPN. In order to allow the readers to have a better understanding of our method, only well-
known cases are chosen in this paper, rather than some railway based cases.
Dining philosophers problem
An example which can be seen in Fig. 4.8(a) is the dining philosophers problem. In this
case, five Chinese philosophers are having dinner at a round table. There is only one plate
and five chopsticks on the table, and each chopstick is placed between two neighbouring
philosophers. To eat the dish, each philosopher has to use two chopsticks next to him. Once
a philosopher starts eating, his two neighbours have to wait until the chopsticks are unoccu-
pied.
This system is modelled by CPNs shown in Fig. 4.8(b), which could well express the
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concept of synchronization and concurrency. Philosophers are defined as a set of PH , and
the chopsticks are defined as a set of CS. The Chopsticks() is a mapping function which
(a) State space of CP-net
(b) State space of B-machine
Figure 4.7 – State space comparison between the transformation
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Plate
Ph1
cs1
Ph2
cs2
Ph3 cs3 Ph4
cs4
Ph5
cs5
(a) Problem describesion (b) CP-net of dining philosophers
val n = 5;
colset PH = index ph with 1..n;
colset CS = index cs with 1..n;
var p: PH;
fun Chopsticks(ph(i)) = 1‘cs(i) ++ 1‘cs(if i=n then 1 else i+1);
Figure 4.8 – Dining philosophers problem
indicates the relationship between the philosophers and the chopsticks he can use.
The translation job could be roughly divided into three steps. First, the basic framework
of the Bmachine should be built. Each place and each transition of the CPN is mapped into
the entries of variables and operations in the Bmachine. Then, the colour informations and
user-defined CPN declarations are filled into the appropriate clauses. Finally, the detailed
specifications of each arc, guard and transition function are complemented. For a clear
mind, these steps are described separately. But in practice, they can be applied at the same
time.
The corresponding B machine is shown in Listing 4.6. In this machine, we named the
variables and the operations in the same way as when they are in the places and transitions.
The expressions starting with "E_" are the arc expressions. The source and destination of
each arc is noted in an abbreviate form. For example, the arc E_T_TkChsmeans the arc from
place Think to transition Take_Chopsticks. Similarly, the arc E_PdChs_U means the arc from
transition Put_Down_Chopsticks to place Unused. The expression starting with "CDT_" is
the enabling condition of each operation. Statements "skip" and "TRUE" are omitted in the
machine. Because for each generalized substitution S, it holds that S ||skip = S, and for each
predicate P that P ∧ TRUE = P.
Listing 4.6 – B-machine for dining philosophers
✞ ☎
MACHINE dining_philosophers
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CONSTANTS val_n, PH, CS
PROPERTIES
val_n : INT & val_n = 5 &
PH <<:INT & PH = 1..val_n &
CS = 1..val_n
VARIABLES
Think, Eat, Unused
INVARIANT
Think : MS(PH) & Eat : MS(PH) & Unused : MS(CS)
INITIALISATION
Think := Ms_Empty(PH) <+ PH*{1} ||
Eat := Ms_Empty(PH) ||
Unused := Ms_Empty(CS) <+ CS*{1}
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def"
Chopsticks(pp)== {pp,((pp mod val_n)+1)};
VAR_TkChs== pp;
E_T_TkChs== (Ms_Empty(PH) <+ {pp|->1});
E_U_TkChs== (Ms_Empty(CS) <+ Chopsticks(pp)*{1});
E_TkChs_E== (Ms_Empty(PH) <+ {pp|->1});
CDT_TkChs== pp:PH & Ms_Subset(Think,E_T_TkChs,PH) & Ms_Subset(Unused,E_U_TkChs,CS);
VAR_PdChs== pp;
E_E_PdChs== (Ms_Empty(PH) <+ {pp|->1});
E_PdChs_T== (Ms_Empty(PH) <+ {pp|->1});
E_PdChs_U== (Ms_Empty(CS) <+ Chopsticks(pp)*{1});
CDT_PdChs== pp:PH & Ms_Subset(Eat,E_E_PdChs,PH)
OPERATIONS
TakeChopsticks=
SELECT #(VAR_TkChs).(CDT_TkChs)
THEN ANY VAR_TkChs WHERE CDT_TkChs
THEN
Think:= Ms_Less(Think,E_T_TkChs,PH) ||
Unused:= Ms_Less(Unused,E_U_TkChs,CS) ||
Eat:= Ms_Add(Eat,E_TkChs_E,PH)
END
END;
PutDownChopsticks=
SELECT #(VAR_PdChs).(CDT_PdChs)
THEN ANY VAR_PdChs WHERE CDT_PdChs
THEN
Think:=Ms_Add(Think,E_PdChs_T,PH) ||
Unused:=Ms_Add(Unused,E_PdChs_U,CS) ||
Eat:=Ms_Less(Eat,E_E_PdChs,PH)
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END
END
END
✝ ✆
In this machine, the user-defined function "Chopsticks(p)" is quite diﬀerent from its orig-
inal form inCPN, fun Chopsticks(ph(i))= 1‘cs(i) ++ 1‘cs (if i=n then 1 else i+1).
That is because the conditional bounded choice "SELECT" will use this function in the pred-
icate. But the original function is a "IF-THEN-ELSE-END" substitution which cannot be
a predicate. So this function should be written as a formula, which can be proved by B
language.
The state of the dining_philosophers machine is shown in Table 4.8. It has 9 proof obli-
gations, and could be automatically proved (PRa) by Atelier-B Ver.4.1.0.
Table 4.8 – Component status for dining_philosophers
AutoProved
nPO nPRi nPRa nUn %Pr
Initialisation 3 0 3 0 100
Take_Chopsticks 3 0 3 0 100
Put_Down_Chopsticks 3 0 3 0 100
dining_philosophers 9 0 9 0 100
colset INT = int; colset DATA = string;
colset INTxDATA = product INT*DATA; colset E = with e;
var n,k: INT; var p,str: DATA;
var stop: "s__"; colset BOOL = bool;
var OK: BOOL;
Figure 4.9 – Coloured Petri net of simple protocol
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Simple protocol
In the previous example, all the arc inscriptions are quite simple, and only simple colour
sets are involved. So the following example will demonstrate with compound colour sets
and conditional arc inscriptions.
The example in Fig. 4.9 describes a simple protocol by which a sender can transfer a
number of packets to a receiver. At most two packets could be sent at once. The communi-
cation process may lose packets, and diﬀerent packets may overtake each other. Hence, it
may be necessary to retransmit packets and to ignore doublets and packets that are out of
order.
The string colour set in the B machine becomes an enumerate set with all necessary
strings. and the combined string result could be a string sequence. The declarative part of
the Bmachine is shown in Listing 4.7.
Listing 4.7 – B-machine declarative part of simple protocol
✞ ☎
MACHINE SimpleProtocol
SETS DATA={Modellin, g_and_An, alysi, s__}; EV={ee}
CONSTANTS
INTxDATA,val_stop,DataLst
PROPERTIES
INTxDATA = INTEGER*DATA & val_stop = s__ & DataLst = seq(DATA)
VARIABLES
Send, Limit, Received, NextSend, NextRec, AA, BB, CC, DD
INVARIANT
Send : MS(INTxDATA) & Limit : MS(EV) &
Received : MS(DataLst) &
NextSend : MS(INTEGER) & NextRec : MS(INTEGER) &
AA : MS(INTxDATA) & BB : MS(INTxDATA) &
CC : MS(INTEGER) & DD : MS(INTEGER)
INITIALISATION
Send := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(1|->Modellin)|->1,(2|->g_and_An)|->1,(3|->alysi)
|->1,(4|->s__)|->1} ||
Limit := Ms_Empty(EV) <+ {ee|->2} ||
Received := Ms_Empty(DataLst) <+ {[]|->1} ||
NextSend := Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {1|->1} ||
NextRec := Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {1|->1} ||
AA := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) ||
BB := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) ||
CC := Ms_Empty(INTEGER) ||
DD := Ms_Empty(INTEGER)
✝ ✆
There are five transitions in the model. The transitions TransmitPacket, TransmitAcknow
and ReceivePacket have conditional output arcs. In our framework the arcs are defined in
the Definition clause of the machine, but the conditional expressions cannot be applied in
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Definitions. So a transformation of transition is needed to generate a new formalism, which
has the same function but simpler arcs.
(a) Original transition (b) New transition
Figure 4.10 – Demo of transition transformation
The transformation ensures consistency of original transition but has a diﬀerent notation.
All the arc inscriptions will be concentrated inside the transition function, and maintain
conciseness of all the arc expressions. A transformation demo of transition ReceivePacket is
shown in Fig. 4.10.
After transforming the three transitions into the simple form, we can continue to trans-
late the CPN, and part of the operations are shown in Listing 4.8, where TrPck is short for
"TransmitPacket", RcPck is short for "ReceivePacket". The state of the this machine is shown
in Table 4.9.
Listing 4.8 – Part of operations of simple protocol
✞ ☎
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def"
// TransmitPacket
VAR_TrPck== nn,pp;
E_A_TrPck== (Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(nn|->pp)|->1});
E_TrPck_B== (Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(nn|->pp)|->1});
E_TrPck_L== (Ms_Empty(EV) <+ {ee|->1});
CDT_TrPck== (nn:INTEGER & pp:DATA & Ms_Subset(AA, E_A_TrPck, INTxDATA));
// ReceivePacket
VAR_RcPck== nn,pp,str,kk;
E_B_RcPck== (Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(nn|->pp)|->1});
E_R_RcPck== (Ms_Empty(DataLst) <+ {str|->1});
E_RcPck_R(str1)== (Ms_Empty(DataLst) <+ {str1|->1});
E_N_RcPck== (Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {kk|->1});
E_RcPck_N(kk1)== (Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {kk1|->1});
E_RcPck_C(kk1)== (Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {kk1|->1});
128 CHAPTER 4. Model transformation: from CPN to B language
CDT_RcPck== (nn:INTEGER & pp:DATA & str:DataLst & kk:INTEGER & Ms_Subset(BB,E_B_RcPck,
INTxDATA) & Ms_Subset(NextRec,E_N_RcPck,INTEGER) & Ms_Subset(Received,E_R_RcPck,
DataLst))
OPERATIONS
Op_TransmitPacket=
SELECT #(VAR_TrPck).(CDT_TrPck)
THEN ANY VAR_TrPck,OK
WHERE CDT_TrPck & OK:BOOL
THEN
AA:= Ms_Less(AA,E_A_TrPck,INTxDATA) ||
IF OK=TRUE
THEN BB:= Ms_Add(BB,E_TrPck_B,INTxDATA)
ELSE Limit:= Ms_Add(Limit,E_TrPck_L,EV)
END
END
END;
Op_ReceivePacket=
SELECT #(VAR_RcPck).(CDT_RcPck)
THEN ANY VAR_RcPck
WHERE CDT_RcPck
THEN
BB:= Ms_Less(BB,E_B_RcPck,Colset_INTxDATA) ||
IF nn=kk
THEN
IF pp/=val_stop
THEN Received := Ms_Add(Ms_Less(Received,E_R_RcPck,DataLst),E_RcPck_R(str<-pp),
DataLst)
ELSE Received := Ms_Add(Ms_Less(Received,E_R_RcPck,DataLst),E_RcPck_R(str),
DataLst)
END ||
NextRec := Ms_Add(Ms_Less(NextRec,E_N_RcPck,INTEGER),E_RcPck_N(kk+1),INTEGER) ||
CC := Ms_Add(CC,E_RcPck_C(kk+1),INTEGER)
ELSE
Received:=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(Received,E_R_RcPck,DataLst),E_RcPck_R(str),DataLst) ||
NextRec:= Ms_Add(Ms_Less(NextRec,E_N_RcPck,INTEGER),E_RcPck_N(kk),INTEGER) ||
CC := Ms_Add(CC,E_RcPck_C(kk),INTEGER)
END
END
END
✝ ✆
4.4 Extending transformation using hierarchical concept
In this section, the hierarchical concept is discussed and two solutions are suggested. Then,
we choose the multi-systems solution to expand our research.
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Table 4.9 – Component status for SimpleProtocol
AutoProved
nPO nPRi nPRa nUn %Pr
Initialisation 6 0 6 0 100
Op_SendPacket 2 0 2 0 100
Op_ReceiveAcknow 3 0 3 0 100
Op_TransmitPacket 2 0 2 0 100
Op_TransmitAcknow 2 0 2 0 100
Op_ReceivePacket 4 0 4 0 100
SimpleProtocol 19 0 19 0 100
4.4.1 Hierarchy concept
A HCPN organised a set of module instances, in a way similar to that in which programs
are organized into modules. The hierarchy concept makes it possible to build up a system
at diﬀerent abstraction levels. Each module is an individual CPN. If Tsub , ∅ exists, then any
substitution transition t ∈ Tsub could be further represented by a lower level module. The
connections with higher-level module are indicated by Pport .
The hierarchy concept of CPNs lets a system model have several nets. In practice, the
hierarchy concept can solve two kinds of problems. First, single system, which means a large
single system is constituted by multiple non-autonomic systems, such as a train’s automatic
driving system. This is a complete system, but is formed by diﬀerent functional compo-
nents. Second, multi-systems (or composite system), which means a system is integrated or
composed of several autonomic systems, such as a railway signalling control process, involv-
ing train control centre, track side equipment and trains.
In this paper, we only deal with the second concept of hierarchy. To be precise, a CPN of
a large system will be translated into a set of abstract machines. Each single net will have
its own image B machine under the translation.
In CPNs, tokens (or markings) can be modified via transitions of diﬀerent levels. For
Table 4.10 – Comparison of composition clauses
Operation of M2
Constituents of M1 SEES INCLUDES USES
Sets, enumerated set elements,
read read read
concrete constants,
Abstract constants read read read
Concrete variable read - non write read - non write read - non write
Abstract variable read - non write read - non write read - non write
Operations read - non write read write
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example, places directly connected to the Tsub in the upper level can be modified by the
transitions inside the Tsub. Therefore, the relations between each Bmachine need to comply
with the same rule. In the framework of our early research, the places and the transitions
correspond to the variables and the operations in a Bmachine. Then, the next question is to
find a proper composition clause, which allows an operation to read and write the variables
inside another machine. The visibility comparison of each composition clause is shown
in Table 4.10.
The most approximate clause is INCLUDES, which is used to build a new abstract ma-
chine using other abstract machines. It could bring together the components (sets, con-
stants, variables) of machine instances as well as their properties (Properties and Invariant
clauses) [ClearSy 2014]. The schematic diagram is shown in Fig. 4.11.
T1 substitution T2 substitution
Prime module
(a) Coloured Petri net Hierarchy of module in-
stances
Machine
Prime module
Machine
T1 substitution
Machine
T2 substitution
INCLUDES
(b) B project structure
Figure 4.11 – Comparison of hierarchy structure between coloured Petri nets and B ma-
chines
4.4.2 Framework of model transformation
According to Definition A.9, let CPNH = (S,SF,PS,FS) be a HCPN, and s∗0, s
∗
1, s
∗
2 ∈ S and
s∗0 , s
∗
1, s
∗
0 , s
∗
2, s
∗
1 , s
∗
2 be three instances of diﬀerent modules. s
∗
0 = ((P
s∗0 ,T s
∗
0 ,As
∗
0 ,Σs
∗
0 ,V s
∗
0 ,
Cs
∗
0 ,Gs
∗
0 ,Es
∗
0 , I s
∗
0),P
s∗0
port ,T
s∗0
sub,PT
s∗0), s∗1 and s
∗
2 has the similar form. If s
∗
1 is a sub-module of s
∗
0, it
should satisfy the following condition:
∃(sf , t0).{sf ∈ SF ∧ t0 ∈ T
s∗0
sub ∧ sf = t0 → s
∗
1}
Let β be a the mapping function β : CPN → AMNs, then the image of a net N in the
CPN model N under β is a B machine Bm, Bm = β[N ]. If such a previous condition holds,
we can declare that the machine Bm1 should "INCLUDES" the machine Bm0.
Before we give the framework of the transformation, it is important to introduce how to
express the hierarchy concept in the Bmachines.
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Framework of hierarchy in Bmachines
In HCPNs, the data transmissions are achieved by compound places (in Definition A.11)
across the hierarchical structure of the model. Such compound places are located in diﬀer-
ent modules but their values are glued together. However, there is no such relevant mech-
anism in the B notation. A B machine can only have its own local variables (local places),
while other types of variables, such as port places and fusion places, should be defined in
other higher-level machines, and be accessed by operations.
In HCPNs, a compound place can have many instances. In contrast, in B machines all
the places of a same compound place only allow a unique instance, and the set of all the
unique place instances is denoted as PIone, where PIone ⊂ (Pport ∪ FS). The locations of each
place instance p ∈ PIone in B machines should obey the following two rules:
(i) For a fusion place f s ∈ FS, the instance of f s∗ should be defined in the prime module
SPM . (in Definition A.10), which is also the root machine of the B project;
(ii) For a port-socket relation pair (p1,p2), where (p1,p2) ∈ [p] and an arc (s
∗
1, t, s
∗
2) ∈ AIH
exists, p1 ∈ (Ps
∗
1 − P
s∗1
port), p2 ∈ P
s∗2. Then p1 will be defined in machine s∗1, while p2 will
not appear in any machines.
In Bmachines, if a machineM1 includes another machineM0, then the INCLUDESmech-
anism specifies that M1 can only modify the variables in M0 by the operations in M0. So
some access operations need to be pre-defined in the same machine with the instance of the
compound places. Supposing there are two diﬀerent module instants s∗0 and s
∗
1, that s
∗
0 is
included by s∗1, consequently s
∗
0 should prepare some operations for s
∗
1. The operations may
be parametrized functions which can be recalled by other machines when s∗0 is included.
The access methods of compound places are defined as following rules.
(i) The place instances VP can be read directly by included machines, which means they
can be used in CDT expressions of another machine.
(ii) Let s1 be a sub-module of s0, and (pi0, s0) ∼cp (pi1, s1). If a transition t ∈ T s1 exists,
that is only connected to one compound place instance, where (∗t ∪ t∗)∩ (FS ∪ Ps1port) =
{pi1}, then the image of such compound place pi is VPI, defined in M0 with data type
Colset_PI. Meanwhile, in machine M0, the following pre-defined operations may ex-
ist for the operation β[t] inM1.
(a) Addition
OpArc_Add_VPI(ms)=
PRE ms:MS(Colset_PI)
THEN VPI:=Ms_Add(VPI,ms,Colset_PI)
END
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(b) Subtraction
OpArc_Less_VPI(ms)=
PRE ms:MS(Colset_PI) & Ms_Subset(VPI,ms,Colset_PI)
THEN VPI:=Ms_Less(VPI,ms,Colset_PI)
END
(iii) Let s1 be a sub-module of s0, if a transition t ∈ T s1 connected to more than one com-
pound places. The set of these places denotes Ps1ins and the corresponding compound
place set in s0 denotes P
s0
ins. For ∀p ∈ P
s1
ins, ∃pi ∈ P
s0
ins such that (pi, s0) ∼cp (p,s1) and
(∗t ∪ t∗)∩ (FS ∪ Ps1port) = P
s1
ins. Then the operation pre-defined inM0 should be as
OpArc_T(ms_P1, · · ·, ms_Pn)= PRE
ms_Pi:MS(Colset_Pi) & // for ST (pi) =IN
· · ·
ms_Pj:MS(Colset_Pj) & // for ST (pj ) =OUT
Ms_Subset(VPj,ms_Pj,Colset_Pj) &
· · ·
ms_Pk:MS(Colset_Pk) & // for ST (pk) =I/O
Ms_Subset(VPk,ms_Pk,Colset_Pk) &
· · ·
THEN
VPi:=Ms_Add(VPi,ms_Pi,Colset_Pi)
· · ·
VPj:=Ms_Less(VPj,ms_Pj,Colset_Pj)
· · ·
VPk:=Ms_Less(Ms_Add(VPk,ms_P
in
k ,Colset_Pk),ms_P
out
k ,Colset_Pk)
· · ·
END
The reason for combining all the actions into one operation is to keep the consistency of
the invariants, because in the Atelier-B, the Type Checker Specifies "Two included operations
cannot be called in parallel" [ClearSy 2011].
Framework of machine details
In order to describe the details of a transformed machine, we give the following assumptions.
A module instance s∗1 that includes s
∗
0, and s
∗
1 is included by s
∗
2. Then we can have:
(i) the set of all the places is Ps
∗
1 ,
(ii) the set of port places P
s∗1
port ,
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(iii) the set of fusion places P
s∗1
f s ,
(iv) the pure local places are P
s∗1
pure = Ps
∗
1 −P
s∗1
port −P
s∗1
f s = {p1, · · · ,pm},
MACHINEM1
INCLUDESM0
SETS Colset1, Colset2, · · · , Colsetk−1
CONSTANTS Colsetk , Colsetk+1, · · · , Colsetl
PROPERTIES
Colsetk := EXPR
k
V & Colsetk+1 := EXPR
k+1
V & · · · & Colsetl := EXPR
l
V
VARIABLES VP1, VP2, · · · , VPm
INVARIANT
VP1 : (Colset1)MS & VP2 : (Colset2)MS & · · · & VPm : (Colsetl )MS
INITIALISATION
VP1 := V I1 || VP2 := V I2 || · · · || VPm := V Im
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def";
· · ·
VARj == EXPR
tj
V ; // For trainsition Tj
Ep1,tj == EXPRVARj ;
Ep2,tj == EXPRVARj ;
· · ·
Etj ,p1 == EXPRVARj ;
Etj ,p2 == EXPRVARj ;
· · ·
GRDj == EXPRV ;
CDT j == EXPRV ;
· · ·
OPERATIONS
OP1= SELECT #(VAR1).(CDT1) THEN
ANY VAR1 WHERE CDT1 THEN ACT1 END END;
· · ·
OPn= SELECT #(VARn).(CDTn) THEN
ANY VARn WHERE CDTn THEN ACTn END END;
· · ·
OpArc1(ms)= PRE ArcCDT1 THEN ArcACT1 END;
· · ·
OpArcv(ms)= PRE ArcCDTv THEN ArcACTv END;
END
Figure 4.12 – The framework of a B machine transformed from hierarchical coloured Petri
net
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(v) the pure non-substitution transitions are T
s∗1
pure = T s
∗
1 −T
s∗1
sub = {t1, · · · , tn},
(vi) the set of transitions that are both in s∗2 and are directly connected with P
s∗2
port is T
s∗2
dc =
{t | t ∈ T s
∗
2 ∧∃p ∈ P
s∗2
port ⇒ (p,t)∪ (t,p) , φ} = {t1, · · · , tv},
(vii) the set of local colour sets are Σs
∗
1 = {σ1, · · · ,σk−1,σk , · · · ,σl},
(viii) the places that should be defined in the machineM0 are Ps
∗
0 = P
s∗1
port +P
s∗1
f s ,
(ix) the pre-defined operations inM0 are OpArcs0 = {OpArc
s0
1 , · · · ,OpArc
s0
u }.
Then we defined that the image of a non-hierarchical CPN s∗1 under mapping β is a B
machine M1, M1 = β[s
∗
1] with the following structure in Fig. 4.12. For such a mapping, the
general mapping relations that are defined as follows hold:
1. “MultiSets.def” is an included definition file, which stores the multi-set algorithms
that were introduced in Section 4.3.2.
For each token colour ∀k ∈ {1..l}, the corresponding relations are:
2. Colsetk = β[σk ] is a colour set, where σk = C(pi ) ∈ Σs
∗
1 , pn ∈ P
s∗1
pure.
3. (Colsetk)MS = β[C(pi )MS ], is the multi-set of colours.
For each place related element ∀i ∈ {1..m}, the relations are shown as follows.
4. VPi = β[M(pi)], is the marking of each place, where pi ∈ P
s∗1
pure.
5. VPi ∈ (Colsetk)MS, where Type[VPi] = Colsetk .
6. V Ii = β[I(pi )〈〉] = β[M0(pn)] is the initial marking.
7. The markingsM of the system are defined asM =
∑m
1 VP .
For each transition related element ∀j ∈ {1..n} , the relations are shown as below:
8. OPj = β[tj ] is the transition, where tj ∈ T
s∗1
pure.
9. VARj = β[Var(tj )] is the variables of transition tj .
10. GRDj = β[G(tj )] is the guard function of transition tj .
11. CDTj is the condition of each operation, CDTm = (VARj ∈ Colsetk) ∧ cdt(p1, tj ) ∧
cdt(p2, tj )∧ · · · ∧ cdt(pi , tn)∧GRDj .
12. ACTj = act(p1, tj )∧ act(p2, tj )∧ ...∧ act(pi , tn)∧OpArc
s0
1 ∧ · · · ∧OpArc
s0
u .
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The details for ∀p,t (p ∈ P
s∗1
pure, t ∈ T
s∗1
pure) have the relations as:
13. Ea is the arc expression, where Ep,t = β[E(p,t)] and Et,p = β[E(t,p)].
14. Ea =

EXPRt ∈ (Colsetk)MS if a ∈ A
ΦMS if a < A
The enabling conditions are the same as those in non-hierarchical CPNs. They are
achieved by the nested usage of two substitution statements “SELECT-THEN-END” and
“ANY-THEN-END”. Their combination eﬀect can represent the enabling conditions and ran-
dom token choice.
15. cdt(p,t) =

VP ≥ Ep,t if p ∈
∗t
true if p < ∗t
After an operation is activated, the occurrence rules are executed by actions. For any
pure place in s1, where p ∈ P
s∗1
pure, the related actions in machineM1 are defined as:
16. act(p,t) =

VP := VP −−Ep,t ++Et,p if p ∈ ∗t ∪ t∗
skip if p < ∗t ∪ t∗
But for compound place related transitions, if p′,p ∈ [p] where p′ ∈ s0, p ∈ s1, p′ ∈ PIone,
p < PIone. Place p′ has its image VP in BmachineM1, while place p does not have any images.
Their actions should be achieved by recalling the operations pre-defined in machineM0.
17. act(p,t) =

OpArc(ms) if p ∈ ∗t ∪ t∗
skip if p < ∗t ∪ t∗
4.4.3 Transformation equivalence
In the previous subsection, we introduce a formal systematic transformation, which consists
of a collection of mapping rules. With such rules, it is important to prove the correctness
and consistency of our methodology.
Static properties
In the CPNs, the state of a system (static properties) is specified with its marking, while in
abstract B machines, it will be presented in the form of variables.
Lemma 4.4. State of system. Let a CPN has a set of sub-nets {N1, · · · ,Nm}. Each net Ni has
its own image Bmi = β[Ni ]. In Ni , we denote the set of pure places as P i = {p
i
1, · · · ,p
i
n}, the set
of colour set as Σi = {σ i1, · · · ,σ
i
s }. The state of the system is defined as:
1. VP ij ≡ β[M(p
i
j )] ≡ β[M([p
i
j ])], where i ∈ {1..m},j ∈ {1..n}.
2. State(Bmi ) = VP
i
1 ∧ · · · ∧VP
i
m ⇔M(Ni).
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3. State0(Bm) = V I
i
1 ∧ · · · ∧V I
i
m ⇔ I
i =M0(Ni).
4. M =
∑m
i=1M(Ni) =
∑(m,n)
(i=1,j=1)VP
i
j =
∑m
i=1State(Bmi ).
The invariants of a token in CPN is its colour set σ ∈ Σ, while the corresponding invariants
in Bmachine are listed in Invariant clause. The invariants of the state are defined as:
5. Colsetil ≡ β[σ
i
l ], where l ∈ {1..s}
6. (Colsetil )MS ≡ β[(Cpij )MS], where C(p
i
j ) = σ
i
l ∈ Σ
i
7. Invariant(Bmi )
= VP i1 : Colset
i
1 ∧ · · · ∧VP
i
m : Colset
i
s
⇔ C i : P i → Σi
8. C : P→ Σ =
m∑
i=1
M(P i → Σi) =
m∑
i=1
Invariant(Bmi )
With this mapping relation, the consistency of static properties before and after transfor-
mation is guaranteed.
Dynamic properties
The Dynamic properties (state changes) of the CPNs is the performance of transitions, while
the samemechanism is expressed by operations in Bmachines. According to Definition A.13,
the process of firing a transition can be divided into two parts: enabling, token transit.
Lemma 4.5. Enabling condition. Let a set of pure transitions be T i = {T i1 , · · · ,T
i
w} ∈ N
i . For
a pre-enabled transition tiv ∈ T
i , the variables of tiv are Var(t
i
v), and its binding value is
b(Var(tiv)). We denote the mapping image of a given binding b
i
v ∈ B(t
i
v) as bvi,β. Then in
machine Bmi , the corresponding conditions are expressed as:
1. VARiv ≡ β[V ar(t
i
v)]
2. bi,βv ≡ β[biv]
3. β[G(tiv )〈b
i
v〉] = true⇒ β[G(t
i
v)]β[〈b
i
v〉] = true
⇒ GRDiv〈b
i,β
v 〉 = true
4. β[E(pi , tv)〈b〉 ≤M(p
i
j )]⇒ β[E(pi , tv)〈b〉] ≤ β[M(pi )]
⇒ Epij ,t
i
v
〈bβ〉 ≤ VPi ⇒Ms_Subset(VP
i
j ,Epij ,t
i
v
,Colsetil )〈b
β〉,
where Colsetil = β[C(p
i
j )].
.
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Definition 4.1. Token transit. Let transition tiv be enabled by marking M with binding
element (tiv ,b
i
v) ∈ BE. After firing t
i
v , the new marking is M
′. Then corresponding data
changes in Bmachines are expressed as:
1. OP iv ≡ β[t
i
v ]
2. β[M ′(pij )]
= β[M(pij )−−E(p
i
j , t
i
v )〈b〉++E(t
i
v ,p
i
j )〈b
i
v〉]
= VP ij −−Epij ,tiv 〈b
i,β
v 〉++Etiv ,pij 〈b
i,β
v 〉
=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(VP ij ,Epij ,tiv ,Colset
i
l ),Etiv ,pij ,Colset
i
l )〈b
i,β
v 〉
= VP ′ij , where Colset
i
l = β[C(p
i
j )].
.
3. β[M] =
(m,n)∑
(i=1,j=1)
VP ij .
It could also be written in another form:
4. M(pij )
(tiv ,b
i
v )
−−−−−→M ′(pij )⇔ VP
i
j
OP iv 〈b
i,β
v 〉
−−−−−−−→ VP ij
′
.
5. M
(tiv ,b
i
v )
−−−−−→M ′ ⇔
∑(m,n)
(i=1,j=1)VP
OP iv 〈b
i,β
v 〉
−−−−−−−→
∑(m,n)
(i=1,j=1)VP
′.
So far, enabling condition and token transit are matched for the transitions in theHCPNs
and the operations in B machines. So the behaviours of the two systems are considered
coherent.
4.4.4 Demonstration for mapping hierarchical coloured Petri net
This section presents a demonstration to illustrate the translation process of HCPN.
The example presented in Figs. 4.13 and 4.14 is a hierarchical protocol, similar to pre-
vious "Simple Protocol". It has separate pages (subnets) for the Sender, the Network, and
the Receiver parts. The sender sends messages which the network broadcasts to the two
receivers, while each receiver send acknowledgements back to the sender through the net-
work.
After mapping to B machines, in the root machine, all the data types are defined. There
are 8 variables and 7 operations. The corresponding Bmachine is shown in Listing 4.9. The
declaration part is similar to non-hierarchical CPNs. The original net does not contain nor-
mal transition in the root net, so the operations here are pre-defined for other transitions
in the sub-nets. For example, the operation OpArc_Sender_AA(ms)will be recalled by oper-
ation Op_SendPacket in machine "Sender", the operation OpArc_Nw_TrPck(ms_AA, ms_B1,
ms_B2) will be recalled by operation Op_TransmitPacket in machine "Network".
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Overview
colset INT = int; colset Ten0 = int with 0..10;
colset DATA = string; colset Ten1 = int with 1..10;
colset INTxDATA = product INT*DATA; var s: Ten0;
colset INTxINT = product INT*INT; var r,r1,r2: Ten1;
var n,k,n1,n2: INT; fun OK(s:Ten0, r:Ten1)=(r<=s);
var p,str: DATA;
var stop: "s__";
Figure 4.13 – Root net of the hierarchical protocol model
(a) Sender net (b) Network net (c) Receiver net
Figure 4.14 – Sub-nets of the hierarchical protocol model
Listing 4.9 – B-machine for Root net
✞ ☎
MACHINE HierarchicalProtocol
SETS STR = {Modellin, g_and_An, anlysis_b, y_Means, of_Colou, red_Petr, i_Net, s__}
CONSTANTS Ten0,Ten1,INTxDATA,INTxINT,val_stop
PROPERTIES
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INTxDATA = INTEGER*STR & INTxINT = INTEGER*INTEGER & val_stop : STR & val_stop = s__ &
Ten0 <<: INT & Ten0 = 0..10 & Ten1 <<: INT & Ten1 = 1..10
VARIABLES AA, DD, B1, B2, C1, C2, Received1, Received2
INVARIANT
AA : MS(INTxDATA) & DD : MS(INTxINT) & B1 : MS(INTxDATA) & B2 : MS(INTxDATA) &
C1 : MS(INTEGER) & C2 : MS(INTEGER) & Received1 : MS(seq(STR)) & Received2 : MS(seq(STR)
)
INITIALISATION
AA := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) || DD := Ms_Empty(INTxINT) || B1 := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) ||
B2 := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) || C1 := Ms_Empty(INTEGER) || C2 := Ms_Empty(INTEGER) ||
Received1 := Ms_Empty(seq(STR)) <+ {[]|->1} || Received2 := Ms_Empty(seq(STR)) <+
{[]|->1}
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def"
OPERATIONS
OpArc_Sender_AA(ms)= PRE ms : MS(INTxDATA) THEN AA:=Ms_Add(AA,ms,INTxDATA) END;
OpArc_DD_Sender(ms)=
PRE ms : MS(INTxINT) &
Ms_Subset(DD,ms,INTxINT)
THEN DD:=Ms_Less(DD,ms,INTxINT) END;
OpArc_Nw_TrPck(ms_AA, ms_B1, ms_B2)=
PRE ms_AA : MS(INTxDATA) & ms_B1 : MS(INTxDATA) & ms_B2 : MS(INTxDATA) &
Ms_Subset(AA,ms_AA,INTxDATA)
THEN AA:=Ms_Less(AA,ms_AA,INTxDATA) || B1:=Ms_Add(B1,ms_B1,INTxDATA) ||
B2:=Ms_Add(B2,ms_B2,INTxDATA)
END;
OpArc_Nw_TrAck1(ms_DD, ms_C1)=
PRE ms_DD : MS(INTxINT) & ms_C1 : MS(INTEGER) & Ms_Subset(C1,ms_C1,INTEGER)
THEN DD:=Ms_Add(DD,ms_DD,INTxINT) || C1:=Ms_Less(C1,ms_C1,INTEGER)
END;
OpArc_Nw_TrAck2(ms_DD, ms_C2)=
PRE ms_DD : MS(INTxINT) & ms_C2 : MS(INTEGER) & Ms_Subset(C2,ms_C2,INTEGER)
THEN DD:=Ms_Add(DD,ms_DD,INTxINT) || C2:=Ms_Less(C2,ms_C2,INTEGER)
END;
OpArc_RecNo1(ms_B1, ms_C1, ms_Rec1_in, ms_Rec1_out)=
PRE ms_B1 : MS(INTxDATA) & ms_C1 : MS(INTEGER) & ms_Rec1_out : MS(seq(STR)) &
ms_Rec1_in : MS(seq(STR)) & Ms_Subset(B1,ms_B1,INTxDATA) &
Ms_Subset(Received1,ms_Rec1_out,seq(STR))
THEN B1:=Ms_Less(B1,ms_B1,INTxDATA) || C1:=Ms_Add(C1,ms_C1,INTEGER)||
Received1:=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(Received1,ms_Rec1_out,seq(STR)),ms_Rec1_in,seq(STR))
END;
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OpArc_RecNo2(ms_B2, ms_C2, ms_Rec2_in, ms_Rec2_out)=
PRE ms_B2 : MS(INTxDATA) & ms_C2 : MS(INTEGER) & ms_Rec2_out : MS(seq(STR)) &
ms_Rec2_in : MS(seq(STR)) & Ms_Subset(B2,ms_B2,INTxDATA) &
Ms_Subset(Received2,ms_Rec2_out,seq(STR))
THEN B2:=Ms_Less(B2,ms_B2,INTxDATA) || C2:=Ms_Add(C2,ms_C2,INTEGER)||
Received2:=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(Received2,ms_Rec2_out,seq(STR)),ms_Rec2_in,seq(STR))
END
END
✝ ✆
The Bmachine of "Sender" is shown in Listing 4.10, there are 2 variables and 2 operations.
The listing demonstrates how it recalls an operation in the root machine.
Listing 4.10 – B-machine for Sender net
✞ ☎
MACHINE Sender
INCLUDES HierarchicalProtocol
VARIABLES Send,NextSend
INVARIANT
Send : MS(INTxDATA) & NextSend : MS(INTEGER)
INITIALISATION
Send := Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(1|->Modellin)|->1, (2|->g_and_An)|->1, (3|->anlysis_b)
|->1, (4|->y_Means)|->1, (5|->of_Colou)|->1, (6|->red_Petr)|->1, (7|->i_Net)|->1,
(8|->s__)|->1} ||
NextSend := Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {1|->1}
DEFINITIONS
// SenderPacket
var_SdPck == nn,pp;
ae_rd_Sd_SdPck ==(Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(nn|->pp)|->1});
ae_rd_NS_SdPck ==(Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {nn|->1});
ae_SdPck_AA == (Ms_Empty(INTxDATA) <+ {(nn|->pp)|->1});
Cdt_SdPck == (nn:INTEGER & pp:STR & Ms_Subset(Send,ae_rd_Sd_SdPck,INTxDATA) & Ms_Subset(
NextSend,ae_rd_NS_SdPck,INTEGER));
// ReceiveAcknow
var_RcAck == kk,n1,n2;
ae_NS_RcAck==(Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {kk|->1});
ae_RcAck_NS(nn)==(Ms_Empty(INTEGER) <+ {nn|->1});
ae_DD_RcAck==(Ms_Empty(INTxINT) <+ {(n1|->1)|->1,(n2|->2)|->1});
Cdt_RcAck == (kk:INTEGER & n1:INTEGER & n2:INTEGER & Ms_Subset(DD,ae_DD_RcAck,INTxINT) &
Ms_Subset(NextSend,ae_NS_RcAck,INTEGER) )
OPERATIONS
Op_SendPacket=
SELECT #(var_SdPck).(Cdt_SdPck)
THEN ANY var_SdPck
WHERE Cdt_SdPck
THEN OpArc_Sender_AA(ae_SdPck_AA)
END
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END;
Op_ReceiveAcknow=
SELECT #(var_RcAck).(Cdt_RcAck)
THEN ANY var_RcAck
WHERE Cdt_RcAck
THEN
OpArc_DD_Sender(ae_DD_RcAck) ||
IF n1>n2
THEN NextSend:=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(NextSend,ae_NS_RcAck,INTEGER), ae_RcAck_NS(n2),
INTEGER)
ELSE NextSend:=Ms_Add(Ms_Less(NextSend,NextSend,INTEGER), ae_RcAck_NS(n1),INTEGER)
END
END
END
END
✝ ✆
The state of the each machine is shown in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11 – Component status for hierarchical protocol
AutoProved
nPO nPRi nPRa nUn %Pr
Hierarchicalprotocol 19 0 19 0 100
Sender 6 0 6 0 100
Network 24 0 24 0 100
RecNo1 18 0 18 0 100
RecNo2 18 0 18 0 100
4.5 Extending transformation using prioritized transitions
In this section, the prioritized transitions and its mechanism are introduced into the model
transformation framework.
4.5.1 Priority management
When simulating or analysing the CPNmodels, the priority enabling is manipulated by the
tools. The prioritized enabling checking algorithm of CPN Tools is shown in Algorithm 3.1.
From this algorithm we know that the priority enabling conditions for a give transition t
depend on all the other transitions that have higher priority than t. That is to say, the
prioritized transitions in CPN Tools have the right to check the enabling status of other
transitions. However, in B language, operations have no right to access or to check the
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other operations. As there is no such mechanism in B language, the priority management
mechanism should be achieved inside the B machine itself. It can be divided into three
parts:
Priority set
In the CPNs with prioritized transitions, all the priorities are pre-defined as a finite set of
natural numbers P. When enabling the transitions, there need a comparison of the priority
values ρ(t). However, in B machines, it is diﬃcult to attach and get a natural number to an
operation. So we leave the comparison function to the final priority management mechanism,
in corresponding B machines, the definition of P can be translated into an enumeration set
of priority IDs, which is used to distinguish diﬀerent priorities.
Transition prioritized
As we may not attach a number to operations in B machines, we consider it as a necessary
enabling condition of operations. So, we need to add a global variable to indicate the cur-
rent system priority level (Pri). It value is always modified by the priority management
mechanism. An operation can be priority-enabled only if Pri equals to some give value. Let
a transition tj have its priority ρ(tj ) = prij . The example of its corresponding operation is
shown in Fig. 4.15.
OPi = PRE Pri= prij
THEN SELECT CDTt1 THEN ACTt1 END
END
Figure 4.15 – An example of prioritized operation
Priority management
In order to achieve the similar priority management mechanism with AMN, we introduce
an operation called “Chg_Priority”. Its algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.1. It checks
the operations that are sorted by groups of diﬀerent priorities, and processes them highest-
priority-first until it finds the first pre-enabled operation Opj , and it assigns the variable
Pri to ρ(Opj ). Then all the operations that have the same priority of ρ(Opj), can be priority-
enabled by the variable Pri.
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Algorithm 4.1 Algorithm of operation “Chg_Priority”
1: PRIORITY← {pri1,· · · ,pris}, where pri1 > · · · > pris
2: procedure Chg_Priority(Pri) is
3: if Pri = Suspend then
4: if pri1 ∈ PRIORITY then
5: for all Op that ρ(Op) = pri1 do
6: if CheckEnabling(Op) then
7: return Pri = pri1
8: · · · · · ·
9: else if pris ∈ PRIORITY then
10: for all Op that ρ(Op) = pris do
11: if CheckEnabling(t) then
12: return Pri = pris
13: elsereturn Pri = Stop
The content of the operation Ctrl_Priority is shown in Fig. 4.16. The role of this oper-
ation is a priority management system. It is only enabled when Pri = Suspend. Once exe-
cuted, it will check all the pre-enabling conditions according to the level of priority. First
it will check all the conditions for transitions with highest priority. If one of the conditions
is pre-enabled, it will set Pri to the highest priority. Otherwise, it will continue to check
the rest transitions with lower priority, until it finds a pre-enabled condition. If none of the
transitions is pre-enabled, it will set Pri to “Stop”, which means this is the dead-end of the
whole system.
Chg_Priority = PRE Pri= Suspend
THEN IF #VAR1.(CDT1) or · · · THEN Pri:=prit1
ELSIF #VAR2.(CDT2) or · · · THEN Pri:=prit2
· · ·
ELSIF #VARn.(CDTn) or · · · THEN Pri:=pritn
ELSE Pri:=Stop
END
END
Figure 4.16 – The template of operation “Chg_Priority”
4.5.2 Framework of model transformation
For a CPN with prioritized transitions (CPN,ρ), we define that:
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MACHINEM
SETS Colset1, Colset2, · · · , Colsetk−1, PRIORITY
CONSTANTS Colsetk , Colsetk+1, · · · , Colsetl
PROPERTIES
Colsetk := EXPR
k
V & Colsetk+1 := EXPR
k+1
V & · · · & Colsetl := EXPR
l
V
VARIABLES VP1, VP2, · · · , VPm, Pri
INVARIANT
VP1 : (Colset1)MS & VP2 : (Colset2)MS & · · · & VPm : (Colsetl )MS & Pri : PRIORITY
INITIALISATION
VP1 := V I1 || VP2 := V I2 || · · · || VPm := V Im || Pri := Suspend
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def" ;
· · ·
VARtj == EXPR
tj
V ; // For trainsition tj
Ep1,tj == EXPRVARtj ;
Ep2,tj == EXPRVARtj ;
· · ·
Etj ,p1 == EXPRVARtj ;
Etj ,p2 == EXPRVARtj ;
· · ·
GRDtj == EXPRVARtj ;
CDTtj == EXPRVARtj ;
· · ·
OPERATIONS
Chg_Priority= PRE Pri = Suspend THEN Pri_Comp END;
OPt1= PRE Pri = prit1
THEN SELECT CDTt1 THEN ACTt1 END END;
· · ·
OPtn= PRE Pri = pritn
THEN SELECT CDTtn THEN ACTtn END END;
END
Figure 4.17 – The framework of a B machine transformed from prioritized Petri net
(i) CPN = (P,T ,A,Σ,V ,C,G,E,I ),
(ii) P = {pri1, ...,pris},
(iii) P = {p1, ...,pm},
(iv) T = {t1, ..., tn},
4.5. Extending transformation using prioritized transitions 145
(v) A = {(p,t) | p ∈ P ∧ t ∈ T } ∪ {(t,p) | t ∈ T ∧ p ∈ P},
(vi) Σ = {σ1, ...,σk−1,σk , ...,σl }
Let the new β be the mapping β : (CPN,ρ) → AMN , then the image of CPN (CPN,ρ)
under β is a B machine Bm, Bm = β[(CPN,ρ)] with the structure in Fig. 4.17. All the new
added elements of Bm have the following mapping relationship:
The priority related relations are:
1. PRIORITY = β[P] is a set of priorities, and Suspend,Stop ∈ PRIORITY .
2. Pri is a variable that indicates the current priority level of the system.
For each transition related elements ∀j ∈ {1..n} , the relations are shown below.
3. pritj is the priority of the transition j.
4. ACTtj = act(p1, tj )∧ act(p2, tj )∧ ...∧ act(pm, tj )∧ (Pri := Suspend).
4.5.3 Mapping coloured Petri net with prioritized transitions
For a better understanding of the new transformation method, we have a toy example
in Fig. 4.18, which is a CPN model with 3 places (A-C) and 5 transitions (Ta-Te). Places
contain tokens (a multi-set) which represent the state of the system. Then initial marking is
that place A has a token 1`1 with type INT. In such an initial marking, transition Ta is pre-
enabled in the binding n=1 as A contains a single token with value “1”. In this CPNmodel,
we have assigned priorities to transitions Ta, Td, Te, and other transitions without a priority
inscription have the default priority. There are 3 types of priorities P_LOW, P_NORMAL and
BA C
Ta
Tb
Td
Tc
Te
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
INT
1‘1
INT INT
P_LOW P_HIGH
P_HIGH
Declarations:
colset INT = int;
var n:INT;
var P_HIGH = 100;
var P_NORMAL = 1000;
var P_LOW = 10000;
Figure 4.18 – A simple coloured Petri net model with prioritized transitions
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Figure 4.19 – The state-space discussion of example in Fig. 4.18
P_HIGH. The default priority is P_NORMAL. Corresponding to Definition 3.1, each priority
is a natural number that is defined in the declaration table in Fig. 4.18. In CPN Tools, the
priorities are defined as Positive INT variables, the higher the number, the lower the priority.
According to the model declarations, priority relation is P_LOW < P_NORMAL < P_HIGH. Be-
sides, the transition Tb has an Inhibitor arc from place B, which prevents Tb from enabling
if place B contains a token.
The state-space of the example CPN is shown in Fig. 4.19. It is a simple net with single
token colour and without value change, so we may use the representation of classical PN
to illustrate its state-space. For example, the initial state (1,0,0) means place A contains
the token “1`1”, place B and place C have no token. The name on the arcs are the fired
transitions. The solid lines indicate the state-space of the system with priorities, while the
dashed part is the system without priority. It is clear that prioritiezd transitions can exclude
some unwanted occurrences, which could eﬀectively reduce the size of state-space.
The corresponding B machine is shown in Listing 4.11. In this machine, we named the
variables and the operations as when they are in the places and transitions. Expressions
starting with "e_" are the arc expressions. The source and destination of each arc are noted
within its name. For example, the arc e_AA_Ta means the arc from place A to transition
Ta. Similarly, the arc e_Ta_BB means the arc from transition Ta to place B. The expression
starting with "CDT_" is the enabling condition of each operation.
Listing 4.11 – B-machine for the prioritized coloured Petri net model
✞ ☎
MACHINE Prioritized_Transitions
SETS PRIORITY={High, Normal, Low, Suspend}
VARIABLES AA, BB, CC, Pri
INVARIANT
AA : MS(INT) & BB : MS(INT) & CC : MS(INT) &
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Pri : PRIORITY
INITIALISATION
AA := Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {1|->1} || BB := Ms_Empty(INT) || CC := Ms_Empty(INT) ||
Pri := Suspend
DEFINITIONS
"MultiSets.def"
var_Ta == nn;
e_AA_Ta ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
e_Ta_BB ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
cdt_Ta == (nn:INT & Ms_Subset(AA, e_AA_Ta, INT));
var_Tb == nn;
e_BB_Tb ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
e_Tb_AA ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
cdt_Tb == (nn:INT & Ms_Subset(BB, e_BB_Tb, INT));
var_Tc == nn;
e_BB_Tc ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
e_Tc_CC ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
cdt_Tc == (nn:INT & Ms_Subset(BB, e_BB_Tb, INT));
var_Td == nn;
e_rd_CC_Td ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {nn|->1});
e_Td_BB ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {(nn)|->1});
cdt_Td == (nn:INT & Ms_Subset(CC, e_rd_CC_Td, INT) & BB = Ms_Empty(INT));
var_Te == nn;
e_CC_Te ==(Ms_Empty(INT) <+ {(nn)|->1});
cdt_Te == (nn:INT & Ms_Subset(CC, e_CC_Te, INT))
OPERATIONS
Chg_Priority = PRE Pri=Suspend
THEN IF #var_Td.(cdt_Td) or #var_Te.(cdt_Te) THEN Pri:=High
ELSIF #var_Tb.(cdt_Tb) or #var_Tc.(cdt_Tc) THEN Pri:=Normal
ELSIF #var_Ta.(cdt_Ta) THEN Pri:=Low END END;
Op_Ta= PRE Pri=Low
THEN SELECT #var_Ta.(cdt_Ta)
THEN ANY var_Ta WHERE cdt_Ta
THEN AA:=Ms_Less(AA, e_AA_Ta, INTEGER) || BB:=Ms_Add(BB, e_Ta_BB, INTEGER) ||
Pri:=Suspend END END END;
Op_Tb= PRE Pri=Normal
THEN SELECT #var_Tb.(cdt_Tb)
THEN ANY var_Tb WHERE cdt_Tb
THEN BB:=Ms_Less(BB, e_BB_Tb, INTEGER) || AA:=Ms_Add(AA, e_Tb_AA, INTEGER) ||
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Pri:=Suspend END END END;
Op_Tc= PRE Pri=Normal
THEN SELECT #var_Tc.(cdt_Tc)
THEN ANY var_Tc WHERE cdt_Tc
THEN BB:=Ms_Less(BB, e_BB_Tc, INTEGER) || CC:=Ms_Add(CC, e_Tc_CC, INTEGER) ||
Pri:=Suspend END END END;
Op_Td= PRE Pri=High
THEN SELECT #var_Td.(cdt_Td) THEN ANY var_Td WHERE cdt_Td
THEN BB:=Ms_Add(BB, e_Td_BB, INTEGER) || Pri:=Suspend END END END;
Op_Te= PRE Pri=High
THEN SELECT #var_Te.(cdt_Te) THEN ANY var_Te WHERE cdt_Te
THEN CC:=Ms_Less(CC, e_CC_Te, INTEGER) || Pri:=Suspend END END END
END
✝ ✆
The component status for this machine is shown in Table 4.12. There are 10 proof obli-
gations, and are automatically proved (PRa) by Atelier-B Ver.4.1.0.
Table 4.12 – Component status for the corresponding Bmachine
AutoProved
nPO nPRi nPRa nUn %Pr
Initialisation 2 0 2 0 100
Pri_Ctrl 0 0 0 0 100
Op_Ta 2 0 2 0 100
Op_Tb 2 0 2 0 100
Op_Tc 2 0 2 0 100
Op_Td 1 0 1 0 100
Op_Te 1 0 1 0 100
Prioritized_Transitions 10 0 10 0 100
4.5.4 Transformation equivalence
In the previous two subsections, we have presented the formal transformation methodol-
ogy and a case study. With the proposed mapping rules, it is necessary to prove that the
introduced transformation is equivalent.
The proof method of system state, enabling condition and token transit are the same with
those in Section 4.3.4. So in this subsection, we only proof the priority enabling condition.
Lemma 4.6. Priority enabling. For a transition t with priority ρ(t) is pre-enabled by mark-
ingM , there are the following concepts:
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1. [t]EN is the pre-enabled status of t.
2. Pri is the current highest enabled priority.
3. TEN(M) and TUN(M) are the sets of transitions that pre-enabled or disabled by the
markingM .
4. T >(t) and T <(t) are the sets of transitions that have the higher or lower priority than t.
If this transition t is priority enabled, then the corresponding condition of Definition 3.2
is expressed as:
5. PRIORITY = β[P]
6. β[M
[t]EN
−−−−→] = β[∀t′ ∈ TEN(M), ρ(t) ≥ ρ(t
′)]
= β[T >(t) ⊆ TUN(M)] = Pri = ρ(t)
= Chg_Priority〈t〉
Although in the B machines, a diﬀerent priority control algorithm is added, but it re-
produces the same mechanism as that in CPNs. Thus, the consistency of priority enabling
conditions is guaranteed.
Model checking
Model checking is a classical method to check equivalence of finite-state systems. For a given
model of the system, exhaustively and automatically checking is applied to verify whether
this model meets certain specifications. As both the CPNs and the Bmethod have their own
supported tools for simulation and state-space analysis. Because the case study in this paper
is a small one, we can perform a comparison of their state-space. This comparison is not a
proof, but it can be a good illustration for better understanding.
The state-space of theCPNmodel is shown in Fig. 4.19. The state-space of the Bmachine
is calculated by ProB1 and shown in Fig. 4.20. After initialisation, the CPN model has 5
states, while the B machine has 10 states. Each state in Fig. 4.20 represents the tokens of
each place and the value of Pri. As the priority management in Bmachine is achieved by an
operation “Chg_Priority”, before any data value changes, this operation must be recalled in
order to determine the highest priority of all the pre-enabled operations. So the new states
caused by the operation “Chg_Priority” can be seen as transient states. From the figure, a
pair of states that directly linked by an arc “Chg” have the same marking, not considering
priority. The pair of states can be approximated as a single node, which is indicated by
dashed ellipses. Then the new state-space is exactly the same as that of the CPNmodel.
1ProB, developed by the University of Southampton, is an animator and model checker for the B-Method.
It allows animation of many B specifications, and can be used to systematically check a specification for a
range of errors
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Figure 4.20 – The state-space of Bmachine “Prioritized_Transitions”
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the combination usages of diﬀerent modelling languages in the con-
text of safety critical systems. The strong motivation of such an approach is to bridge the
gap of critical tasks, from a strong requirement analysis towards a valid implementation
on a real system. Precisely, this approach focuses on model transformation, from CPN to
B machine while preserving the same modelling requirements. When systems are already
specified by CPNs and verified by experts, to save eﬀorts and reduce errors, our method
could transform CPN models into B machines. This approach may assist people in the de-
sign phase, to quickly shift from a validated solution towards a valid implementation.
As the CPNs have a fine modelling and analysis characteristic, especially an easy-to-
understand graphic notation, it is more attractive for designers to use than text-based meth-
ods. However, an abstract B machine is a valid input of the B method which is able to
develop into the executable implementation.
First, the detailed mapping process of non-hierarchical CPNs and AMNs are presented.
Then, the transformation method is illustrated with some classical examples. This transla-
tion is compatible with various types of colour sets and the transformed B machines can be
automatically proved by Atelier B. Based on that, hierarchy concept is introduced into the
previous transformation method to carry out the mapping from HCPNs to AMNs. It could
be applied to the “multi-systems” models and is illustrated by a hierarchical protocol exam-
ple. Finally, we consider the transition priorities of CPNs, and create a priority management
mechanism to realize the prioritized operations in abstract Bmachines.
One of the limitations of this paper is that the colour-set "list" is not so perfect. Because
it is already a concrete programming data type in CPN, it is diﬃcult to abstract all its func-
tion with set theory and first order logic. Another limitation is that the current translation
method does not support timed CPNs, which are associated with a timed multi-set and new
behaviour rules. Considering the timetable and time constrained protocol, it could be an
interesting research task. Note that the Bmachine dealing with the time concept still needs
some scientific work.
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Conclusions
This thesis has been devoted to the model based system engineering for safety of railway
critical systems. It is an interdisciplinary area of modelling of complex systems, safety-
critical systems, formal methods and model-driven engineering. This thesis provides some
new approaches via formal languages, which aim to aid designers in eﬀectively ensuring
railway safety, and improving the quality with system design and verification in railway
industry. This study has focused on two aspects that are important for analysing the French
RIS: formal specifications and a fast shift from analysis to implementation. The nature and
its formal specifications of RIS have been studied. A hierarchical modelling framework is
proposed via CPN to specify and verify properties and behaviours of the RISs. To bridge
the gap between the specifications and the implementations, B method has been chosen
as the solution of formal implementation development. A transformation from CPN to B
machines is proposed, as it is necessary. It can be used for the formal implementations or
the theorem-proving.
The work has been presented as follows:
Formal modelization of RIS
Railway system is always in a strong domain specific context. The knowledge of railway is
partly written in textual documents, and partly unwritten while owned by engineers. So in
the system design or development process, we always need the assistance and supervision
of expert engineers who have got both the written and unwritten knowledge. Initially, a
quick comparison of GRAFCET and CPN is given, which illustrates their similarity and the
ability to be seamlessly converted. So CPN has been chosen as our formal specification lan-
guage. Its hierarchy and colour features make it possible to propose a generic and compact
structure which contains all high-level functions of RIS. At the same time, PN’s rigorous
semantics allow us to implement formal proofs
The RIS is one of the crucial parts of the railway transit safety. In the French railway
domain, the computer-controlled relay-based RIS (PRCI type) is the dominant practice. Its
complex sequences and consequent actions make it diﬃcult to be verified and validated. For
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such systems, first we analysis the architecture of RIS and the hierarchical structure of mod-
elling framework. After that, we introduce an intuitive modelling approach, which could
formally specify the constructions of the fixed installations and the signalling operations of
the interlocking logic. As a multi-input multi-output system, the signalling part of RIS is
suitable to be modelled in a vertical decomposition way. It should contain diﬀerent aspects,
including components, scenarios and functions. The fixed installation part is represented
by logical objects connected to each other in the form of the track layout. It is natural for
us to model it in a geographic way. However, in practice, each station or yard in a single
line has its own RIS, which respects the same national standards but has diﬀerent facility
layouts. Normally, to specify all the stations, we have to rebuild models. It has low eﬃciency
and will probably introduce new errors during the rebuilding process. With the modelling
power of CPN, a general solution is proposed by introducing a modelling pattern, which
could be easily adapted to diﬀerent stations with PRCI type RIS. It is a general solution in a
parameterized form. The “place/transition” structure (unmarked CPN model) represents a
set of RIS functional rules. The logical formation of railway layout (configuration) is repre-
sented by the information contained in tokens. Besides, models that are less compact can be
derived from this generic one in order to validate various aspects, while keeping the safety
property. Finally, we analysis the low level part of the RIS, which is the relay-based logic cir-
cuits. The relay-based circuit components have the nature of concurrency. An event-based
concept is introduced to better describe these internal interactions. All the relay-based tran-
sitions (actions) are supervised by an “event place”, and diﬀerent transition priorities realize
their relative synchronization. Furthermore, this event-based model is compatible with the
classic CPNmodel
Model transformation
The purpose of using a model transformation is to save eﬀorts and reduce errors by auto-
matically building the models that conform to diﬀerent modelling languages. In the French
railway industry, the Petri nets and the B method are two recognized formal methods for
safety critical systems, having their own successful applications. The PNs are a mathemati-
cal modelling language for describing the distributed systems, and they oﬀer superior graph-
ical notations for stepwise processes. They are accepted by the French railway specialists,
because they have user-friendly notations. Besides, there are already some system that are
specified by PNs and CPNs. The B method is a software development method based on
abstract machine notations and the concept of refinement. Because there are already some
successful implementations of B method, in the French railway context, B proved model is
accepted as a strong safety proof. Consequently, there is a need for transforming the CPN
models into abstract Bmachines. This transformation can help people to quickly shift from
a valid design solution to a valid implementation development process. The transformed B
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machines can also be used for theorem-proving.
First, for non-hierarchical CPN model, we introduce a systematic mapping framework
of model transformation in which all the information on a CPN can find its corresponding
portion (functions or definitions) in the transformed Bmachine. The “multi-set” is the core
mechanism of CPN language. We improve and extend the solution in [Bon and Dutilleul
2013], so that the transformation is compatible with various types of colour sets and the
transformed B machines can be automatically proved by Atelier B without using “interac-
tive prover”. The multi-set mechanism and its related specifications are defined in an exter-
nal *.def file so that they can be accessed by all the transformed B machines. CPN’s system
marking, colour-sets, tokens are represented static part of Bmachines, while, the transitions,
step enabling, token transit are represented by operations of B machines This transforma-
tion is compatible with various types of colour sets and the transformed B machines can be
automatically proved by Atelier B. Sometimes, a CPN model specifies a scenario of multi-
systems (or components). Each sub-system is an independent one, which could be treated as
a signal system and be transformed into a Bmachine. Based on that, the hierarchy concept is
introduced into the previous transformation method to carry out the mapping fromHCPNs
to AMNs. The hierarchical links between connected machines are through the “INCLUDES”
clause and the accessible pre-defined operations in the upper level of machines. In addition,
we introduce a set of rules for classifying diﬀerent places into diﬀerent machines. Finally,
we consider the transition priorities of CPNs, and create a priority management mechanism
to realize the prioritized operations in abstract B machines. Because, in CPN models, the
priority enabling is manipulated by CPN tools, while in the B machine there are no such
functions. All the priority mechanisms must be achieved inside B machines. So we add
some new elements into the transformation framework, including a variable, a set and a
priorities management operation. By the priority-based pre-condition of operations, we can
realize the similar functions of prioritized transition.
Limits of model transformation
Colour set. Not all colour types are fully supported in our solutions. For example, the
colour-set "list" is not so perfect. Because it is already a concrete programming data type in
CPNs, it is diﬃcult to abstract all its functions with set theory and first order logic.
Meta language inscriptions. The CPN model adopts a programming language, which is
based on the functional programming language (Standard ML). This language has the ad-
vantages of defining colour types, describing data manipulation, and creating compact and
parametrized models. However, most of the time it is impossible to “reverse” a well de-
veloped model of programming language into a model based on set theory and first-order
logic.
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Time domain. In our study, time factor has not yet been considered. So, the timed CPNs
are not supported,which is associated with a timed multi-set and new behaviour rules. Con-
sidering the timetable and time constrained protocol, it could be an interesting research task.
Note that the B machine dealing with the time concept still needs some scientific work.
Perspectives
Based on the results given by this thesis, several perspectives should be considered:
In theory
• Extend the model framework: The current solution is only a basic extendible frame-
work. There are many factors that are not considered in this framework. Further study
may perform the following works: introducing failure modes, timing aspects, simula-
tion of given scenarios.
• Combined analysis with ERTMS: Combination analysis and global safety verification
can be performed by integrating several existing models. The ERTMS is a general
standard, while each RIS is compliant with diﬀerent infrastructure conditions. With
some existing ERTMS rule models [Hörste and Schnieder 1999], we can check the
safety consistency of ERTMS rules and given local conditions. There is an example
of combination research on ERTMS in [Goverde, Corman, and D′Ariano 2013], which
use standard UIC compression method for the scheduling conditions, and compute
the capacity consumption via Monte Carlo simulation.
• Extend the transformation framework: For HCPNs, we only consider the “multi-
systems” solution in this thesis. The other solution, so called “single-system”, corre-
sponding to a large single system with multiple nets. In order to continuously enhance
the compatibility of our transformation, this feature should be considered as necessary.
In application
• PERFECT project: This thesis takes place in the PERFECT project, which studies safe
implementation of ERTMS in France. The management of railway signalling is based
on local rules pertaining to each country. Generally, the current solution of ERTMS
implementation is to use ERTMS-equipped trains on existing lines. This makes it
diﬃcult to evaluate the ERTMS-based system in term of safety.
The first step is to build formal models of each sub-systems, then to carry out models
analysis to formally prove each sub-system. Some research of first step of the project
can be found in papers, such as the B formal validation of ERTMS operating rules
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[Ben-ayed, Collart-Dutilleul, Bon, Idani, et al. 2014; Ben-ayed, Collart-Dutilleul, Bon,
Ledru, et al. 2014] and the modelling of French interlocking system (in my thesis).
The second step is to integrate each model into one formal model. It will then be possi-
ble to analyse in details the influence of implementing European laws on the original
systems. To prepare the model combination, we need to unify all the specifications, so
the model transformation technique is studied, such as UML to B [Ben-ayed, Bon, and
Collart-Dutilleul 2014] and CPN to B (in my thesis).
The integration work is an interesting perspective of both the work of Ben-Ayed and
SUN. In the future, the integration work will be performed, some scenarios and simu-
lations may be tested on this global model.
• Semi-automated tool ofmodel transformation: Themodel transformation fromCPNs
to AMNs seems to be tedious laborious. It is ineﬃcient and error-prone, not easy to
check. To maintain high eﬃciency and low error rate, we need to develop a software to
assist the transformation process, in order to minimize the human participation rate.
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Résumé étendu en français
Le développement et l’application des langages formels sont un défi à long terme pour la
science informatique. Un enjeu particulier est l’acceptation par l’industrie. Malgré des suc-
cès industriels avérés, la dissémination des méthodes formelles dans l’industrie ferroviaire
est encore limitée. Cette thèse présente une approche pour la modélisation et la vérification
des postes d’aiguillage français en utilise les méthodes formelles pour assurer eﬃcacement
la sécurité ferroviaire. Les méthodes formelles étudiées dans cette thèse sont les réseaux de
Petri colorés (RdPCs) et la méthode B. Les RdPCs sont appropriés pour spécifier les systèmes
de contrôles/commandes à événements discrets, alors que la méthode B oﬀre la démonstra-
tion automatique de théorèmes et permet d’refiner les modèles de specification abstraite
jusqu’à l’implémentation finale.
Motivation de la recherche
Jusqu’à présent, il existe plus de 20 types de systèmes de signalisation et de contrôle de
vitesse diﬀérents dans toute l’Union européenne. Chaque système est autonome et non-
interopérable avec les autres de sorte que les trains qui circulent dans plusieurs pays doivent
être équipés de tous les systèmes à bord. Cela demande un eﬀort d’ingénierie et d’intégration
supplémentaire, augmente les coûts totaux et réduit la performance du transport ferroviaire.
Pour mettre fin à une telle situation de segmentation et pour promouvoir le marché ferrovi-
aire européen des passagers et du fret, le système de signalisation ERTMS (European Rail
Traﬃc Management System) a été introduit pour créer une nouvelle génération de systèmes
de signalisation et de systèmes de contrôle de la vitesse afin de disposer d’un réseau sans
soudure au niveau européen.
En raison des contraintes financières et organisationnelles, il est impossible d’installer
ERTMS sur l’ensemble du réseau dans un courte période. La plupart des compagnies na-
tionales préfèrent déployer progressivement ERTMS. Pour les lignes existantes, il existe une
solution de « fonctionnement mixte » qui est une stratégie dans lequel la signalisation en
bordure de voie est équipé à la fois d’ERTMS et des systèmes conventionnels. Jusqu’ici, il n’y
a pas eu beaucoup d’implementation d’ERTMS ce qui signifie qu’il est impossible d’évaluer
ce nouveau système de manière traditionnelle. Au cours de la mise en œuvre d’ERTMS, une
évaluation de la cohérence globale est nécessaire. La spécification et l’analyse de systèmes
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d’enclenchement ferroviaires (SEF) en est un élément important. Afin de maintenir la sécu-
rité de haut niveau avec le cadre déterministe, un projet nommé « PERFECT » a été lancé par
l’IFSTTAR pour développer la spécification et la vérification de la sécurité des SEFs français
dans le cadre des règles nationales et de l’influence de la mise en œuvre d’ERTMS sur les
systèmes nationaux.
Mon travail de thèse est une des phases fondamentales de ce projet. Il se concentre sur
l’approche formelle des SEFs français basé sur le poste à relais à commande informatique
(PRCI). L’objectif général de cette thèse est d’étudier l’hypothèse que les languages formelles
peuvent améliorer la qualité de la conception et la vérification des systèmes dans l’industrie
ferroviaire. L’étude vise à fournir une méthodologie pour une évaluation complète de la
cohérence des deux aspects suivants : les règles de fonctionnement des systèmes de signali-
sation locales et les exigences de sécurité supplémentaires (ERTMS).
Contexte de la recherche
Si nous voulons obtenir l’acceptation et la reconnaissance dans l’industrie ferroviaire française,
il nous semble préférable de « parler », dès la phase de conception, le même langage qu’eux
ou au moins un langage similaire.
Langage formel de modélisation
Le GRAphe Fonctionnel de Commande Étape/Transition (GRAFCET) est unmode de représen-
tation et d’analyse d’un automatisme particulièrement bien adapté aux systèmes à évolu-
tion séquentielle. Le GRAFCET est largement utilisé dans les domaines de l’industrie et de
la recherche notamment dans l’industrie française. Par exemple, des grandes entreprises
comme Alstom, Renault, Siemens, Peugeot et Michelin l’utilisent largement ou le reconnais-
sent comme une norme interne. Cependant, avec la nécessité accrue de sécurité imposée par
les normes internationales, le GRAFCET a été critiqué en raison de son absence de fonde-
ments formels permettant d’assurer les exigences d’exactitude et de sécurité.
Afin d’être proche des habitudes d’utilisation de l’industrie et de profiter des méthodes
formelles, nous considérons que les réseaux de Petri (RdPs) sont un outil satisfaisant pour
la modélisation du système ferroviaire français. Les formalismes de notation des RdPs et
duGRAFCET sont si proches que l’ingénieur qui est familier avec le GRAFCET comprendra
aisément les modèles RdP. Autrement dit, si un système est spécifié par des RdPs, il peut être
validé à la fois par des outils desRdPs et par les ingénieurs experts. En conséquence, lesRdPs
sont le langage formel qui nous semble le plus appropriée pour poursuivre nos recherches.
Actuellement, les RdPs et les RdPCs sont acceptés par certaines industries françaises telles
que la Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer français (SNCF) [Antoni 2012b; Buchheit et al.
2011; Lalouette et al. 2010].
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Nous pouvons également citer une application à grande échelle, le métro d’Oslo [Bjørk
2006; Hagalisletto et al. 2007; Moen and Yu 2004; Yu 2004], qui intègre les RdPCs dans
le développement de son système de simulation et les outils pour l’analyse des horaires de
trains. Un des retours d’expérience important est que les RdPCs sont un bon langage de
spécification pour la communication. En eﬀet, le groupe de recherche a collaboré avec les
ingénieurs en chef de l’infrastructure des chemin en fer et le département de la circulation
par ce moyen et bien qu’ils n’étaient pas des spécialistes en RdP, ils ont compris les modèles
et ont apporté des amélioration significatives.
Langage formel de démonstration de théorèmes
La vérification de modèles RdPC est basées sur la vérification de modèle qui se confronte au
problème bien connu de « l’explosion de conbinatoire ». Afin d’être capable de vérifier un
système à grande échelle, nous avons besoin d’utiliser un autre langage formel qui permet
la démonstration de théorèmes.
Dans le context de l’industrie ferroviaire française, nous pensons bien évidemment à la
méthode B. Non seulement la méthode B permet de modéliser formellement un système
mais elle permet également de prouver que tous les comportements du système respectent
les propriétés. Des projets industriels tels que le système SACEM2, le SAET-METEOR3
et le CdG-VAL4 utilisent le langage B dans leur processus de développement. Ces succès
d’ingénierie ont réussi à convaincre de la fiabilité de la méthode B, parce que le code final
généré à partir de la specification en machine B est considéré comme sûr et prouvé. Donc,
dans le contexte ferroviaire français, un modèle B prouvée est acceptée comme une preuve
forte de la sécurité [Boulanger 2013a,b].
Modélisation formelle pour les systèmes d’enclenchement fer-
roviaires via les réseaux de Petri colorés
Le cadre demodélisation d’un SEF peut être divisée en trois parties : les opérations de signal-
isation, les installations fixes et les trains. les opérations de signalisation sont un ensemble
de règles de fonctionnement et de procédures de contrôle d’un système d’enclenchement.
Les installations fixes comprennent des cantons, des aiguillages, des feux de signalisation et
d’autres installations automatiques. Les trains se déplacent sur les itinéraires d’enclenchement
et sont supervisés par les conditions de la route et les instructions d’opérations.
Les opérations de signalisation du SEF sont un système à entrées et sorties multiples.
Leurs modes de fonctionnement nécessitent des fonctions de diﬀérents niveaux. Par conse-
2Système d’Aide à la Conduite, l’Exploitation et la Maintenance
3Système d’Automatisation de l’Exploitation des Trains - METro Est-Ouest Rapide
4Véhicule Automatique Léger de l’aéroport Charles de Gaulle
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quent, pour la modélisation, la structure hiérarchique nous semble la plus compatible avec
ces exigences. Le modèle doit intégrer les diﬀérentes fonctions de la description du système
et contenir des vues de modularité comme représenté sur la figure 5.1(a). Les RdPCHs nous
semble répondre à ces exigences et permettent la mise en place du modèle simple.
Scénario
Fonction
Décomposition
Pré/Post
Composant
Élémentaire
Haut Niveau
Fusion place
Place / Place de port
Transition
Transition Remplacement
(a) La structure du modèle hiérarchique de
fonctionnement de signalisation
z.2 z.4 z.6
z.10
2
(b) Démo des Cantons avec un aiguillage
Z2
Zone
Z2 à Z4train
[#dir train=odd]
Z4 à Z2train
[#dir train=even]
Z4
train
train
Zone
Z10 à Z4
train
Z4 à Z10
train
[#dir train=odd]
[#dir train=even]
Z10
train
train
Zone
Z4 à Z6
train
Z6 à Z4
train
[#dir train=odd]
[#dir train=even]
Z6
train
train
Zone
PT2
G
G
D
D
PT
(c) Modèle RdPC correspondante
Figure 1 – Une approche géographique de la modélisation de SEF
La solution la plus courante de la modélisation des installations fixes est l’approche
géographique. Cette approche peut être considérée comme la modélisation du placement
géographique des éléments physiques du SEF. Sa structure géographique nous permet de
découper le réseau ferroviaire en composants indépendants et distribués qui peuvent être
modélisées individuellement.Normalement, un itinéraire du SEF est constitué de plusieurs
composants similaires : des cantons, des aiguillages et des feux de signalisation en bordure
de itinéraire. Les figures 5.1(b) et5.1(c), montre un schéma d’aiguillage et et son modèle de
RdPC correspondant. Chaque place représente un canton et chaque transition modélise le
déplacement d’un train entre deux cantons. L’aiguillage est représenté par une place unique
qui stocke les informations de connexion en cours.
La modélisation géographique impose un modèle par gare. Pour modéliser une ligne
complète, il est donc nécessaire de juxtaposer les diﬀérents models bout à bout. Ces con-
traintes multiplient les risques d’erreur. Nous avons constaté que les gares qui sont équipés
avec le même type de SEF suivent les mêmes règles nationales. Les seules diﬀérences sont
les configurations de leurs installations fixes. Par consequent, il nous semble que la struc-
ture attendue du modèle peut être à la fois générique et paramétrée permettant ainsi de
modéliser, à partir du même modèle, les diverses configurations possibles. Pour pouvoir
utiliser une structure générique, on doit donc s’aﬀranchir de l’approche géographique de la
modélisation. Les informations géographiques doivent alors être représenté dans les jetons.
La figure 2 illustre cette généricité. Ce réseau simple modélise le schema de la figure 5.1(b)
Transformation de modèles RdPC en machine B 163
par un RdPC paramétré et est equivalent au réseau de la figure5.1(c). La place « Connexions
des cantons » modélise les contraintes de circulation des trains. À chaque franchissement de
la transition, la valeur du jeton « train » sera actualisée en fonction des éléments de liaison
activés.
Positions
de trains
TS
Circulation
des trains
(TrID,dir,Ts1)
(TrID,dir,Ts2)
[contains PointList pos]
Connexions
des cantons
(dir,Ts1,Ts2,pos)
TC
1‘(odd,“TS2”,“TS4”,[])++
1‘(odd,“TS4”,“TS6”,[(2,R)])++
1‘(odd,“TS4”,“TS10”,[(2,L)])++
1‘(even,“TS4”,“TS2”,[])++
1‘(even,“TS6”,“TS4”,[(2,R)])++
1‘(even,“TS10”,“TS4”,[(2,L)])
Liste
des points
PointList
LST’PT
1‘[(2,L)]
Figure 2 – Exemple de représentation généralisée
Dans les systèmes à relais, chaque événement, comme par exemple les commandes ex-
ternes ou les actions de commutation internes, entraîne un changement d’état du circuit.
Lors de la modélisation de tels systèmes, il exist des problèmes d’actions synchrones et de
conditions « temporaires ». Nous avons conçu un mécanisme pour résoudre ces problèmes.
Il est réalisé en introduisant des règles à base d’événements par une « place événement »
dans les modèles ordinaires RdPC. Un modèle événementiel est un modèle RdP avec des
transitions prioritaires et des conditions d’événements stockées dans la place événement
(type de fusion). Ceci transforme les transitions connectées en « transitions dirigées événe-
ment » et permet aux événements interne/externe d’influencer la progression des jetons.
Comme les transitions à base d’événements expriment tous les changements internes, il
y aura par conséquent une augmentation de l’espace d’état. Nous introduisons donc une
méthode d’abstraction pour minimiser la taille de l’espace d’état du système. Du point de
vue de l’analyse, les états internes ne sont pas utiles, car ils ont moins de valeur que les états
stables. En eﬀet, chaque état interne est un petit changement à l’intérieur des systèmes à
relais. Lorsque le système termine tous les changements dans un chemin de l’espace d’état,
le système atteint un nouvel état d’équilibre. Cela signifie une réponse complète à l’entrée
externe (commande de contrôle ou actions des trains). Ainsi, les états d’événement-stable et
les états d’absence d’événement sont plus concis pour décrire l’accessibilité d’un système de
sécurité. Un exemple est représenté sur la figure 3.
Transformation demodèles réseau de Petri coloré enmachineB
Cette étude est basée sur[Bon and Dutilleul 2013]. Nous introduisons un cadre plus ex-
plicite de la transformation, simplifions les opérations pour les structures multi-ensemble
et rendons la traduction compatible avec les types non-numériques de jeux de couleurs. En-
suite, nous réformons les spécifications du multi-ensemble afin d’assurer que les machines
B transformées peuvent être automatiquement prouvées par l’Atelier B.
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États internes États internes
États
d’événement
stable
États
d’absence
d’événement
(m,n,B)
Liste d’événement
(1,1,1)
[("A",1),
("C",1)]
(2,1,1)
[("A",1),
("C",1)]
(1,2,1)
[("A",1),
("C",1)]
(2,2,1)
[("A",1),
("C",1)]
(2,2,1)
[("C",1)]
(3,2,1)
[("C",1)]
(2,3,0)
[("C",1)]
(3,3,0)
[("C",1)]
(3,3,0)
[]
t1m
t1n
t1n
t1m
EventEnd
t2m
t2n
t2n
t2m
EventEnd
Figure 3 – Règles de simplification de l’état de l’espace du système
D’abord, nous étudions la transformation du modèle RdPC non-hiérarchique en ma-
chine B. Une version simplifiée du cadre de la transformation de modèle est mise en évi-
dence dans le tableau 1, pour faire correspondre la structure « place-transition » du RdPC
au formalisme du langage B.
Table 1 – Une version simplifiée du cadre modèle de transformation
Élément du RdPC ⇒ Notation de la machine B
Couleurs Σ SETS and/or CONSTANTS
Places + MarquagesM(p) VARIABLES
Couleurs→Place C INVARIANT
Transitions T OPERATIONS
Liaison b DEFINITIONS
Multi-ensembles "MultiSets.def"
L’une des caractéristiques importantes du RdPC est l’existence de diﬀérents types de don-
nées. Unmarquage du RdPC correspond à un multi-ensemble qui contient des informations
de nombre et de couleur de jeton. Chaque action des transitions est associée aux modifica-
tions de marquage. Ainsi, les spécifications de multi-ensemble doivent être introduites dans
le cadre de la machine B. Cependant, il est imprudent et inutile de prédéfinir tous les types
de multi-ensembles dans une seule machine abstraite. Afin d’être plus adaptables et flex-
ibles, nous introduisons un ensemble de définitions paramétrées, qui pourrait associer les
numéros de jetons avec leurs couleurs et permettre la modification de jetons via des opéra-
tions. Ces définitions sont écrites dans un fichier « MultiSets.def » qui est directement inclus
dans les machines abstraites comme indiqué dans le listing 1.
Listing 1 – Spécifications de multi-ensemble et de leurs opérations
✞ ☎
DEFINITIONS
MS(ss)==(ss<->NATURAL);
Ms_Empty(ss)== {elt|elt: ss * {0}};
Ms_Subset(ms1,ms2,ss)== !elt.(elt:ss => ms1(elt)>=ms2(elt));
Ms_Add(ms1,ms2,ss) == (%ee.(ee:ss & ms1(ee):ran(ms1) & ms2(ee):ran(ms2) & ms1(ee)>=0 & ms2(
ee)>=0 | ms1(ee) + ms2(ee)));
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Ms_Less(ms1,ms2,ss)== (%ee.(ee:ss & ms1(ee):ran(ms1) & ms2(ee):ran(ms2) | ms1(ee) - ms2(ee)
))
✝ ✆
Après cela, nous présentons un schema global de preuve d’équivalence de la transforma-
tion de modèle. Nous analysons à la fois les attributs statiques et les comportements dy-
namiques pour démontrer l’équivalence de la transformation. Après le succès de la preuve
de notre transformation, nous générons les graphes d’espace d’états à la fois du modèle
RdPC et du modèle B généré. Nous comparons ces deux espaces d’états afin d’obtenir une
preuve supplémentaire.
Le concept de hiérarchie du RdPC peut principalement résoudre deux types de prob-
lèmes. Tout d’abord, les systèmes-uniques qui sont un seul grand système constitué de
plusieurs systèmes non-autonomes. Ensuite, les multi-systèmes (ou systèmes composites),
qui sont un système intégré ou composé de plusieurs systèmes autonomes. Dans cette thèse,
nous ne traitons que des multi-systèmes. Pour être précis, un modèle RdPCH d’un grand
système sera traduit en un ensemble de machines abstraites. Chaque réseau unique aura
son image après la transformation. Pour une telle transformation, la clause la plus appro-
priée du langage B est la clause « INCLUDES ». Elle permet à la machine incluante de lire
l’ensemble des constituants des machines incluses.
La diﬀérence majeure par rapport à la transformation de RdPC non-hiérarchique tiens
dans les transmissions de données par la structure hiérarchique. Dans les réseaux de Petri
colorés hiérarchies (RdPCHs), la transmission de données entre diﬀérent modules est réal-
isée par des « places composées » qui sont localisées dans des modules diﬀérents mais qui
partagent les mêmes valeurs. Néanmoins, une variable ne peut être définie qu’une seule
fois dans les machines B générées. Cela signifie que chaque machine B ne peut définir que
ses propres variables locales. Les autres ne serons accessibles qu’en utilisant des machines
incluses. Si une variable doit être modifiée par d’autres machines, cela ne peut être fait que
par des opérations prédéfinies. Nous utilisons cette méthode afin de simuler la fonction
des places composées. L’emplacement de la place est dépendant de sa nature : si c’est une
place normale, elle sera définie dans sa propre machine B, si c’est une place de fusion, elle
sera définie dans la machine B racine et si c’est une place de port, elle sera définie dans la
machine B du niveau supérieur.
Enfin, nous introduisons les transitions prioritaires dans notre méthode de transforma-
tion. Dans le RdPC avec des transitions prioritaire, toutes les priorités sont prédéfinis
comme un ensemble fini de nombres naturels P. Avant la validation des transitions, il y a be-
soin d’une comparaison des valeurs de priorité ρ(t). Dans les machines B correspondantes,
la définition de P peut être traduit par un ensemble d’énumération des identités utilisé pour
distinguer les diﬀérentes priorités. Nous ne pouvons pas directement assigner un numéro
à une opération dans les machines B, par conséquent nous considérons le numéro de pri-
orité comme une condition nécessaire des opérations (figure 5.4(a)), et nous modélisons la
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fonction de comparaison par une opération de gestion de priorité (figure 5.4(b)).
OPi = PRE Pri= prij
THEN SELECT CDTt1 THEN ACTt1 END
END
(a) Un exemple de opération priorisée
Chg_Priority = PRE Pri= Suspend
THEN IF #VAR1.(CDT1) or · · · THEN Pri:=prit1
ELSIF #VAR2.(CDT2) or · · · THEN Pri:=prit2
· · ·
ELSIF #VARn.(CDTn) or · · · THEN Pri:=pritn
ELSE Pri:=Stop
END
END
(b) Le template d’opération “Chg_Priority”
Figure 4 – Mangement de priorité
Conclusions
Cette thèse propose de nouvelles approches qui visent à aider les concepteurs à assurer eﬃ-
cacement la sécurité de chemin de fer et à améliorer la qualité de la conception du système
et de sa vérification par l’utilisation des langages formels. Cette étude s’est concentrée sur
deux aspects importants pour l’analyse du SEF français: les spécifications formelles et une
évolution rapide de l’analyse à la mise en œuvre.
Modélisation formelle des systèmes d’enclenchement
Dans le domaine ferroviaire français, le SEF du type PRCI est la plus répandu. D’abord, pour
ces systèmes, nous introduisons une approche de modélisation intuitive qui pourrait spéci-
fier formellement les constructions des installations fixes et les opérations de signalisation
de la logique du SEF. La partie de signalisation du SEF est modélisée par une décomposi-
tion verticale alors que la partie de l’installation fixe est modélisée de façon géographique.
Puis, avec la puissance de la modélisation des RdPC, une solution générale est proposé par
l’introduction d’un patron de modèle qui est un modèle sous une forme paramétrée. La
structure de « place/transition » représente un ensemble de règles fonctionnelles RIS. La
formation logique de chemin de fer est représenté par des jetons. Enfin, pour la partie de
bas niveau du SEF, les « circuits logiques à relais », un concept basé sur les événements est
introduit afin de mieux décrire les interactions internes et de réaliser une synchronisation
relative.
Modélisation formelle des systèmes d’enclenchement
La transformation des RdPCs en machines B peut aider les concepteurs sur la route de
l’analyse à application. Tout d’abord, pour le modèle du RdPC non-hiérarchique, nous
introduisons un modèle de transformation par un cadre de correspondance systématique
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dans lequel toutes les informations sur un modèle RdPC peuvent trouver leur partie corre-
spondante dans la machine B générée. Le « multi ensembles » est le mécanisme central des
RdPCs. Nous améliorons et étendons la solution de [Bon and Dutilleul 2013], de tell sorte
que la nouvelle transformation soit compatible avec diﬀérentes couleurs de jetons. Cette
amélioration permet aux machines B générées d’être automatiquement prouvés par l’Atelier
B. Ensuite, le concept de hiérarchie est introduit dans la méthode de transformation pour ef-
fectuer la correspondance du RdPCH. Les liens hiérarchiques entre les machines connectées
sont exprimées par la clause « INCLUDES » et les opérations prédéfinies dans les machines
du niveau supérieur. En outre, nous introduisons un ensemble de règles de classification
des places dans diﬀérentes machines. Enfin, nous considérons les priorités de transition de
RdP et créons un mécanisme de gestion de priorité pour réaliser les opérations prioritaires
dans les machines abstraites. Quelques nouveaux éléments sont ajoutés dans le cadre de
la transformation, y compris une variable globale, un ensemble et une opération de gestion
des priorités. Par la condition préalable des opérations basée sur la priorité, nous pouvons
réaliser les fonctions similaires à celle des transitions priorisées.
Perspectives
Pour la parti théorique, le cadre du modèle et le cadre de la transformation de modèles
sont extensibles, en eﬀet, un certain nombre de facteurs ne sont pas pris en compte. Dans
les recherches futures, on peut introduire le mode de défaillance dans le modèle RdPC ou
encore considérer la transformation de « système-unique ».
Du point du vue pratique, cette thèse se place dans le projet PERFECT qui étudie la mise
en œuvre de la sécurité de l’ERTMS en France. Les règles de fonctionnement de l’ERTMS
sont spécifiés par la langage B dans certains recherches [Ben-ayed, Collart-Dutilleul, Bon,
Idani, et al. 2014; Ben-ayed, Collart-Dutilleul, Bon, Ledru, et al. 2014]. Le travail d’intégration
des travaux de Ben-Ayed est une perspective intéressante.
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AppendixA
Definition of coloured Petri nets and
related concepts
The Appendix provides a formal definition of coloured Petri net and the definitions of the
related concepts which are utilized throughout the thesis. This appendix begin with intro-
ducing some background knowledge regarding the CPN definitions. Then we introduce the
concept of set and multi-set used in the thesis, which is based on the standard [IOS/IEC
2002]. Next, the definition of non-hierarchical CPN and HCPN, adopted from [Jensen and
Kristensen 2009], is presented. Finally, we introduce the Transition priorities. In order
to keep the definitions self consistent, we adapt and integrate the definitions of Best and
Koutny 1992; Westergaard and Verbeek 2013 into Kurt Jensen’s definition framework.
Background
CPN can be represented in two diﬀerent ways [Jensen 1987]:
1. Graphically, by expressing in directed bipartite graphs with place, transition, arcs, ini-
tial markings and complementary inscriptions.
2. Algebraically, by providing a many tuple mathematical definition of sets and functions
In Jensen’s theory both forms are equivalent, and he provide a translation procedure
between them [Jensen 1987]. Later the extended (hierarchical and time concepts) graphical
and algebraic forms are provided in [Jensen and Kristensen 2009].
Sets and multi-sets
Sets
In mathematics, a set is a collection of numbers or distinct objects.
Let N = {0,1,2, · · · } denote the set of natural numbers. Let bool = {true, f alse}. Then we
have the following relations:
• true ∈ bool
• ∅ ⊆ bool
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• bool ⊆ bool
• {true} ⊂ bool
• {true} ∪ {f alse} = bool
• 3 < bool
• Na = {4,2,1,3} = {1,2,3,4} = {1,2,2,3,3,4,1,1}
• Na =Nb if and only if Na ⊆Nb and Na ⊇Nb.
Multi-sets
Definition A.1. A multi-set B over a basis set A is a maplet function:
B : A→N
In the CPN’s framework, the function B associates a natural number with each of the
basis elements. A multi-set can be noted as a symbolic sum of basis elements scaled by their
numbers: B =
∑
a∈AB(a) ∗ a. For example, if A = (x,y) then B = 2x + 3y is the symbolic sum
representation of the multi-set {(x,2), (y,3)}.
Set of multi-sets
The colour set of a place in CPNs is a set of multi-sets.
Definition A.2. Let C be the set of all multi-set over A, where C = [A→N ] and Let B1,B2 ∈
C, then the following relations exists:
• B1 = B2 ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A,B1(a) = B1(b)
• B1 ≤ B2 ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A,B1(a) ≤ B1(b)
• for n ∈N,B = n ∗B1 ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A,B1(a) = n ∗B1(b)
Definition of coloured Petri nets
Non-hierarchical coloured Petri nets
This basis definitions are adopt from the book of “Coloured Petri nets: modelling and valida-
tion of concurrent systems” [Jensen and Kristensen 2009] and the papers of Westergaard and
Verbeek [Westergaard and Verbeek 2011, 2013].
DefinitionA.3. Anon-hierarchical CPN is a nine-tuple CPN = (P,T ,A,Σ,V ,C,G,E,I ), where:
(i) P is a finite set of places.
(ii) T is a finite set of transitions, P ∩ T = φ.
(iii) A ⊆ P ×T ∪ T ×P is a finite set of arcs, .
(iv) Σ is a finite set of non-empty colour sets.
(v) V is a finite set typed variables, Type[v] ∈ Σ for all variables v ∈ V .
(vi) C : P→ Σ is a colour set function that assigns a colour set to each place
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(vii) G : T → EXPRv is a guard function, that assigns a guard to each transition, ∀t ∈ T
such that Type[G(t)] = Bool and Type[Var(G(t))] ⊆ Σ.
(viii) E : A→ EXPRv is an arc expression function, that assigns an expression to each arc,
∀a ∈ A that Type[E(a)] = C(p)MS and Type[Var(E(t))] ⊆ Σ.
(ix) I : P → EXPRφ is an initialisation function, that assigns an initialisation expression
to each place, ∀p ∈ P that Type[I(p)] = C(p)MS.
Enabling and Occurrence rules of non-hierarchical coloured Petri nets
To formally define the behaviour of CPNs, some semantic concepts and notations should be
introduced.
Definition A.4. For a CPN, there exists the following concepts:
(i) A marking M is a mapping from places into multi-set of tokens, for ∀p ∈ P : M(p) ∈
C(p)MS,
(ii) The initial markingM0 is defined as ∀p ∈ P :M0(p) = I(p)〈〉.
(iii) The variables of a transition t is denoted asVar(t) ⊆ V and Var(t) = {v | v ∈ Var(G(t))∨
∃a ∈ A : v ∈ Var(E(a))}.
(iv) A binding of a transition t is a function b that maps each variable v ∈ Var(t) into a
value b(v) ∈ Type[v]. The set of all bindings for t is denoted by B(t).
(v) A binding element is a couple (t,b) where t ∈ T and b ∈ B(t). The set of all binding
elements in a CPN is denoted as BE.
(vi) An arc expression is E(p,t) or E(t,p) denote the arc expression on the input or output
arc from p to t. In an enabled binding element (t,b), the multi-set of tokens removed
from an input place p when t occurs in a binding b is given by E(p,t)〈b〉, and E(t,p)〈b〉
is the multi-set of tokens added to an output place p.
The behaviours of a CPN are the transfer of tokens, which are based on the enabling
rules of the binding elements, there are represented as following.
Definition A.5. In the marking M , a binding element (t,b) ∈ BE is called enabled if and
only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) G(t)〈b〉 = ture
(ii) ∀p ∈ P : E(p,t)〈b〉 ≪=M(p).
After the firing the enabled transition t, the new marking of the system is:
(iii) ∀p ∈ P :M ′(p) = (M(p)−−E(p,t)〈b〉) + +E(t,p)〈b〉.
The operator “++” takes two multi-sets as arguments and returns the union (the sum).
In the same way, the operator “−−” the subtraction of two multi-sets.
The enabling and occurrence of steps can be summarised in a more general form, in
which the Definition A.5 is a special case of the definition below.
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Definition A.6. A step Y ∈ BEMS is enabled in a markingM if and only if the following two
properties are satisfied:
(i) ∀(t,b) ∈ Y : G(t)〈b〉 = ture
(ii) ∀p ∈ P :
++
MS
∑
(t,b)∈Y
E(p,t)〈b〉 ≪=M(p).
After the firing the enabled the step Y , the new markingM ′ of the system is:
(iii) ∀p ∈ P :M ′(p) = (M(p)−−
++
MS
∑
(t,b)∈Y
E(p,t)〈b〉++
++
MS
∑
(t,b)∈Y
E(t,p)〈b〉.
When a step Y occurs in marking M1, producing a new marking M2, it can be denoted
asM1
Y
−→M2.
Definition A.7. Let an infinite occurrence sequence beM
Y1
−→M1
Y2
−→M2
Y
−→ ·· · , then the set
of marking reachable from the markingM is denoted as R(M).
Module of hierarchy
The hierarchy ofHCPNs is represented bymodules, eachmodule constituting a non-hierarchical
CPN as defined in Definition A.3. This means that each module can have its local colour
set definitions and declarations of typed variables. Meanwhile, it should contain the infor-
mation of hierarchical links. The definition of module in a HCPN model is based on the
descriptions below.
Definition A.8. A CPNmodule is a four-tuple CPNM = (CPN,Tsub,Pport ,PT ), where:
(i) CPN = (P,T ,A,Σ,V ,C,G,E,I ) is a non-hierarchical CPN.
(ii) Tsub ⊆ T is a set of substitution transitions.
(iii) Pport ⊆ T is a set of port places.
(iv) PT : Pport → {IN, OUT, I/O} is a port type function that assigns a port type to each
port place.
Hierarchical coloured Petri nets
A HCPN model consists of a finite set S of sub-modules. Each sub-module s ∈ S is defined
in the Definition A.8. Such modules can exchange tokens via port-socket relations. The port
places Pport in the sub-modules and the socket place Psock in the upper level modules are re-
lated. The socket type function ST : Psock → {IN,OUT ,IO} that assigns a sock type to each
Psock . It is also possible for modules to exchange tokens via fusion sets, which allow places
in diﬀerent modules to be glued together into one compound place across the hierarchical
structure of the model. Then, the definition of a HCPNmodel is described as below.
Definition A.9. A HCPN is a four-tuple CPNH = (S,SF,PS,FS), where:
(i) S is a finite set of sub-modules. s = ((Ps,T s,As,Σs,V s,Cs,Gs,Es, I s),Psport ,T
s
sub,PT
s). It
should be noted that, for all s1, s2 ∈ S and s1 , s2 such that (Ps1 ∪ T s1)∩ (Ps2 ∪ T s2) = φ.
APPENDIX A. 191
(ii) SF : Tsub → S is a sub-module function that assigns a sub-module to each substitution
transition. It is required that the module hierarchy be acyclic.
(iii) PS is a port-socket relation function that assigns a port-socket relation PS(t) ⊆ Psock(t)×
P
SF(t)
port to each substitution transition t. It is required that ST (p) = PT (p
′), and I(p)〈〉 =
I(p′)〈〉 for ∀(p,p′) ∈ PS(t) and ∀t ∈ Tsub
(iv) FS ⊆ 2P is a set of non-empty fusion sets such that C(p) = C(p′) and I(p)〈〉 = I(p′)〈〉 for
∀p,p′ ∈ f s and ∀f s ∈ FS.
The definition below summarises the definition of the module hierarchy.
Definition A.10. The module hierarchy for a HCPN is a direct graph MH = (NMH ,AMH ),
where
(i) NMH = S is the set of nodes.
(ii) AMH = {(s1, t, s2) ∈NMH ×Tsub ×NMH | t ∈ T
s1
sub ∧ s2 = SF(t)} is the set of arc.
(iii) The roots of MH are called prime modules, and the set of all prime modules is de-
noted SPM .
(iv) For amodule s ∈ S, the set ofmodule instances isMI s = {(s′ , t1t2 · · · tn, s) ∈ SPM×T ∗sub×S |
s′
t1t2···tn
−−−−−−→ s is a path inMH}, The set of all instance of modules is denoted MI , where
T ∗sub is to denote the set of all finite sequences of substitution transition. If the sequence
is empty it will be denoted by ε.
(v) The instance hierarchy of CPNH is directed graph IH = (NIH ,AIH ), where NIH =MI
is the set of nodes, and AIH = {((s′, t1t2 · · · tn, s1), t, (s′ , t1t2 · · · tn, s2)) ∈ NIH ×Tsub × TIH} is
the set of arcs.
Instances and compound places
The following definition describes the definition of place and transition instances, and of
compound places.
Definition A.11. Let CPNH = (S,SF,PS,FS) be a HCPN and let IH = (NIH ,AIH) be the
instance hierarchy of CPNH .
(i) The set of all place instances PIp = {(p,s∗) | s∗ ∈ MI s}. The set of all transition in-
stances T It = {(t, s∗) | s∗ ∈ MI s}. The set of all place instances and all transition in-
stances is denoted by PI and T I .
(ii) The place instance relation ∼cp PI ×PI is the smallest equivalence relation containing
all those pairs ((p1, s
∗
1), (p2, s
∗
2)) that satisfy at least one of the following two conditions:
(a) A fusion set f s ∈ FS exists, such that p1,p2 ∈ f s.
(b) An arc (s∗1, t, s
∗
2) ∈ AIH exists, such that p1,p2 ∈ PS(t)
(iii) The equivalence classes determined by ∼cp are called compound places. The set of
compound places is denoted [PI ]. For a place instance p∗ we use [p∗] to denote the
compound place to which p∗ belongs.
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The concepts of variables of transitions, bindings, binding elements are defined in a way
similar to that for non-hierarchical CPNmodels.
Definition A.12. For a HCPN, the following concepts exist:
(i) A marking is a function M that maps each compound place [p∗] into a multi-set of
tokensM([p∗]) ∈ C(p)MS, where (p,s∗) is any place instance belonging to [p∗].
(ii) The initial markingM0 is defined byM0([p∗]) = I(p)〈〉.
(iii) The variables of a transition t∗ of a transition t are denoted as Var(t∗) and defined by
Var(t∗) = Var(t) .
(iv) A binding of a transition t∗ of a transition t ∈ T − Tsub is a function b that maps each
variable v ∈ Var(t∗) into a value b(v) ∈ Type[v]. The set of all bindings for a transition
instance t∗ is denoted by B(t∗).
(v) A binding element is a couple (t∗,b) that t∗ ∈ T is a transition instance of a transition
t ∈ T −Tsub and b ∈ B(t∗). BE(t) denotes the set of all binding elements for a transition
instance t∗, BE(t∗) ={(t∗,b) | b ∈ B(t∗)}. The set of all binding elements in a CPN is
denoted as BE.
Enabling and Occurrence rules of hierarchical coloured Petri nets
The enabling and occurrence of a binding element is defined as follow.
Definition A.13. A binding element (t∗,b) ∈ BEMS is enabled in a markingM if and only if
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) G(t∗)〈b〉 = ture
(ii) ∀pcp ∈ [PI ] :
++
MS
∑
(t∗,b)∈BEMS,p∗∈Pcp
E(p∗, t∗)〈b〉 ≤M(pcp)
If (t∗,b) is enabled inM , it may occur, the new markingM ′ defined as:
∀pcp ∈ [PI ] :M ′(pcp) = (M(pcp)−−
++
MS
∑
(t∗,b)∈BEMS,p∗∈Pcp
E(p∗, t∗)〈b〉) + +
++
MS
∑
(t∗,b)∈BEMS,p∗∈Pcp
E(t∗,p∗)〈b〉.
Transition priorities
For low-level PNs, static priorities are defined in Best and Koutny 1992, which are relational
static priorities. For high-level PNs, CPN Tools support the absolute static priority concept,
which is described in Westergaard and Verbeek 2013.
As we are using the Kurt Jensen’s definition form in our research, while the publication
above using other forms of PN definitions. To normalize the all the definition, we adapt and
integrate the definitions of Best and Koutny 1992; Westergaard and Verbeek 2013 into Kurt
Jensen’s definition framework. Then, we have the definitions as below:
Definition A.14. Static Priority (Def. 3.1 in Best and Koutny 1992,Def. 3 in Westergaard
and Verbeek 2013) A static priority system is a pair (CPN,ρ), which:
1. CPN = (P,T ,A,Σ,V ,C,G,E,I ) is a CPN.
2. ρ : T → P is a priority function that assigns a priority to each transition.
APPENDIX A. 193
3. P is a finite set of natural numbers, called the priorities of the transitions.
The priorities in Definition A.14 are global and do not depend on the binding of the
transition. Intuitively, if ρ(t) < ρ(t′) then t′ has priority over t. Precisely, it means that t′ has
the priority to be enabled than t. When dealing with such priority systems, we say that if a
transition is enabled according to Definition A.5, it is pre-enabled. Then, we can have the
new enabling rules for priority systems as follows:
Definition A.15. Enabling with Priority (Def. 3.3 in Best and Koutny 1992,Def. 4 in West-
ergaard and Verbeek 2013). A transition t ∈ T is enabled in the marking M if it is pre-
enabled and no transition t′ with ρ(t) < ρ(t′) is pre-enabled.
The algorithm for checking enablingwith priority in CPNTools is shown in Algorithm A.1.
First, It sorts all transitions according to priority and processes them highest-priority-first
until it reaches t. If it finds a pre-enabled transition with higher priority than t, it returns
false. If it does not find a pre-enabled transition with higher priority than t it returns the
pre-enable status of t.
Algorithm A.1 Algorithm for checking enabling with prior-
ity (Algorithm 3 in [Westergaard and Verbeek 2013])
1: SortedTransitions← PrioritySort(T)
2: After any transitions or initialisation
3: procedure CheckEnablingPriority(t) is
4: for all t′ ∈ SortedTransitions do
5: if ρ(t′) > ρ(t) then
6: if CheckEnabling(t′) then
7: return false
8: else
9: return CheckEnabling(t)
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Model based system engineering for safety of railway critical systems
Abstract
Development and application of formal languages are a long-standing challenge within the computer sci-
ence domain. One particular challenge is the acceptance of industry. Although many successful stories have
demonstrated the applicability of formal methods to industrial practice, their use within industry is still lim-
ited. This thesis presents some model-based methodologies for modelling and verification of the French rail-
way interlocking systems (RIS), which aims to use formal methods to eﬀectively ensure railway traﬃc safety.
This thesis mainly addresses two issues. The first one is the modellization of interlocking system by
coloured Petri nets (CPNs). Next, a generic and compact modelling framework is introduced, in which the
interlocking rules are modelled in a hierarchical structure while the railway layout is modelled in a geographi-
cal perspective. Then, a modelling pattern is presented. It is a parameterized model which respects the French
national rules. It is a general reusable solution that can be applied in diﬀerent stations. Then, an event-based
concept is brought into the modelling process of low level part of RIS to have better description of internal
interactions of low level relay-based interlocking logic.
The second issue is the transformation of coloured Petri nets into B machines, which can assist designers
on the way from analysis to implementation. A mechanism describing the multi-sets and their behaviours in
B machines is introduced to allow the following systematic translations. Firstly, a detailed mapping method-
ology from non-hierarchical CPNs to abstract B machine notations is presented. Then the hierarchy and the
transition priority of CPNs are successively integrated into the mapping process, in order to enrich the adapt-
ability of the transformation. This transformation is compatible with various types of colour sets and the
transformed Bmachines can be automatically proved by Atelier B.
All these works at diﬀerent levels contribute towards a global safe analysis framework.
Keywords: railway interlocking system, discrete event systems, CPN, modelling methodology
Ingénierie de modèle pour la sécurité des systèmes critiques ferroviaires
Résumé
Le développement et l’application des langages formels sont un défi à long terme pour la science informa-
tique. Un enjeu particulier est l’acceptation par l’industrie. Malgré des succès industriels avérés, la dissémina-
tion des méthodes formelles dans la pratique industrielle ferroviaire est encore limitée. Cette thèse présente
une approche pour la modélisation et la vérification des postes d’aiguillage français, qui utilise les méthodes
formelles pour assurer eﬃcacement la sécurité ferroviaire.
Cette thèse se concentre sur deux questions. La première est la modélisation du système d’enclenchement
par les réseaux de Petri colorés (RdPC). Un cadre de modélisation générique et compact est introduit, dans le-
quel les règles d’enclenchement sont modélisées dans une structure hiérarchique, tandis que les installations
sont modélisées dans une perspective géographique. Ensuite, un patron de modèle est présenté. C’est un mo-
dèle paramétré qui intègre les règles nationales françaises. C’est une solution générale et réutilisable qui peut
être appliquée pour diﬀérentes gares. Puis, un concept basé sur l’événement est présenté dans le processus
de modélisation des parties basses des postes d’aiguillage. Ce dernier fournit une meilleure description des
interactions internes de la logique d’enclenchement à relais.
La deuxième question est la transformation des RdPCs en machines B, qui va aider les concepteurs sur la
route de l’analyse à application. Des mécanismes décrivant les multi-ensembles et leurs comportements dans
les machines B sont introduits. Il permettent la transformation systématique. Tout d’abord, une méthodologie
détaillée, s’appuyant sur une table de correspondance, du RdPCs non-hiérarchiques vers les notations B est
présentée. Ensuite, la hiérarchie et la priorité des transitions du RdPC sont successivement intégrées dans le
processus de mapping, afin d’enrichir les possibilités de types de modèles en entrées de la transformation.
Cette transformation est compatible avec diﬀérents types d’ensemble de couleurs, et la structure des machines
B produites par la transformation permet la preuve automatique intégrale par l’Atelier B.
L’ensemble de ces travaux , chacun à leur niveau, contribuent à renforcer l’eﬃcacité d’un cadre global
d’analyse sécuritaire.
Mots clés : système d’enclenchement ferroviaire, systèmes à événements discrets, RdPC, méthode
de modélisation
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